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Thesis Summary 
 This thesis investigated the long held claim that reliance on routines and rituals 
(restricted and repetitive behaviours [RRB]) is related to a difficulty with flexibly 
generating novel ideas (imagination) in those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).   
The sparse body of previous research into this relationship has yielded equivocal 
findings.  Therefore the main aim of this thesis was to address the question: what is 
the nature of the relationship, if any, between imagination and RRBs in individuals with 
ASD? 
 In order to test this relationship, I developed the first self-report measure of 
RRBs suitable for use with autistic adults, the Adult Repetitive Behaviours 
Questionnaire-2 (RBQ-2A), which has since been published in the Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders.  In Study One I tested the RBQ-2A with neurotypical (NT) 
adults and showed that it is a reliable and valid measure of RRB, comprising two 
components: repetitive motor behaviours (RMB) and insistence on sameness (IS).  
Study Two showed that autistic adults scored significantly higher on the RBQ-2A 
compared to NT adults, and in a larger sample of autistic adults (Study Three), three 
components were identified: RMB, repetitive sensory behaviours (RSB) and IS.  In 
Study Four, significant associations between RBQ-2A score and the imagination 
subscale of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient were found; although this relationship was 
unstable.  More convincingly, participants who reported not playing pretend as a child 
showed significantly higher levels of IS, and a more limited pattern of self-chosen 
activities, compared to participants who did play pretend.  Finally, a range of 
imagination measures were administered to a small sample of autistic adults (Study 
Five).  There was a great deal of variation in performance on imagination tasks, but 
none of these measures correlated with each other.  There were also no significant 
relationships between these tasks and the RBQ-2A. However, 89% of participants 
reported both impoverished past pretend play and a limited pattern of self-chosen 
activities.  
 In summary, in this thesis I showed that the conceptualisation of imagination in 
ASD is incomplete and suggested a conceptualisation of imagination for future 
research, comprising the key components of generativity, novelty and flexibility.  I also 
showed that the RBQ-2A is a reliable and valid self-report measure of RRBs in autistic 
adults.  Finally, in terms of the nature of the relationship between imagination and 
RRBs, I provided evidence that this relationship is restricted to IS and past pretend 
play; that is, individuals with ASD who showed poor pretend play as children go on to 
behave in a more restricted manner in later life.  However, this is a weak relationship, 
and individuals with ASD may still show high levels of creativity in other domains. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
 “Thus, a six-year-old boy had the ambition to collect 1,000 
matchboxes, a goal which he pursued with fanatical energy.  
The mother, however, never saw him play trains with them as 
other children do.” (p. 82) 
- Asperger (1944) 
“The toddler with autism may spin the wheels of a toy car 
instead of pretending to park or clean it, while the adult with 
autism may show no interest in fiction in the form of TV soaps 
or novels, preferring to read telephone directories…” (p. 19) 
- Happé (1999) 
 The earliest accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) describe the 
behavioural inflexibility that characterises autistic individuals to varying degrees 
(Asperger, 1944; Kanner, 1943).  This behavioural inflexibility is reflected in markedly 
restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviours and actions, coupled with a strong 
desire to maintain sameness in the environment.  These behaviours are now grouped 
together under one umbrella term: restricted and repetitive behaviours (RRB).  
However, Happé (1999) noted that early observations of RRB have also been depicted 
as evidence of impaired imaginative ability (Wing & Gould, 1979).  It has been argued 
that a difficulty with imagination is the central difficulty of ASD (e.g. Harris, 2000; 
Wing, Gould & Gillberg, 2011), such that autistic individuals find it difficult to 
symbolically store abstract concepts from their experience and therefore struggle to 
use such concepts when reacting to daily life or thinking about the future (Wing, 
Gould, Yeates & Brierly, 1977).  This results in an inflexibility of thought as a 
counterpart to behavioural inflexibility.  Indeed, lack of imaginative activity and 
preference for repetition in ASD have been described as two sides of the same coin 
(Turner, 1999b). 
Traditionally the main criteria for ASD have been conceptualised as a “triad of 
impairments” (Wing & Gould, 1979), comprising difficulties in social interaction and 
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communication, with the final component comprising difficulties in imagination co-
occurring with RRBs.  This formulation of the triad has been generally accepted in the 
literature (Honey, Leekam, Turner & McConachie, 2007); for example Best, Arora, 
Porter and Doherty (2015) assert that “the deficit in imagination is manifested as 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities” (p. 4064).  In 
contrast, imagination is categorised with social and communication difficulties in 
international diagnostic manuals and according to Jarrold (2003) the reasoning for this 
is not entirely clear.  
Nevertheless, researchers continue to make a theoretical case for the 
relationship – or shared underlying mechanisms - between RRBs and imagination in 
ASD (e.g. Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg & Stegge, 2009; Boucher, 2007).  For example, it 
has been suggested that a difficulty with imagining the future may explain the elevated 
presence of RRBs in ASD (Jackson & Atance, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Williams, 
Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Terrett et al., 2013).  According to this argument, imagining the 
future (along with remembering the past) has an evolutionary advantage in that this 
ability increases behavioural flexibility (e.g. Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), allowing 
individuals to imagine different scenarios based on previous experience and plan for 
new scenarios.  If an individual however is not able to imagine or plan for the future, 
this may lead to a preference for familiar routines and environments.  Clinicians 
maintain the importance of imagination in ASD, particularly in terms of diagnosis.  Yet 
imagination is downplayed in international diagnostic manuals and the apparent 
relationship between RRBs and imagination in ASD has received little attention in 
terms of empirical work (see section 1.3, page 50 for a review).  Furthermore, the 
existing evidence base for this relationship is equivocal.  Therefore the main aim of this 
thesis is to further investigate the relationship between inflexibility of thought and 
behaviour – in other words, imagination and RRBs. 
Specifically, I aim to address this relationship in adults with ASD, including 
Asperger’s syndrome (AS).  Although adults are generally under-represented in ASD 
research (Pellicano, Dinsmore & Charman, 2014), there is a particularly striking lack of 
research regarding imagination in autistic adults.  Imaginative difficulties in ASD are 
generally measured in research and diagnosis in terms of a lack of or impoverished 
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childhood pretend play (e.g. Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Hobson, Hobson, Malik, 
Bargiota & Caló , 2013; Rutherford, Young, Hepburn & Rogers, 2007; Wing et al., 1977), 
which is not the most useful indicator of current imaginative ability for most adults 
seeking a diagnosis.  Moreover, in adult psychiatry, the assessment of a person’s sense 
of reality and inner world forms an important aspect of the diagnosis of overlapping 
conditions such as bipolar disorder.  Given the increasing numbers of individuals who 
are being diagnosed with ASD as adults, it is important to understand the relationship 
between imagination and RRBs, and imagination more generally, in autistic adults. 
Before the relationship between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults can be 
assessed, two related issues ought to be addressed.  The first issue is the discrepancy 
between the RRB literature and the imagination literature.  RRBs in ASD have been 
thoroughly researched, and a large body of work has been developed surrounding this 
phenomenon.  Although it should be noted that there are still many issues that are 
unresolved in RRBs, in comparison the subject of imagination has been somewhat 
neglected.  Much work has focused on the definition, conceptualisation and 
measurement of RRBs, whereas there have been few attempts to formally 
conceptualise and define imagination, and imagination has been measured across 
several contexts using a variety of methods.  Furthermore, a review of the literature 
reveals that the findings from studies of autistic imagination are equivocal (see section 
1.1.3, page 22) and while certain tests of imagination are failed by autistic individuals, 
they succeed in others; indeed there are many autistic individuals who are successful 
artists, musicians, poets and inventors (e.g. Bogdashina, 2003; Lawson, 2011).  This 
discrepancy between the two literatures may serve as an explanation for why the 
evidence base is so poor in terms of the relationship between imagination and RRBs. 
The second issue concerns how to measure RRBs in autistic adults.  I have 
noted that there has been much work regarding the measurement of RRBs, and I 
review this in section 1.2 (page 34).  However, many of these measures rely on parent-
report.  As I am investigating the relationship between imagination and RRBs in autistic 
adults, parent-report is not necessarily the ideal method.  For example, parents of 
adults are more likely to have passed away.  In the case of adults who have moved 
away from home, their parents may be unable to report as accurately on their child’s 
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RRBs.  Autistic adults may have also learned to ‘mask’ their RRBs and therefore they 
may not be as accessible to any observer.  In a similar vein, observational methods are 
limited in accessing a complete picture of RRBs as they are time-limited and depend on 
the behaviour manifesting itself during the observational setting.  Therefore as an 
additional aim of this thesis, I developed a self-report measure of RRBs for autistic 
adults: the Adult Repetitive Behaviours Questionnaire – 2 (RBQ-2A; see Chapter Two, 
pages 63-64 for an explanation of this decision).  I began this work in a Master’s 
dissertation (Barrett, 2013), and I continue it in this thesis, by assessing the reliability 
and validity of the RBQ-2A. 
This chapter will address the first issue, beginning with a conceptual analysis of 
imagination in ASD research, and the formulation of a working definition for this 
thesis.  I will then briefly review the different methods used to assess imagination and 
discuss what we have learned from these methods, focussing on two key issues that 
arise from the initial review; specifically, imagination in adulthood and the different 
dimensions of the imagination construct.  I will then turn to RRB in order to address 
the second issue discussed above.  The literature regarding the conceptualisation and 
measurement of RRBs will be reviewed, as will the literature regarding the 
presentation of RRBs in autistic adults, as this may differ from children and 
adolescents.  Finally I will bring these two literatures together and discuss the previous 
research that has addressed the relationship between imagination and RRBs, what the 
limitations of the research are, and how I plan to improve upon these limitations.  
Chapter Two will outline some of the methodological issues that arose from this plan 
and how I addressed them.  Chapters Three and Four will describe the development 
and testing of the RBQ-2A, including analysing data from this questionnaire using 
principal components analysis (PCA).  Chapters Four and Five will address the 
measurement and presentation of imagination in autistic adults, and whether 
imagination and RRBs are related to each other in this population. 
1.1 Imagination in ASD 
1.1.1 Definition and conceptual analysis of imagination 
 One of the biggest obstacles in understanding the literature on imagination and 
ASD is the lack of a standardised definition.  Imagination has not been defined 
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consistently throughout research in ASD, and has been measured across a wide range 
of contexts using various methods, ranging from pretend play, to thinking about the 
future, to traditional measures of creativity such as drawing and writing.  The 
combination of the large variety of measures used and lack of a consistent definition 
has resulted in an incoherent literature.  As such, although imagination is generally 
considered impaired within ASD, the evidence for this is equivocal.  Even when a 
difficulty is found, this is not always ASD-specific (e.g. Craig, Baron-Cohen & Scott, 
2001) or due to problems with imagination itself (e.g. Allen & Craig, 2016).  Therefore 
it is important to begin this review of imagination with a conceptual analysis and 
attempt to define imagination in a way that is relevant to ASD.  I will begin by 
considering the definition of imagination outside of ASD research, such as its everyday 
use and how it has been defined by developmental psychologists and creativity 
researchers.  I will then discuss how imagination in relation to ASD has been defined by 
researchers and clinicians, before pulling together these different perspectives in order 
to formulate a definition of imagination for the purposes of this thesis. 
 A useful starting point is the use of the word in everyday language.  Imagination 
is defined in various ways, for example the following definitions from the Oxford 
English Dictionary Online (2015): 
1. a) The power or capacity to form internal images or ideas of 
objects and situations not actually present to the senses, 
including remembered objects and situations, and those 
constructed by mentally combining or projecting images of 
previously experienced qualities, objects, and situations. Also 
(esp. in modern philosophy): the power or capacity by which the 
mind integrates sensory data in the process of perception. 
3. The mental consideration of future or potential actions or 
events. 
5. The mind's creativity and resourcefulness in using and 
inventing images, analogies, etc.; poetic or artistic genius or 
talent. Also: an individual's poetic or artistic genius or talent.  
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 Therefore, even in its everyday use, the word imagination represents a 
complex construct.  The first definition is a more general explanation of what is meant 
by imagination, and includes a discussion of the origins of imagination; in other words, 
we construct new thoughts and images by combining our previous experiences.  The 
latter definitions comprise two examples of imagination that have already been 
mentioned in relation to ASD research: thinking about the future and creativity.   
 However, in psychological terms, the construct of imagination – or creativity – 
has not been well-defined.  Psychological constructs are inherently abstract concepts 
and therefore cannot be directly observed or measured, and in some cases they 
cannot be defined (e.g. Hospers, 1997; Kline, 2000).  One way of understanding a 
construct is to establish examples and counter-examples of the construct by setting up 
necessary and sufficient criteria for that construct (e.g. Bozeman & Feeney, 2007; 
Hospers, 1997).  There have been few attempts to properly define the construct of 
imagination or creativity within the literature on imagination in ASD, although ASD 
researchers have been influenced by developmental psychologists and creativity 
researchers who have written on the subject.  The following sections will briefly 
examine how imagination and creativity have been defined in research and clinical 
terms, and will pull out the necessary and sufficient criteria for this construct. 
1.1.1.1 Influence outside of the ASD literature 
 Early psychological theories of imagination focus on symbolic play as the 
earliest indicator of imagination in children.  Vygotsky (1966) argued that play is 
essential for the development of abstract thought, by separating objects from their 
meanings.  In more general terms, Vygotsky (2004) argued that our brains combine 
and creatively rework elements of our previous experience and from these generate 
new ideas and actions by combining them in novel ways.  Following on from this, 
Vygotsky also argued that the older a person and the more varied their experiences 
then the richer their imagination.  This relates to some modern work showing that 
diversifying experiences increase the creativity of individuals in terms of originality 
(e.g. Ritter et al., 2012). 
 Perhaps the most influential individual on our understanding of symbolic play 
in children was Piaget.  Piaget distinguished between two modes of thought: 
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accommodation and assimilation, arguing that “play is essentially assimilation” (p.87, 
Piaget, 1962).  Assimilation refers to the integration of external percepts and actions 
into an individual’s own limited schemata and cognitive or motor skills (Singer & 
Singer, 2013).  However, this mode of thought is eventually replaced by logic and 
rationality (Harris, 2000).  This account provides some insight into how play influences 
later cognitive skills, and has some aspects in common with Vygotsky’s (2004) 
description.  However, Piaget’s account of symbolic play has been criticised as taking a 
negative stance by Harris (2000), who argued that in Piaget’s view pretend play 
indicates that children have poor objective understanding of reality.  In contrast, Harris 
suggested that in pretend play children actually draw on their causal understanding of 
the physical and mental world, and that the consideration of alternate realities 
afforded by pretend play represents a move towards objective reality and is critical for 
making causal and moral judgements; therefore, this type of thinking is critical 
throughout an individual’s development.  Piaget was also criticised by Sutton-Smith 
(1966; cited in Singer & Singer, 2013) for not addressing the adaptive value of play for 
an individual’s ability to think flexibly.  Although these psychological explanations of 
imagination and creativity vary somewhat in details, all relate the importance of 
drawing on real-world experience and knowledge in a flexible manner. 
 Aside from the developmental psychology perspective, early research 
distinguished creative ability from more traditional concepts of intelligence.  Guilford 
(1959) hypothesised that there are two main strategies to solve a problem: divergent 
and convergent thinking.  Divergent thinking refers to the generation of several 
relevant ideas to solve a given problem, whereas convergent thinking refers to thought 
channelled in one direction to reach a single conclusion.  Guilford argued that creative 
individuals are more influenced by divergent thinking which comprises fluency (the 
generation of relevant ideas), flexibility and originality (analogous to novelty).  It has 
been argued that originality is the most important aspect of creativity (Wallach and 
Kogan, 1965).  Sousa’s (2009; cited in Newbold, 2013) definition of creativity expands 
on Guilford’s with the inclusion of elaboration as a dimension.   
 A more recent conceptualisation of creativity that is commonly referenced is 
the ability to produce outputs that are novel and appropriate for the current task or 
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situation (e.g. Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  This is a clear definition of creativity; however, it 
does not necessarily encapsulate all forms of imagination.  A person may daydream 
about the future without producing any outputs and they can still be said to be 
imagining the future.  Therefore although producing an output is a necessary criterion 
for creativity, it is a sufficient but not necessary criteria for imagination.  This 
distinction between imagination and creativity is an important one that has not been 
fully resolved (e.g. Lawson, 2011; Scott, 2013), but is relevant to the conceptualisation 
of imagination.  I suggest that a compromise can be reached by considering 
imagination the mental process, and creativity the production of outputs related to 
these mental processes.  Therefore creativity requires imagination, but imagination 
does not necessarily lead to creativity.  Whereas a clear definition relating to creativity 
has emerged from this literature, the construct of imagination remains ill-defined. 
1.1.1.2 How has imagination been defined in ASD research? 
 Few ASD researchers explicitly define or set out their criteria for imagination, 
and there is no consensus among those that do.  In their seminal paper, Wing and 
Gould (1979) described the lack of imaginative and symbolic activities, including 
pretend play, in a group of autistic children.  Wing et al. (1977) describe in more detail 
what is meant by imaginative activities: symbolic play; symbolic play with other 
children; inventing stories; modelling or drawing pictures with imaginative themes; 
lively discussion of past experiences.  Wing et al. (1977) also emphasised the 
importance of flexibility and variety of activity, which echoes Guilford’s (1959) 
conceptualisation of divergent thinking.  However, the originators of the triad of 
impairments in ASD have since clarified that they specifically refer to social 
imagination; this is the ability to foresee the consequences of their own and others’ 
actions and to act in an appropriate fashion, as well as learning from past experience 
and mistakes (Wing et al., 2011).  This is the clearest example of a definition of 
imagination in relation to ASD.  However, few imagination researchers have referred to 
this definition, potentially as a result of the overlap between social imagination and 
other social difficulties such as theory of mind (ToM).  
 Other ASD researchers have consulted the definitions of imagination in the 
typical literature, and applied this to ASD populations.  According to Scott and Baron-
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Cohen (1996), imagination often involves the ability to form a mental representation 
of entities and situations, specifically those that are non-veridical, and may involve the 
adaptation or combinations of existing concepts to create new ones.  This echoes 
Vygotsky’s (2004) argument that the generation of novelty involves a creative re-
combinatorial activity that reworks elements of past experiences.  Imagination 
depends and operates on previous experience, which is reflected in current theories 
and evidence regarding the relationship between imagination, thinking about the 
future and episodic memory (EM; e.g. Boucher, 2007; Terrett et al., 2013; Hassabis, 
Kumaran & Maguire, 2007).   
 Similarly, creativity is thought to involve the generation, manipulation and 
transformation of images to produce original representations (Flowers & Garbin, 1989; 
cited in Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999 and Scott, 2013); although this can only be applied 
to certain forms of imagination and not others (Scott, 2013).  Less precise definitions of 
creativity contrast it with conformity (Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Scott, 2013) and 
relate it to complexity (Lewis & Boucher, 1991).  Arguably then, Scott and Baron-
Cohen’s (1996) description encompasses more forms of imagination and creativity, as 
it can be applied to many different outputs, such as pretence (e.g. Scott, Baron-Cohen 
& Leslie, 1999), symbolic play (e.g. Honey et al., 2007), counterfactual reasoning (e.g. 
Leevers & Harris, 1998) and imagining the future (e.g. Lind & Bowler, 2010).  However, 
several ASD researchers endorse the more concrete conceptualisation of creativity 
involving generation of ideas that are both novel and appropriate (e.g. Ten Eycke & 
Müller, 2014; Pring, Ryder, Crane & Hermelin, 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2014).  This adds 
an extra level to the definitions of creativity in ASD research considered thus far, in 
that a response must be relevant to the task or situation, reflecting the way that 
creativity has been defined outside of the ASD literature (e.g. Runco & Jaegar, 2012), 
and further blurring the distinction between imagination and creativity.  From this 
overview however, there are several common elements that appear to be important to 
imagination: novelty, generativity, flexibility, the use of past experiences and adaptive 
responses. 
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1.1.1.3 How has imagination been defined in clinical terms? 
 In addition to the rearrangement of the diagnostic criteria so that imagination 
is placed with communication rather than RRBs, international diagnostic manuals tend 
to downplay the role of imagination in ASD (e.g. Honey et al., 2007)  and do not 
provide a clear definition of imagination for clinical purposes.  Within the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013) difficulties with shared social play and imagination are listed 
under social interaction and communication, with the example of age-appropriate 
flexible pretend play.  However, there is not a clear example of how imagination may 
manifest in adults. One of the International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision 
(ICD-10; World Health Organisation [WHO], 1993) criteria includes abnormal or 
impaired development of functional or symbolic play before the age of three years; 
although this is not a necessary criterion for diagnosis, which highlights what little 
importance is placed on imagination in formal diagnostic manuals.   
 Some guidance for clinicians and researchers can be found in diagnostic tools 
such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al, 2000; Lord, 
Rutter, DiLavore, Risi, Gotham & Bishop, 2012), the Autism Diagnostic Interview – 
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and the Diagnostic Interview for 
Social and Communication Disorders (DISCO; Leekam, Libby, Wing, Gould, & Taylor, 
2002; Wing, Leekam, Libby, Gould, & Larcombe, 2002).  The ADOS does not explicitly 
define imagination and creativity, but coding guidelines for younger and less verbally 
fluent participants specify the flexible, creative and representational use of objects 
beyond their physical properties, particularly in relation to pretend play which 
provides the predominant indicator of imagination in the ADOS.  For older, verbally 
fluent individuals imagination encompasses any form of creativity or inventiveness 
shown by the individual throughout the session.  While this is a somewhat more 
detailed description of imagination in ASD compared to the DSM-5 and ICD-10, it 
remains vague as “creativity and inventiveness” are not explicitly defined or 
operationalised. 
 Again, the DISCO does not provide a specific definition of imagination in ASD. 
However, it does include a relatively detailed description and set of examples for how 
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imagination may be rated in both children and adults with ASD in its schedule.  This 
focuses on the developmental stages of imaginative play.   In addition to pretend play 
in young children it includes role play, inventing imaginary worlds, and lively, wide-
ranging curiosity.  However, it is emphasised that some apparently imaginative 
behaviours in children may be repetitive, or copied.  An additional item relates to 
shared imagination: the sharing of imaginative activities with peers.  Moreover the 
DISCO also provides guidance for assessing imagination in autistic adolescents and 
adults.  Some adults with ASD may display similar examples of imaginative activity as 
children with ASD (such as pretend play), whereas other adolescents and adults may 
invent imaginary scenarios.  According to the DISCO childhood imagination is the 
precursor to the ability to predict a range of possible consequences arising from past 
and present events, in other words, social imagination.   
 Overall, the diagnostic manuals and tools do not provide a consistent picture of 
the construct of imagination; rather they give vague definitions along with some 
examples of imaginative and creative behaviour.  However, some common themes do 
emerge: there is an emphasis on flexibility and inventiveness, the latter of which could 
reflect both generativity and novelty, which complements the key components 
identified from the previous sections. 
1.1.1.4 Summary and conclusion: Defining imagination 
 In summary, imagination and creativity have been poorly defined in the case of 
ASD.  As discussed, across the ASD literature, imagination and creativity have been 
defined in a number of ways, but a certain number of common elements were 
identified: the generation of novel mental representations; the flexible manipulation of 
these representations; and the adaptive or relevant nature of outputs (such as 
responses to a task).  Previous experience has also been identified as very important to 
imagination and creativity, although not always.  Arguably, previous experience 
contributes to imagination, but is not a component of imagination in the same way as 
fluency, originality and flexibility.  Similarly, whereas the adaptive (e.g. relevant and 
useful) nature of outputs is arguably very important in creativity, it is not very useful 
when considering other processes of imagination, such as daydreaming, which do not 
have an output.  In addition, there is the issue of social imagination; the definition on 
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page 8 can also be reduced into these elements as reacting to social situations relies 
on being able to flexibly generate appropriate actions based on previous experience, 
combining generativity, novelty and flexibility along with adaptive responses.  
Importantly however, imagination and creativity do not have to be socially oriented. 
 Therefore, I suggest that generativity, novelty, and flexibility form the key 
components of imagination, with past experience, adaptive outputs and social 
component as related concepts and creativity as the product of imagination.   A 
working definition of imagination for this thesis is the generation and flexible 
manipulation of existing concepts to form novel ideas, which may be rooted in past 
experience and may result in adaptive outputs (creativity), which is illustrated in Figure 
1 below, along with the related concept of social imagination. 
Figure 1-1 Diagram illustrating my conceptualisation of imagination in relation to research in ASD. 
 
Although this is still not a clear-cut definition of imagination, it encompasses 
the key components highlighted by previous researchers.  These elements have been 
identified during the literature review process as part of this thesis.  When conducting 
the review, I searched psychological databases for studies and reviews on imagination 
in ASD, using search terms such as imagination, creativity, drawing, pretend play, 
thinking about the future, and counterfactual reasoning.  These key elements were 
identified by my reading and reflecting on the literature, comparing different 
researchers’ definitions of imagination and what these definitions have in common.  In 
the previous sections I have provided examples of when researchers have defined 
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imagination using fluency/generativity (e.g. Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Ten Eycke & 
Müller), flexibility (e.g. Harris, 2000; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Vygotsky, 2004), 
originality/novelty (e.g. Wallach & Kogan, 1965; 2014; Pring et al., 2012; Takeuchi et 
al., 2014), or all three (e.g. Guilford, 1959).  I have also shown that several researchers 
emphasise the influence of memory or past experience (e.g. Hassabis et al., 2007; Scott 
& Baron-Cohen, 1996; Wing et al., 2011) and the importance of creative output (e.g. 
Runco & Jaegar, 2012).  These common themes across the literature led me to devise 
my definition and conceptualisation of imagination.  In the next section I consider 
different methods used to assess imagination and creativity in ASD, and how well they 
assess the key components of imagination. 
1.1.2 Overview of methods used to study imagination in ASD 
 Imagination in ASD has been measured in a variety of ways, according to the 
particular definitions of researchers.  Possibly the most extensively researched 
phenomenon has been play (see Jarrold, 2003 for a review).  In other studies, 
researchers have assessed related cognitive abilities such as generativity (e.g. Craig & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Liu, Shih & Ma, 2011; Pring et al., 2012), thinking about the future 
(e.g. Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014) and counterfactual reasoning (e.g. 
Morsanyi & Handley, 2012).  Other researchers have drawn on more general creativity 
tasks such as Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1968; Torrance, 
2008; see pages 14-16 & 18-20 for a discussion) and drawing and writing tasks.  These 
factors, coupled with the variety of definitions used for imagination in ASD research, 
and lack of guidance across international diagnostic manuals, make it difficult to 
compare results across studies.  Furthermore, many of these studies do not necessarily 
set out to measure imagination as a whole construct; rather they focus on one aspect 
of imagination such as generativity.  This section will discuss the conceptual strengths 
and weaknesses of these methods and how they relate to my current definition of 
imagination in order for me to decide which areas of imagination would be most 
appropriate to assess in this thesis.  This section will focus on the description and 
evaluation of methods, but see section 1.1.3 (page 22) for a discussion of what we 
have learned from these methods. 
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1.1.2.1 Pretend play 
 Much of the early work relating to imagination in ASD was carried out in studies 
of pretend play (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1987; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Wing et al., 
1977) and was heavily influenced by early researchers such as Piaget and Vygotsky.  
There are thought to be several levels of play in children, although these are not 
agreed upon by all researchers.  Most commonly researchers employ a framework of 
three levels of play: sensory-motor/exploratory play; functional play; and 
pretend/symbolic play (e.g. Leslie, 1987; Blanc, Adrien, Roux & Barthélémy, 2005; 
Rutherford et al., 2007).  Pretend/symbolic play is distinct from the earlier two levels 
of play in that it requires an element of mental representation and acting ‘as if’ 
something is the case (e.g. Leslie, 1987; Lillard et al., 2013).  This can take many forms: 
pretending an object is something else (e.g. a banana is a telephone), attributing 
properties to an object that it does not possess (e.g. a doll is alive) and pretending that 
an absent object is actually present (Baron-Cohen, 1987).  Pretend play may be 
assessed in terms of parental responses to questionnaires and interviews (e.g. Honey 
et al., 2007), observation (e.g. Blanc et al., 2005) or a combination of both (e.g. Wing et 
al., 1977).  Most commonly it is assessed by observing participants in either a 
spontaneous, structured or instructed setting, and is rated on the basis of the 
frequency, duration and quality of play (Jarrold, 2003). 
 While much of our understanding of imagination in ASD has arisen from 
pretend play, it is limited in that researchers are inferring whether or not a child is 
truly pretending from the child’s actions (Jarrold, 2003), and that play behaviours are 
generally limited to childhood.  As this thesis focuses on adults, this limits the utility of 
pretend play as a measure.  However, adults with disabilities, including AS, have been 
interviewed about their childhood play and they were able to provide rich, 
retrospective accounts of their play, although this is necessarily influenced by their 
adult perceptions (Sandberg, Björck-Åkesson, & Granlund, 2004).  Nevertheless, 
pretend play, as the earliest indicator of imaginative ability, is a very useful measure 
for imagination and creativity and satisfies the necessary criteria of generativity, 
novelty and flexibility.  In order to successfully play pretend, a child must be able to 
flexibly recombine elements from their schemata into new routines (e.g. Leslie, 1987; 
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Vygotsky, 2004), and so measurement of pretend play can assess all of these key 
components to imagination, provided the coding scheme allows for this. 
1.1.2.2 Generativity and fluency tasks 
 Imagination and creativity in autistic individuals have often been assessed using 
tasks designed to measure generativity; such tasks are known as fluency tasks or 
divergent thinking tasks.  In the previous section I identified generativity as a 
component of imagination.  However, generativity is also an executive function (EF).  
EF is an umbrella term covering a wide range of abilities.  As well as generativity this 
includes planning, working memory (WM), flexibility/set-shifting, and inhibition.  There 
is evidence that EFs are impaired in children with ASD, although the evidence is mixed 
(e.g. Hill, 2004).  Generativity specifically refers to the ability of individuals to generate 
spontaneous novel responses to a task.  Generativity has been theoretically related to 
the spontaneous production of pretence in autistic children Turner (1999b) and is 
thought to underlie imaginative ability (e.g. Low, Goddard & Melser, 2009). 
 Verbal fluency tasks require participants to say as many words as they can that 
begin with particular letters (most often F, A and S) or belong to a particular semantic 
category, such as animals.  Ideational fluency tasks go beyond this, by requiring 
participants to generate new responses in addition to drawing on their semantic 
memory; although this may be confounded by language ability.  Classic ideational 
fluency tests ask participants to generate novel uses for objects (such as the Use of 
Objects task [UOT; e.g. Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004; Wallach & Kogan, 1965]) and 
the Alternate Uses task (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield & Wilson, 1978).  Another 
popular ideational fluency task is the Pattern Meanings task (PMT; e.g. Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965), in which participants are asked to interpret six meaningless line 
drawings in as many different ways as possible.  The final category of fluency tasks is 
the design fluency task (Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977; Turner, 1999b) in which 
participants are asked to draw as many different novel designs as possible within a 
given time limit.  As well as individual fluency tasks, there are standardised creativity 
assessments, such as the TTCT (Torrance, 2008) and Creativity Assessment Packet 
(CAP; Lin & Wang, 1999).  These assessments include a variety of verbal, design and 
ideational fluency tasks, and each one includes standardised scoring schemes. 
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 Generativity alone is a limited measure of imagination.  As mentioned 
previously, generativity is an EF and therefore difficulties on these tasks may represent 
global executive dysfunction rather than a specific difficulty with imagination.  
Moreover, they are most commonly scored on the total output and the total fluency - 
the number of different, relevant answers a participant generates – which does not 
assess the key components of novelty and flexibility.    Letter and semantic fluency 
tasks are particularly limited in this regard.  Although a participant may be able to 
generate several different responses to a verbal fluency task, the novelty is 
questionable as they are retrieving items from memory; although there is an element 
of novelty in that each time they are required to retrieve new words.  However, verbal 
fluency tasks necessarily do not permit the creation of non-words, and therefore they 
cannot assess re-combinatorial ability. 
 Other fluency tasks are better suited to assessing these dimensions.  For 
example, the TTCT and CAP allow for the standardised assessment of fluency, 
originality, flexibility and elaboration.  In creativity research, originality is scored 
according to how many other participants in the sample generate that particular 
answer; in the case of standardised tasks, this is derived from population norms.  
Flexibility is assessed by assigning responses to categories and scoring participants for 
how many categories are used.  It is also important when assessing originality that the 
answers are relevant; giving a nonsensical response could technically be original but 
does not demonstrate true imagination according to the novel and appropriate 
definition used by many creativity researchers (e.g. Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  Assessing 
all of these aspects would provide a fuller picture of a participant’s imaginative ability, 
according to my definition, than fluency alone.   
 Finally, it has been suggested that tests of divergent thinking are not measures 
of creativity itself but rather indicators of creative ability (e.g. Runco, 2008).  Arguably 
though, as imagination and creativity are both abstract concepts, they can only be 
measured through indicators of these constructs, and it would be wise to include more 
than one measure to obtain a full picture of imaginative and creative ability. 
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1.1.2.3 Thinking about the future 
 Several studies examine the ability to think about the future in individuals with 
ASD. Many researchers specifically investigate episodic future-thinking (EFT), which 
refers to the ability of an individual to mentally time travel forwards to imagine a 
specific future event (e.g. Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  EFT has been assessed in a 
variety of ways in participants with ASD.  Three studies with children used batteries of 
short tasks to test their participants’ knowledge of the future (Hanson & Atance, 2013; 
Jackson & Atance, 2008; Marini et al., 2016).  A study of adults with ASD used a 
sentence completion task (e.g. Next year …); however, this was found to have 
methodological problems (Crane, Lind & Bowler, 2013; see pages 31-32).  In a study 
with children, Angus, de Rosnay, Lunenburg, Terwogt and Begeer (2015) told 
participants that they would be having an interview with an unknown experimenter, 
and then proceeded to ask the participants questions about their anticipation of the 
event.  A more sophisticated assessment of EFT is the analysis of narratives generated 
by the participants (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler & Raber, 2014; Lind et al., 2014; 
Terrett et al, 2013).  The exact paradigm varies slightly between tasks; usually 
participants are presented with a cue word (which may be an object, situation or time 
period) and asked to generate and recount an imaginary future scenario relating to 
said cue word.  This scenario should be a specific, personal, single event lasting no 
more than a day for it to qualify as episodic.  Again, the precise nature of the scoring 
varies depending on the study.  Lind and Bowler (2010) categorised responses as being 
episodic or errors (omissions or general images) and Terrett et al. (2013) identified the 
constituent details of each response and coded them as internal (episodic) or external 
(non-episodic).  The most detailed coding scheme was employed by Lind et al. (2014), 
who calculated an experiential index based on four subcomponents: the content of the 
description, participant questionnaires, spatial coherence and independent quality 
ratings from scorers.   
 EFT requires imaginative ability in terms of generating novel potential future 
scenarios by flexibly combining elements from past experience, as per my definition of 
imagination.  Lind and Bowler (2010) specifically argue that the cognitive processing 
involved in EFT resembles that of imaginative processes in general.  As imagining the 
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future requires the generation of a mental representation of a non-existent situation 
or experience, this fits well with the definition of imagination discussed 
earlier.  Furthermore, EFT is thought to be related to EM (e.g. Lind & Williams, 2012) 
by way of flexibly selecting and recombining existing event features from EM (Lind & 
Bowler, 2010).  This relationship fits with the idea that imagination may involve the 
adaptation, manipulation and transformation of existing concepts as discussed earlier.   
1.1.2.4 Counterfactual reasoning 
        Counterfactual reasoning occurs when a known fact is contradicted (Peterson & 
Bowler, 2000), such as when reasoning about alternative scenarios to a past event 
(Begeer et al, 2009).   Therefore counterfactual reasoning requires imagination (e.g. 
Leevers & Harris, 2000) as an individual must be able to mentally represent an 
alternative scenario to one that actually happened or is happening.  Counterfactual 
reasoning is an important aspect of daily life, as it allows us to learn from mistakes and 
prepare for the future (Begeer et al., 2009).  This form of reasoning is therefore 
conceptually similar to EFT, and represents the definition of imagination as the ability 
to imagine non-veridical scenarios, fulfilling the criteria of generativity and 
novelty.  Furthermore, considering more than one scenario (e.g. two possible future 
scenarios, or comparing what actually happened to what could have happened) 
requires flexibility.  Therefore, testing participants’ counterfactual reasoning seems to 
be a useful measure of imaginative ability according to my definition of imagination; 
although they are sensitive to methodological issues in terms of the logical structure of 
the scenarios.  
1.1.2.5 Creativity 
 As I argued previously (page 8), the notion of creativity refers to the outputs 
that are produced by the process of imagination; and in turn evidence of creativity 
provides evidence of imaginative ability.  Several researchers have therefore assessed 
imagination in terms of creativity.  One of the most obvious examples of creativity is 
drawing, which is generally associated with creativity.  In addition to the design fluency 
task mentioned previously, other drawing tasks have been used to assess creativity 
and imagination in children both with and without ASD.  For example, Karmiloff-Smith 
(1990) designed an imaginative drawing task that has since been widely used and 
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adapted for ASD research (e.g. Craig et al., 2001; Leevers & Harris, 1998; Low et al., 
2009; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Ten Eycke & Müller, 2015).  This task involves asking 
children to draw a house, then asking them to draw another, but one that “does not 
exist. An impossible house.” (p.373, Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996).  They are then asked 
to draw a man, using similar instructions.  Participants are scored according to whether 
their real drawings fulfil all the essential characteristics of a house or man, and 
whether their impossible drawings retain the overall impression of a house or man, but 
with the addition or deletion of features that render it an impossible representation.  
Scott and Baron-Cohen and Craig et al. (2001) followed this procedure, but it was 
adapted by Leevers and Harris (1998) to be a picture completion task under 
instruction.  Low et al. (2009) also adapted this task by presenting participants a 
picture of a door leading to an alien world of strange, previously unseen people, and 
asked to draw as many as possible of these “strange and funny-looking” people (see 
also Allen & Craig, 2016).  Generally, the impossible person task fits well with the 
criteria for imagination according to my definition, as they require the generation of 
ideas along with creating a novel combination in order to make a person ‘impossible’ – 
for example, by replacing a person’s arms with tentacles – which requires flexibility 
and originality. 
 However, it is worth noting here that not all drawing tasks meet these criteria.  
For example, Leevers and Harris (1998) also asked children to complete a pair of 
pictures so that one was real and the other impossible but gave them forced-choice 
options (e.g. draw stripes or spots on a zebra).  This dramatically reduces the 
imaginative nature of the task as participants do not generate their own ideas.  
Similarly, Booth, Charlton, Hughes and Happé (2003) asked typically developing (TD) 
children and children with ASD or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) to 
copy a drawing twice, including an additional feature the second time, in order to 
assess drawing and planning rather than the imaginative drawing ability of the 
children.  Other tasks ask participants with ASD to produce drawings and rate them on 
qualitative aspects, such as how often they draw people and social scenes (e.g. Lewis & 
Boucher, 1991; Jolley, O’Kelley, Barlow & Jarrold, 2013).  This is useful for 
understanding the distinction between social and non-social imagination, but does not 
 20 
 
assess all aspects of imagination and creativity.  Another flaw in using drawing tasks to 
assess imagination in autistic participants is that it measures a type of creativity that 
many adults do not engage in regardless of diagnosis, and it relies heavily on visuo-
spatial ability and fine motor skills.   
Another obvious candidate for assessing creativity is the written 
word.  Fictional narratives are thought to build on similar mechanisms and serve 
similar functions to daydreaming, imagination and pretend play (Barnes, 2012).  Some 
researchers have presented evidence for skill and talent for poetry in autistic 
individuals that is comparable to neurotypical (NT) poets (e.g. Dowker, Hermelin & 
Pring, 1991; Lawson, 2011).  There is a large body of evidence surrounding the 
narrative ability of individuals with ASD; for example some studies identify a difficulty 
with constructing (or retelling) narratives in ASD (e.g. Diehl, Bennetto, & Carter-Young, 
2006) whereas others do not (Norbury & Bishop, 2003).  Narrative abilities in ASD have 
also been associated with ToM (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986; Capps, Losh & 
Thurber, 2000).  Such studies however do not necessarily assess the imaginative 
nature of the participants’ narrative construction; many such studies ask participants 
to retell a story rather than create a story, or test their comprehension of a narrative.  
There have been some studies comparing the storytelling ability of children with ASD 
with TD counterparts (e.g. Angus et al., 2015; Dillon & Underwood, 2012), comparing 
the fiction preferences of students with ASD and students without ASD (Barnes, 2012) 
and comparing the generation and comprehension of novel metaphors and similes 
(Kasirer  & Mashal, 2014).  As with drawing, writing allows individuals the opportunity 
to generate novel scenarios that may be recombined from existing concepts or their 
past experience.  However, writing ability is confounded by verbal ability, narrative 
skills and fine motor skills when writing by hand.   
1.1.2.6 Summary 
 To summarise, imagination and creativity have been assessed in many and 
varied ways.  Although this could represent a strength of the research, there has been 
little attempt to standardise these tasks (with the exception of formal tests such as the 
TTCT and the CAP), nor have they been validated against each other.  While all of these 
methods can be used to further our understanding of imagination in ASD, it is difficult 
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to identify one task that can assess ‘pure’ imagination, and therefore studies should 
ideally use more than one method simultaneously in order to obtain a fuller picture of 
imagination.  Of the 49 studies I have summarised in Appendix 1 (Table 8.1, pages 224-
242), thirteen measure more than one ‘type’ of imagination (for example, ideational 
fluency and the impossible person task [Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996]).  However, just 
five of these (Angus et al., 2015; Begeer et al., 2009; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Low et al., 
2009; Ten Eycke & Müller, 2016) directly assessed the association between the 
different tasks.  It has been found that ideational fluency correlates with storytelling 
(Angus et al., 2015) and with additive but not subtractive counterfactual reasoning1 
(Begeer et al., 2009) and that thinking about the future correlates with imagination 
measured by the ADOS (Lind & Bowler, 2010).  Low et al. (2009) did find that ideational 
fluency predicted imaginative drawing; however, this relationship became non-
significant when including visuo-spatial planning.  Similarly, Ten Eycke and Müller 
(2016) found that generativity did not predict imaginative drawing in children with 
ASD.  Overall, there is little evidence regarding how these different measures of 
imagination relate to one another and it is difficult to draw conclusions across different 
measures; even within specific tasks the results are not always consistent.  For 
example, some studies have found that children with ASD perform poorly on the 
impossible person task (e.g. Low et al., 2009; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996), although 
this not always ASD-specific (e.g. Craig et al., 2001) and others do not find significant 
group differences on this task (e.g. Allen & Craig, 2016; Leevers & Harris, 1998). 
 It is possible to assess the key components of fluency, flexibility and originality 
across most of the contexts in which imagination and creativity have been assessed in 
ASD.  In terms of specific tasks, I have only argued that verbal fluency cannot assess all 
three key components, as it cannot assess originality.  All other tasks have the 
potential to assess all three key components, and many have also been used to assess 
the related components of memory (such as in the case of EFT), and creative outputs 
(such as drawing tasks).  However, although these methods all possess the potential 
for assessing these three key components, they have not all been used in this way; for 
                                                          
1 Additive counterfactual reasoning adds an element to a scenario (e.g. “If only I had done…”) and is 
therefore generative, whereas subtractive counterfactual reasoning removes an element from a 
scenario (e.g. “if only I had not done…”) and is not generative. 
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example, novelty has never been directly assessed in an EFT study.  Section 1.1.31 
(page 26) outlines the studies that have assessed several different dimensions of 
imagination and creativity. 
Moreover, their usefulness depends on the exact way the phenomenon is 
measured and how it is scored.  For example the impossible person drawing task is a 
useful method for assessing creativity via drawing, whereas Leevers and Harris’ (1998) 
forced-choice drawing task is less useful as participants are making a choice between 
two responses rather than generating their own response, which does not require 
generativity or novelty (although it relies in part on flexibility).  As another example, 
employing an ideational or design fluency task is more useful when assessing 
originality and flexibility in addition to fluency.  The variety of methods and lack of a 
clear definition of imagination has resulted in a rather incoherent literature.  When 
researchers write about ASD, it is generally assumed that individuals with ASD have 
impaired imagination.  However, several studies have demonstrated that this is not the 
case (see the next section) and the diagnostic criteria for ASD do not require the 
presence of imagination impairment; due to the grouping of symptoms (pages 1-2), an 
individual’s communication symptoms along with RRBs may qualify them for a 
diagnosis, and therefore imagination difficulties are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
a diagnosis.  The following section will describe the key findings that have emerged 
from the imagination literature, before focussing on the different dimensions of 
imagination and creativity and research in adults with ASD.  
1.1.3 Key findings in relation to imagination in ASD 
 Since the conceptualisation of ASD as a “triad of impairments” comprising 
imagination, social interaction and communication, the assumption has generally been 
that autistic people have a difficulty with imagination.  However, across the relatively 
diverse range of methods of assessing imagination, there have been few consistent 
findings.  An ASD-specific imagination deficit is not always identified, in spite of the 
fact that impaired imagination is one of the diagnostic criteria for ASD.  Appendix 1 
(Table 8.1, pages 224-242) provides an overview of studies that have compared the 
imagination of individuals with ASD with individuals from other populations.  Whether 
or not a study identified a specific ASD difficulty with imagination is displayed in this 
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table.  Of these studies (N=49), sixteen (33%) have found that, compared to TD and 
clinical control groups, individuals with ASD perform worse on imagination and 
creativity tasks (e.g. Lewis & Boucher, 1991; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014; Low 
et al., 2009; Terrett et al., 2013).  However, eight (16%) studies did not find an ASD-
specific imagination difficulty (e.g. Crane et al., 2013; Dillon & Underwood, 2012; 
Dowker et al., 1991; Leevers & Harris, 1998), and in some cases, participants with ASD 
actually perform better on certain criteria such as originality (e.g. Kasirer & Mashal, 
2014; Liu et al., 2011).  Finally, 23 studies (51%) resulted in mixed findings (e.g. Bishop 
& Norbury, 2005; Dichter, Lam, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw & Bodfish, 2009; Hanson & 
Atance, 2013; Jackson & Atance, 2012).  In addition to comparison with clinical and 
typical populations, higher levels of ASD traits have been associated with lower scores 
on imagination tasks in the general population (e.g. Claridge & McDonald, 2009); 
whereas others have found the opposite (e.g. Best et al., 2015) and others have found 
mixed or tenuous results (e.g. Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008; Takeuchi et al., 2014).  
 Some researchers maintain there is a genuine difficulty with imagination in ASD 
(e.g. Scott et al., 1999), possibly as a result of lack of internal mental representations 
(e.g. Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Craig et al., 2001), which is often used to explain the 
finding that children with ASD often show reduced or repetitive pretend/symbolic play 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1987; Rutherford et al., 2007; Wing et al., 1977).  However, there 
are alternative explanations for why individuals with ASD find imagination tasks 
difficult.  For example, children with ASD are able to understand and imitate pretence 
(e.g. Kavanaugh & Harris, 1994; Libby, Powell, Messer & Jordan, 1997) and are able to 
engage in prompted or structured pretend play (e.g. Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1996; 
Lewis and Boucher, 1988), although this is sometimes poor (e.g. Blanc et al., 2005; 
Sigman & Ungerer, 1984).  Therefore it may not be that participants with ASD cannot 
play pretend, rather they may lack the motivation (Jarrold, 2003).  As Lewis and 
Boucher (1991) noted “it is unsafe to conclude from the fact that an autistic person 
does not do something, that they cannot do it” (p.408, my emphasis).  In another 
domain of imagination, there is evidence that individuals with ASD are more likely to 
prefer non-fictional over fictional narratives (Barnes, 2012), which lends some support 
to the motivational explanation.  In addition, one study found that although children 
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with ASD did not differ from TD children in terms of formal tests of imagination, they 
differed in a task of social anticipation (Angus et al., 2015), which may be related to 
motivation since social difficulties form a core part of ASD. 
   In order to pass tasks assessing pretence, children with ASD must use internal 
mental representations.  Related to this, researchers have suggested one of two 
theories that may explain difficulty with EFT in people with ASD.  These are the self-
projection theory (Buckner & Carrol, 2007), “the ability to shift from one’s current 
perspective to alternative perspectives (temporal, spatial, or mental)” (Lind et al., 
2014, p. 56, and the scene construction theory, “the ability to mentally generate and 
maintain a coherent, multimodal spatial representation” (Lind et al., 2014, p. 56).  
There is some evidence that difficulty with EFT in ASD is specific to the self (e.g. 
Jackson & Atance, 2008); however, this study was limited as they only considered 
within- and not between-group differences in a small, very heterogeneous sample.  A 
later study improved on their method and found that both ASD and TD groups 
performed better at self- compared to non-self-based EFT tasks, and children with ASD 
performed worse at both types of task (Marini et al., 2016).  Evidence from adults 
suggest that both self-projection and scene construction are important to EFT (e.g. 
Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014). 
 An alternative explanation for why individuals with ASD sometimes perform 
poorly on imagination tasks is that these tasks are actually tapping into executive 
dysfunction, which several researchers have set out to test.  Scott and Baron-Cohen 
(1996) found that, children with ASD performed significantly worse on the impossible 
person task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990) compared to control groups; but in addition to 
this, children with ASD were significantly worse than control groups when drawing 
unreal entities under instruction (in order to reduce EF demands), but not when 
drawing real entities.  Therefore the authors argue that difficulty with EFs cannot 
explain their initial findings.  The independence of an imagination deficit from 
executive dysfunction was supported in later studies using different creativity tasks 
(Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Craig et al., 2001).  Studies assessing counterfactual 
reasoning have also not found evidence of a relationship with EFs (e.g. Begeer et al., 
2009; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012) and a study of EFT found that set-shifting did not 
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make a significant unique contribution to EFT in either children with ASD or TD children 
(Terrett et al., 2013).  This latter finding is unexpected given that set-shifting is a 
measure of flexibility, which I have identified as a key component of imagination.  
However, Terrett et al. note that their measure of set-shifting (the Switching task; 
Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 2007) only assess one aspect of shifting, and it may be that EFT 
relies on a different aspect of set-shifting not measured by the Switching task.  
 In contrast, Leevers and Harris (1998) adapted the impossible person task as 
employed by Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996) by dramatically reducing the EF demands2.  
Participants were asked to add details to two pairs of incomplete pictures (two houses 
and two men) so that one in each pair was real and the other impossible.  Autistic 
participants did not perform significantly worse than TD participants or participants 
with learning disabilities (LDs); from this Leevers and Harris concluded that poor 
performance on drawing tasks in ASD may be explained by planning difficulties.  Booth 
et al. (2003) later found that children with ASD show more severe planning difficulties 
in drawing tasks compared to TD children and children with ADHD.  Allen and Craig 
(2016) directly compared cued and non-cued version of the Impossible Person task in 
one sample of children with ASD and children with LDs matched on age, mental age 
(MA) and drawing ability.  Although children with ASD produced significantly fewer 
impossible drawings than children with LDs, when a template was provided there was 
no significant difference between groups, supporting Leevers and Harris’ findings.  
Furthermore, Low et al. (2009) found that for the impossible person task, generativity 
was a significant predictor of imaginative drawing content for children with ASD but 
not TD children; however, this relationship was mediated by visuospatial planning, 
supporting the argument of Leevers and Harris.  Also using the impossible 
person/house task, Ten Eycke and Müller (2016) found that planning and WM (but not 
generativity) predicted imaginative drawing in children with ASD and young TD 
children, but not older TD children.  In contrast, generativity was associated with 
imaginative drawings of people in TD children only.  Therefore, although different EFs 
may be contribute to imaginative ability, these may vary considerably depending on 
age and diagnosis.  Hanson and Atance (2013) did find that children with ASD who 
                                                          
2 NB, this is a different task to the forced-choice task described on page 19 
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scored lower on EFT tasks also scored lower on EF tasks; although unlike Low et al. 
they did not distinguish between different types of EFs. 
 Therefore, a clear picture of imagination and creativity in ASD does not emerge 
from the literature.  Although most studies identify either a clear difficulty with 
imagination in ASD, many are mixed, and several others do not identify an ASD-specific 
difficulty.  Moreover, several studies have demonstrated the presence of creativity in 
autistic individuals; as creativity requires imagination it is therefore incorrect to assert 
that all autistic individuals show impaired imagination.  However, as I have mentioned 
before, imagination and creativity studies are sensitive to task differences (page 21).  
Bogdashina (2003) argues that “imagination in autism is qualitatively different from 
non-autistic imagination” (p. 118, my emphasis).  Therefore it is important to consider 
the type of imagination that is being measured, and how it is being measured.  There is 
conflicting evidence in terms of whether difficulty on certain imagination tasks stems 
from lack of mental representation, lack of motivation, difficulty with self-projection, 
difficulty with scene construction, or executive dysfunction.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, I shall review two areas of imagination in ASD in further detail.  Firstly I will 
consider the different dimensions of imagination and creativity, such as novelty and 
flexibility (see Figure 1) in addition to generativity, as these are the components of 
imagination that I have identified and may explain conflicting findings across studies.  
Secondly I will consider what we have learned about imagination in autistic adults, as 
this is the population I am primarily interested in. 
1.1.3.1 Key components of imagination and creativity 
 My working definition of imagination for this thesis comprises several key 
components and in the field of creativity research, imagination and creativity can be 
rated according to several components, the most common being: fluency, novelty 
(usually referred to as originality in the creativity literature), flexibility and elaboration.  
Certain measures, such as the TTCT, have introduced others, such as abstractness of 
titles.  Yet the majority of imagination and creativity research in ASD have focused on 
fluency, with a few others including other dimensions such as repetition (e.g. Bishop & 
Norbury, 2005; Dichter et al., 2009) and accuracy (e.g. Lind et al., 2014).  Particularly in 
the case of pretend play, researchers have noted the presence of repetitive pretend 
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play (e.g. Wing & Gould, 1979), which may indicate a difficulty with both generativity 
and flexibility.  The focus on generativity/fluency may be an issue considering some 
studies do not find a strong association between generativity and imagination in 
individuals with ASD (e.g. Low et al., 2009; Ten Eycke & Müller, 2016). 
Asperger (1944) suggested that autistic children show highly original and 
unusual patterns of thinking.  In contrast, Wing (1981) argued that the thought 
processes of autistic individuals are narrow, literal and logical, but such individuals 
choose an unusual starting point for their thought processes that would not “occur to 
a normal person who has absorbed the attitudes current in his culture” (p. 118)”.  
Wing suggested that whereas this may occasionally result in a new insight into a 
problem, this mode of thinking usually results in an inappropriate response, reflecting 
earlier discussion that a novel response must also be relevant and appropriate (page 
9).  However, this disconnect from culture may actually be what gives autistic 
individuals an advantage in terms of originality; it has been suggested that social-
communication difficulties, such as lack of ToM, may foster originality as individuals 
with ASD are unaware of or less concerned with what others think, the ‘correct’ way of 
doing things and how others perceive them or their work (Happé & Vital, 2009), and 
are not limited by lexicalised knowledge (Kasirer & Mashal, 2016).   Autistic adults are 
more likely to rate themselves as being original compared to NT adults (Kirchner, Ruch 
& Dziobek, 2016).  Liu et al. (2011) assessed divergent thinking in adolescent boys with 
and without AS using the CAP.  Interestingly they found that the boys with AS showed 
reduced fluency and flexibility compared to their TD peers, but increased originality 
and elaboration.  Their sample however was limited, comprising only males aged 
between ten and eleven years old. 
 Kasirer & Mashal (2014) assessed verbal creativity in adults with ASD and NT 
adults by assessing their generation of different figures of speech (specifically, 
metaphors and similes).  Participants were given ten different concepts as either 
metaphors or similes (e.g. love is… and feeling worthless is like…) and asked to create 
new, comprehensible expressions based on these concepts.  A participant’s creativity 
was calculated as their percentage of responses that could be classed as a novel 
idiomatic response.  There was no main effect of group, however all participants 
 28 
 
performed worse when generating metaphors.  However, there was a significant 
interaction, in that participants with ASD performed better when generating novel 
metaphors compared to the NT group, and this was interpreted as the ASD group 
showing higher originality than the NT group.  However, this study did not assess 
originality in the way it is traditionally measured in creativity research, which is to 
compare the content of participants’ answers against the rest of the sample or a 
population norm.  Furthermore, while two coders rated responses, there was no 
reference to inter-rater reliability and so there is no indication of the objectivity of the 
coding system.  Kasirer and Mashal (2016) conducted a similar study in children, and 
these results supported their earlier findings; that is, children with ASD performed 
better than TD children in terms of generating novel metaphors, whereas TD children 
performed better in terms of comprehending and generating conventional metaphors.  
However, Kasirer and Mashal note that the majority of their sample were diagnosed 
with pervasive developmental disorder – not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), which 
could be seen as a limitation of this latter study. 
 An online survey study (Best et al., 2015) examined the relationship between 
autistic traits as measured by the Subthreshold Autism Trait Questionnaire (SATQ; 
Kanne, Wang, & Christ, 2012) and divergent thinking as measured by the Alternate 
Uses task (Guilford et al., 1978) and PMT.  The authors found a significant negative 
correlation between level of autistic traits and fluency as measured by the PMT but not 
the Alternate Uses task.  However, unusualness of response on the Alternate Uses task 
was found to be a non-linear predictor of autistic traits.  When transformed into a 
categorical variable, participants who generated four or more unusual responses 
scored significantly higher on the SATQ.  Whereas this is an interesting finding, only 
24.1% of participants actually reported having a diagnosis of ASD, and these 
participants were not analysed separately.   
 Conversely, strength in originality has not always been found.  Craig and Baron-
Cohen (1999) administered measures from the TTCT to children with ASD, children 
with AS, children with LDs and TD children.  For one measure, Toy Improvement, 
children are asked to think of as many different ways to improve a toy as possible; in 
this task, both ASD groups generated fewer original responses than the control groups.  
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In line with previous studies, children with ASD also produced less flexible responses.  
Pring et al. (2012) carried out two drawing tasks from the TTCT along with the Figural 
Synthesis Task (FST; Finke & Slayton, 1988) – in which participants use an increasing 
number of shapes to make new representations - with autistic individuals with savant 
skills, without savant skills, adults with LDs and younger art students.  For the TTCT, the 
art students performed significantly better than all three groups in terms of fluency 
and originality, and there were no other group differences on these two dimensions; 
although savants scored significantly higher on elaboration.  Therefore having ASD did 
not result in higher scores in terms of originality.  However, there were no group 
differences on the FST in terms of originality with the exception of at the highest 
number of shapes; in this case, the art students and savants with ASD showed the 
most original responses.  Whereas these findings are at odds with the previous studies 
discussed, this study was limited by small group size (N=9), and the fact that the art 
students were deliberately selected from sixth form level and were therefore much 
younger, in order to avoid the effect of formal training on results.  Pring et al. also note 
that the TTCT measure of originality may be confounded by verbal ability as it is based 
on the titles rather than the drawings themselves3; however, this would not explain 
Craig and Baron-Cohen’s (1999) findings as the ASD and LD groups were matched on 
verbal mental age (VMA). 
 Therefore there is some evidence that while imaginative fluency and flexibility 
may be reduced in ASD, originality and elaboration could be enhanced (e.g. Kasirer & 
Mashal, 2016; Kasirer & Mashal, 2014; Liu et al., 2011), although this is not always 
found (e.g. Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Pring et al., 2012).  However, these studies 
have been carried out across several different tasks; it would be beneficial to assess 
originality and other dimensions of imagination using more than one type of task 
within the same sample of participants. 
1.1.3.2 Imagination in adults with ASD 
 Most studies investigating imagination in ASD have been conducted with 
children rather than adults; just six (12%) of the studies listed in Appendix 1 include 
                                                          
3 However, this is unconvincing as instructions for scoring the TTCT state to focus on the use of the 
stimulus itself, rather than just the title. 
 30 
 
only adults as their participants.  As such, little is known about imagination in adults 
with ASD.  Even in diagnostic manuals and tools, there is little provision for how to 
assess imagination in adults with ASD, with the exception of the DISCO.  Barnes (2012) 
showed that adults with ASD preferred to read non-fiction narratives rather than 
fiction narratives in contrast to NT adults, who preferred to read fictional narratives 
about people.  However, we can infer little about autistic individuals’ ability to imagine 
from this study, only that they may show a preference for non-fiction.  This section will 
review what we currently know about imagination in adults with ASD. 
 Several researchers have investigated different aspects of creativity in adults 
with ASD.  Pring et al.’s (2012) study (see page 29) was carried out among adults aged 
16 to 43 years and Kasirer and Mashal’s (2014) study (see pages 27-28) was carried out 
among adults aged 18 to 27 years.  These two studies found conflicting results, with 
one suggesting that adults with ASD are more original than TD counterparts (Kasirer & 
Mashal, 2014) and the other not supporting this (Pring et al., 2012).  Kasirer and 
Mashal interpreted their findings in terms of the weak central coherence bias in ASD 
and strong attention to detail with narrow focus (Fitzgerald, 2004; Lyons & Fitzgerald, 
2013), which may result in the generation of more original ideas.  The authors also 
suggest that their findings relate to ToM, as participants are more likely to focus on 
their own thoughts which may lead to less conventional responses; although it should 
be noted that some have argued that ToM may extend to difficulty with theory of own-
mind in ASD (Williams, 2010).   
  Dowker et al., 1991 compared the poetry of an adult with ASD and an NT adult. 
Although the poet with ASD performed worse on tests of verbal creativity (including 
the UOT) compared to the NT poet in terms of producing correct responses, the quality 
of the poetry was comparable, with an independent rater unable to reliably distinguish 
between the two poets.  This discrepancy is a good demonstration of how a formal 
creativity task may not provide the best measurement of an individual’s creative 
capabilities, as argued by Runco (2008). 
 A case study of an adult with AS, known as JS, described his patterns of 
memory and difficulty in generative writing (Boucher, 2007).  Specifically, JS struggles 
 31 
 
to access and organise what he wants to say, and has poor free recall, EM and event 
memory.  Boucher argues that these three types of memory are important to 
generativity and contribute to JS’ difficulty with creativity.  Difficulty with event 
memory will result in a lack of generalised event scripts that children use in their 
pretend play, which will then lead to reliance on rote-learned or habitual play 
sequences; this may translate into routines for adults with ASD.  Boucher suggests that 
as well as difficulty with EM, JS may have difficulties with the EM buffer (Baddeley, 
2000), a component of WM which provides temporary storage of information and 
allows for the combination of information from WM and long-term memory.  Boucher 
argues that if this is disrupted in adults with ASD, this would affect their ability to plan, 
think about the future, or decide what to do next, and lead to a reliance on RRBs. 
 Although Boucher’s arguments are compelling, these ideas have not been 
directly empirically tested; there is however some closely related work that has taken 
place within EFT in adults with ASD.  Lind and colleagues analysed short narratives 
about past and future events generated by autistic and NT adults (Lind & Bowler, 2010; 
Lind et al., 2014; see pages 17-18 for a description of their paradigms).  Overall, autistic 
individuals tended to generate less specific and detailed accounts of both past and 
future events compared to their NT counterparts, as well as displaying diminished self-
awareness (Lind & Bowler, 2010) and experiencing more fragmented, less vivid mental 
images (Lind et al., 2014).   Notably, the groups in Lind and Bowler’s study did not 
differ in terms of generativity, and Lind et al. (2014) found that general narrative ability 
did not account for their findings.   
 In contrast, Crane et al. (2013) administered an EM and EFT sentence 
completion task to autistic and NT adults, categorising their responses into one of five 
categories (specific, semantic, extended and categoric events and omissions) and did 
not identify any significant group differences.  However, the authors suggest a number 
of possible methodological limitations to account for this finding: participants were not 
explicitly instructed to think of specific events, the coding was not very detailed and 
responses were computerised which may aid task performance in individuals with ASD.  
It is notable, however, that Crane et al. were the only authors to control for depressive 
symptoms; depression affects thinking about the future (e.g. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; 
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MacLeod, Rose & Williams, 1993) and is also prevalent in the autistic population (e.g. 
Leyfer et al., 2006).  From their findings, Crane et al. stressed the need to employ 
mixed methods approaches in studies of ASD, with awareness of demands on the need 
to socialise and verbalise responses. 
 As discussed earlier, Boucher (2007) argued for a relationship between 
generativity and memory on the basis of a case study; imagination has also been more 
generally associated with memory, as it is thought to involve the manipulation of 
existing concepts (page 6).  Related to this, EFT and EM are significantly associated in 
the general population, whereas they are not associated with each other in adults with 
ASD (Crane et al., 20134; Lind & Bowler, 2010).  Lind and Bowler (2010) suggest that 
perhaps individuals with ASD draw from semantic memory rather than EM when 
imagining the future; this was supported by a later finding with children that semantic 
knowledge is associated with EFT in children with ASD only (Lind et al., 2014).  Lind and 
Bowler explain their findings in terms of the EM buffer, in line with Boucher’s 
argument.  Lind et al. (2014) found that adults with ASD had difficulty with atemporal, 
non-self-relevant scene construction as well as mental time travel, supporting the idea 
that EFT (and EM) difficulties in ASD may be related to a general difficulty with binding 
different elements of a scene.  However, these studies have also identified support for 
the self-projection theory of EFT.  For example, Lind and Bowler noted that 
participants with ASD did not tend to pre-experience the future (or re-experience the 
past) from their own point of view.    
 It is difficult to draw conclusions about imagination in adults with ASD given 
how fragmented the research has been.  Generally, studies of adults fall within the 
categories of creativity (including drawing and writing) and EFT.  There are mixed 
results from creativity studies.  Whereas Pring et al. (2012) found that non-savant 
people with ASD show no particular strengths in creativity, Kasirer and Mashal (2014) 
showed that people with ASD generate more novel metaphors than NT adults.  
Presenting mixed findings, Dowker et al. (1991) showed that a poet with AS struggled 
with formal verbal creativity tests but did well in terms of her own poetry.  Therefore it 
                                                          
4 Although Crane et al. (2013) also did not find a relationship between EFT and EM in their NT adult 
sample. 
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may be that performance on creativity tasks relies on what tasks are used and how 
creativity is assessed.  As illustrated by Figure 1 (page 12), creativity requires 
imagination, but imagination does not require creativity and therefore using creativity 
as an assessment of imagination has certain limitations.  Findings from studies of EFT, 
which assess imagination more directly as they do not rely on creativity as an output, 
have been more straightforward, with two studies identifying difficulties in adults with 
ASD (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014) and one finding no group differences 
(Crane et al., 2013).  These studies have also attempted to understand why these 
difficulties exist in ASD, and have identified problems with EM and the EM buffer, 
difficulty with self-projection and poor scene construction as potential candidates.   
1.1.4 Conclusion: Imagination in ASD 
 This review of imagination began with a conceptual analysis and an attempt to 
define the construct.  Drawing on previous research, a wide range of definitions has 
been employed.  Following my conceptual analysis I decided upon the following 
definition of imagination: generation and flexible manipulation of existing concepts to 
form novel ideas, which may be rooted in past experience and may result in adaptive 
outputs (creativity).  The key components of this definition are fluency, novelty and 
flexibility.  I then reviewed the methods of previous research, contrasting their 
methods to this definition.  Most methods can be interpreted in terms of this 
framework; however, much of the previous work has focussed on generativity, or 
fluency, at the expense of novelty and flexibility (although there are some exceptions, 
such as studies of repetitive pretend play).  Therefore while the individual methods are 
generally strong, there is little attempt to understand how they relate to each other 
within studies.  Again, there are some exceptions to this; five studies assess how 
different measures of imagination relate to each other (e.g. Angus et al., 2015; Begeer 
et al., 2009; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Low et al., 2009; Ten Eycke & Müller, 2016).  
Therefore, the lack of a consistent finding across the literature may be a result of 
employing different methods.  For example, all but one EFT study (Crane et al., 2013) 
identify an ASD-specific difficulty with imagination, but other methods and measures 
produce more equivocal results.  The lack of a coherent definition of imagination, and 
agreement regarding its multidimensionality – in terms of subcomponents such as 
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fluency, flexibility and originality, and in terms of measurement and context such as 
creativity and thinking about the future – has made it difficult to draw firm conclusions 
from the imagination literature.   It is generally thought that there is a difficulty with 
imagination in ASD, potentially as a result of a difficulty with internal mental 
representation (e.g. Craig et al., 2000; Leslie, 1987), and yet ultimately the literature 
does not support such a straightforward conclusion.  Other difficulties such as 
executive dysfunction (e.g. Low et al., 2009) or a lack of motivation (e.g. Jarrold et al., 
1996) may explain poor performance on certain imagination and creativity tasks; 
indeed, when it comes to autistic individuals’ particular interests, they may be 
motivated to generate more original ideas (e.g. Liu et al., 2011).  The difference could 
also be due to the fact that many different approaches are taken to assessing 
imagination in ASD, and it would be interesting to see how these different measures 
relate to each other.  Having reviewed the relevant literature on imagination in ASD, 
the following section will address relevant and equivalent areas in the body of research 
in RRBs in ASD. 
1.2 Restricted and repetitive behaviours in ASD 
1.2.1 Introduction to RRBs 
 RRBs form one of the core diagnostic criteria for ASD (APA, 2013; WHO, 1993).  
This class of behaviours, driven by a desire for sameness and dislike of change (Kanner, 
1943), includes a wide range of motor and sensory behaviours and restricted activities 
that are highly frequent in their repetition and invariant in their manifestation.  RRBs 
have been considered central to the disorder since ASD was first identified (e.g. 
Asperger, 1944; Kanner, 1943).  There is evidence from factor analytic studies and 
studies of change in ASD symptoms over time that RRB is a distinct construct from 
social and communication difficulties (Seltzer, Shattuck, Abbeduto, & Greenburg, 2004; 
Shuster, Perry, Bebko, & Toplak, 2014).   The origin of RRBs in ASD is not yet certain, 
although there is evidence for genetic, neurobiological and neuropsychological causes 
(e.g. Leekam, Uljarević, & Prior, 2011). 
 RRB is an umbrella term for a wide and heterogeneous range of behaviours.  
These can range from motor stereotypies such as repetitive rocking, hand-flapping and 
kicking to repetitive sensory behaviours such as repeated mouthing or smelling of 
 35 
 
objects.  In addition, sensory sensitivities are now categorised under RRB according to 
the DSM-5 (APA, 2013).  Complex rituals such as lining up, collecting or carrying around 
objects also fall under the term RRB.  RRBs may also include intense, narrow interest in 
certain objects, activities or topics, known as circumscribed interests (CI).  Finally, 
routines and extreme dislike of change are also examples of RRB.  A dichotomy of RRBs 
has been proposed, comprising “lower-order” and “higher-order” RRBs (e.g. Prior & 
Macmillan, 1973; Turner, 1999a).  Lower-order behaviours include repetitive sensory 
and motor behaviours and are thought to be associated with younger children, typical 
development, children with lower intelligence quotients (IQs) and children with other 
disorders; in contrast, higher-order behaviours comprise more cognitively complex 
behaviours such as CI, insistence on sameness (IS) and routines (Turner, 1999a).  
Whereas many of these behaviours appear distinct from one another, they all have the 
following in common: high frequency of repetition; invariance in the pursuit of the 
behaviour or activity; and unusual or inappropriate manifestation of the behaviour.  
Although it has been established that RRB is independent of social and communication 
difficulties (Shuster et al., 2014), RRB itself is better thought of as a multi-dimensional 
construct (e.g. Honey, Rodgers & McConachie, 2012).  This will be discussed further in 
section 1.2.3 (page 42). 
 However, RRBs are not specific to ASD; in fact, RRBs are prevalent in the 
development of all children (e.g. Arnott et al., 2010; Leekam et al., 2007).  Thelen 
(1981) suggested that stereotypic movements serve an adaptive function in terms of 
mastering motor control and postural stability.  A cross-sectional study found that the 
rate of RRBs in TD children increases until around the age of two years, where they 
remain stable before gradually decreasing after the age of four (Evans et al., 1997).  
There is little research investigating RRBs in NT adults, and this evidence is generally 
limited to specific behaviours and situations.  For example, there is evidence of pre-
sleep rituals and transitional object use in college-age adults (Markt & Johnson, 1993) 
and of sport-specific rituals in US college athletes (Bleak & Frederick, 1998).  Several 
studies, however, have demonstrated that participants with ASD show higher levels of 
RRBs than TD participants in terms of both frequency and severity (e.g. Morgan, 
Wetherby & Barber, 2008; South, Ozonoff & McMahon, 2005).  Finally, RRBs are also 
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associated with other neurodevelopmental disorders and neuropsychological 
conditions (e.g. Langen, Durston, Kas, van Engeland, & Staal, 2011; Leekam et al., 
2011).  For example, RRBs are defining features of both obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) and Tourette’s syndrome (e.g. Scahill et al., 2014; Worbe et al., 2010), as well as 
being common in individuals with LD (e.g. Bodfish, Symons, Parker, & Lewis, 2000), 
Williams syndrome (Davies, Udwin & Howlin, 1998), Prader-Willi Syndrome (e.g. 
Greaves, Prince, Evans & Charman, 2006), and Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases 
(e.g. Langen et al., 2011). 
 As with TD individuals, participants with ASD tend to show significantly more 
RRBs than individuals with other disorders such as Williams syndrome or OCD (e.g. 
Rodgers, Riby, Janes, Connolly, & McConachie, 2012; Zandt, Prior & Kyrios, 2007).  
However, there are also qualitative differences between ASD and other groups.  For 
example, there are differences in terms of the types of obsessions and compulsions 
demonstrated by individuals with ASD compared to OCD (e.g. McDougle et al., 1995).  
RRBs are associated with anxiety in children with ASD but not children with Williams 
syndrome (Rodgers et al., 2012), suggesting that the role of anxiety in RRBs is specific 
to individuals with ASD.  Finally, individuals with OCD tend to show distress regarding 
their RRBs, whereas individuals with ASD often prefer to engage in their RRBs and 
resist attempts to divert their attention (e.g. Scahill et al., 2014). 
 As stated, the main aim of this thesis is to assess the relationship between RRBs 
and imagination, and in order to do this I have developed a self-report measure for 
RRBs in autistic adults: the RBQ-2A.  Therefore the remainder of this section will review 
evidence regarding the measurement and categorisation of RRBs using other tools, 
including the precursors to the RBQ-2A.  As this thesis specifically examines the 
relationship between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults, I will also review 
evidence regarding the presentation of RRBs in autistic adults.  This literature will 
provide the background for the development and the assessment of the RBQ-2A. 
1.2.2 Measurement of RRB 
 RRB tends to be measured with interviews, questionnaires and observation 
methods.  There has been one review of RRB measures (Honey et al., 2012), which 
identified the three most common measures used in the RRB literature as the ADI-R, 
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the Repetitive Behaviour Scale – Revised (RBS-R; Bodfish, Symons & Lewis, 1999) and 
the Repetitive Behaviour Interview (RBI; Turner, 1995, unpublished doctoral thesis) 
along with its associated questionnaire version, the Repetitive Behaviours 
Questionnaire (RBQ).  Despite the widespread use of these measures, the evidence 
regarding various indices of reliability and validity remains somewhat incomplete. 
 The RBS-R (Bodfish et al., 1999) is a 43-item informant-report questionnaire, 
designed to capture a wide range of RRBs.  It has an advantage in that it was 
specifically designed to assess RRBs and demonstrates good internal consistency, test-
retest reliability and construct validity across studies (Honey et al., 2012).  The RBQ 
was derived from the RBI, and again was specifically designed to assess RRBs with a 
particular focus on ASD, although it has not been used as widely as the RBS-R.  The 
RBQ has since been updated into a more concise form that includes items from both 
the DISCO and the RBI: the RBQ-2 (e.g. Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 
2014; see page 65 for a more detailed discussion), which shows good reliability and 
validity (e.g. Arnott et al., 2010).  Other questionnaires have been developed that show 
promising reliability and validity (e.g. the Behaviour and Sensory Interests 
Questionnaire; Hanson et al., 2016) although they have yet to be assessed outside of 
the research groups that developed them.   
 Questionnaires are advantageous in that they are generally brief and can 
usually be filled in by the informant with little guidance from the clinician or 
researcher.  Moreover they can be easily administered as global online surveys, which 
allows for the recruitment of larger and more representative samples.  However, 
questionnaires are limited to closed questions answered on a Likert scale, and may not 
include a fully comprehensive set of RRBs.  It can be difficult for a participant to 
accurately gauge the frequency of certain behaviours when there are limited options 
and some behaviours may be highly dependent on the situation.  Finally, RRBs can be 
quite subtle or complex and participants or informants may not understand exactly 
what is meant by certain RRBs.  In contrast, interview measures allow the participants 
to expand upon their responses to a trained individual, who can also clarify and explain 
any RRBs of which the participant is unsure.   The RBI (Turner, 1995) is a semi-
structured interview specifically designed to assess RRBs that asks parents about 50 
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different RRBs and demonstrates adequate convergent validity and internal 
consistency along with excellent inter-rater and test-retest reliability (e.g. Honey et al., 
2012; South et al., 2005), although it has not been as widely used in research as other 
measures such as the ADI-R. 
Diagnostic interviews are also often used as a measure of RRBs, due to their 
reliability and validity in measuring autistic traits.  The most commonly used interview 
method (Honey et al., 2012) is the ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994), a semi-structured 
diagnostic interview for ASD, which covers RRBs along with other ASD traits and 
relevant development history.  Several studies demonstrate the reliability and validity 
of the ADI-R (e.g. Lam & Aman, 2007; Mooney, Gray, Tong, Sweeney & Taffe 2009).  
The DISCO (Leekam et al., 2002; Wing et al., 2002) is another diagnostic interview 
designed to aid clinicians assessing an individual for ASD. The DISCO has good inter-
rater reliability, discriminant validity and correlational validity with the ADOS and ADI-
R (Leekam et al. 2002; Maljaars, Noens, Scholte & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2012; Nygren 
et al. 2009).  The DISCO contains 67 RRB items, in contrast to the ADI-R’s fifteen.  
However, to my knowledge there is no published evidence of the DISCO used as an 
RRB measure and therefore little is known about the psychometric properties of the 
RRB items outside of the context of the whole interview.  
Interviews are limited in practical terms by the fact that they generally require 
an individual to undergo highly specialised training in order to administer them, and in 
the case of diagnostic measures are much more time-consuming.  They also cannot be 
simultaneously administered to a large population as easily as questionnaires.  
Furthermore, the above measures I have discussed rely on informant report, normally 
from the participant’s primary caregiver; even in the case of interviews where the 
clinician makes ratings, they are generally relying on information from a caregiver.  
There is disagreement in the literature over whether or not informant-report is reliable 
(e.g. Fecteau, Mottron, Berthiaume & Burack, 2003; Militerni, Bravaccio, Falco, Fico & 
Palermo, 2002), although it has been argued specifically in the case of investigator-
driven interviews that informant-report is reliable (Seltzer et al., 2004).  The reliability 
of parental report can also be affected by the experiences of the parents.  For 
example, parents of younger children may be more sensitive to their children’s RRBs, 
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whereas parents of older children may have become accustomed to them (e.g. 
Esbensen, Seltzer, Lam & Bodfish, 2009); moreover parents’ judgment and 
understanding of their child’s RRBs may be affected by their understanding of ASD and 
contact with professionals (e.g. Honey, McConachie, Randle, Shearer & Le Couteur, 
2008). 
Furthermore there are no self-report measures of RRBs for adults with ASD, 
which is a particular issue when assessing an adult population.  Most of the measures I 
have discussed may be used to assess RRBs in adults.  However, there are certain 
limitations in that adults may have learned to ‘mask’ their RRBs, and once an adult 
leaves home their caregivers may be less aware of their RRBs, particularly if they 
change.  In addition, the parents or caregivers of older adults with ASD may have 
passed away.  On the other hand, it has been argued that self-report measures in 
general are not suitable for autistic adults. For example, autistic individuals may differ 
from NT individuals in terms of their understanding of psychological self (e.g. Jackson, 
Skirrow & Hare, 2012; Williams, 2010), which may impact their ability to report their 
own mental states and behaviour.  Indeed, one of the most widely used self-report 
measures of autistic traits, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001), was designed with this potential 
limitation in mind and participants were asked about their preferences rather than 
their social and communicative behaviour. 
 The specific issues regarding both parent- and self-reporting can be avoided by 
the use of observation methods (e.g. Goldman et al., 2008; Watt, Wetherby, Barber & 
Morgan, 2008).  In this case, participants are filmed and the videos coded for different 
RRBs.  The coding varies from study to study and may be based on an existing measure 
of RRBs.  For example, some studies have also used the ADOS (Lord et al., 2002), an 
observational diagnostic tool for ASD, to assess RRB.  Such methods are useful for 
measuring the frequency of certain RRBs in an objective and replicable manner.   
However, while they are effective for measuring motor and sensory behaviours, they 
have limited use when assessing more complex behaviours such as routines and rituals 
(e.g., Harrop et al., 2014; Militerni et al., 2002).  This may be because such routines 
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and rituals can be context-dependent or the observation session does not allow 
enough time for the manifestation of such behaviours (e.g. Honey et al., 2012).   
 Occasionally the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et 
al., 1989) and its associated child-version, the CYBOCS, are used to assess RRBs in ASD 
(e.g. Anagnostou et al., 2011; McDougle et al., 1995).  The YBOCS is a semi-structured 
interview measure that has its origins in the measurement of OCD.  One advantage of 
this scale is that it can be used as a self-report measure, and even when interviewing 
parents their children may be encouraged to contribute (Scahill et al., 2014).  However, 
whereas there is overlap between OCD and ASD, individuals with these disorders show 
different profiles of RRBs (e.g. Cadman et al., 2015) and measures of obsessive-
compulsive behaviours do not capture the same construct as RRB.  For example, the 
YBOCS includes questions about intrusive imagery, which is not a feature of RRBs.  This 
criticism has been addressed in CYBOCS by its adaptation into a form suitable for 
children with ASD (Scahill et al., 2006), but not adults. 
  As mentioned, some tools that are used to measure RRBs are not actually 
specific RRB measures, but rather diagnostic measures such as the ADOS and the ADI-
R, or questionnaires that cover a range of ASD traits.  A notable disadvantage of such 
measures is the use of diagnostic tools to both classify a child and measure their RRBs 
in the same study, which results in circularity and has been criticised for non-
independence of measurement (e.g. Bodfish et al., 1999; Harrop et al., 2014; Honey et 
al., 2012). In addition, these measures are not specifically designed to capture RRBs 
and include a wide variety of other autistic characteristics.  This generally results in a 
narrower range of RRBs that are included; for example, the ADI-R includes just 15 RRB 
items and has been reported to under-sample RRBs (Lecavalier et al., 2006).  
 Given the variety of measures used to assess RRB in ASD research, it is 
important to establish whether these tools are all measuring the same construct.  
Correlation, or convergent, validity is a measure of whether different measures of the 
same construct correlate with each other (e.g. Strauss & Smith, 2009), indicating that 
both tools are measuring the same underlying construct.  There has been some 
attempt to assess the convergent validity of different RRB measures.  Honey, 
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McConachie, Turner and Rodgers (2012) found evidence of significant positive 
correlations between the ADI-R and the RBQ, although not between the ADOS and the 
RBQ.  This may cast doubt on the RBQ’s utility, or it may be a result of the fact that 
ADOS is a time-limited observational measure (Honey et al., 2012).  There is some 
evidence of correlational validity between the RBI and both the ADOS and ADI-R, 
although this is not complete; for example the Rigidity scale of the RBI did not 
significantly correlate with the RRB domains on either the ADI-R or ADOS (South et al., 
2005).  Militerni et al. (2002) employed both parental report and direct observation 
and found that the two methods complemented each other well.  In addition, they 
noted a positive correlation between number of observed RRBs and the Childhood 
Autism Rating Scale (Schopler, Reichler, & Renner, 1988). 
  Mirenda et al. (2010) found that the sub-scales of the RBS-R significantly 
correlated with ADI-R total RRB score, with the exception of self-injurious behaviours, 
although the effect sizes were small to moderate.  A later study (Bishop et al., 2013) 
investigated the sub-categories of both the RBS-R and ADI-R in a large sample of 
children with ASD (N=1825), and found that equivalent sub-scales for repetitive 
sensory motor behaviours (RSMBs) correlated with each other across measures, and 
that the self-injury item on the ADI-R correlated with the RBS-R’s self-injury subscale; 
although again the effect sizes were small to moderate.   Chowdhury, Benson and 
Hillier (2010), when investigating the change of RRBs over time, found similar results in 
the pattern of change across both the ADI-R and the RBS-R.  Together these studies 
represent some convergent validity between the RBS-R and the ADI-R. 
 A final issue to consider is what aspect of RRBs are being measured.  RRBs can 
be measured in terms of their frequency (i.e. how often the RRB occurs) and/or their 
severity (i.e. how intense an RRB is, and how much it impacts on the individual and 
their family).  Observation methods are good for determining frequency, but may not 
provide as much information about intensity or severity.  Within the RBQ and RBQ-2, 
some questions ask about frequency whereas others ask about the impact the 
behaviours have on others.  Cuccaro et al. (2003) argue that whereas the ADI-R 
provides information about the presence of RRBs it is limited in capturing information 
about their frequency and intensity.  This may explain why Mirenda et al. (2010) and 
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Bishop et al. (2013) found only moderate correlations, as although the RBS-R and ADI-
R both measure RRBs, they measure them according to different criteria.  Richler, 
Huerta, Bishop and Lord (2010) criticised the tendency for research to focus on mean 
scores as they do not distinguish between prevalence and severity; in their own study, 
they found that over time although their participants maintained high levels of RRBs, 
the impact of these behaviours reduced.   
 In conclusion, there are a wide variety of measures used to assess RRBs in ASD.  
Whereas these measures tend to have good reliability and validity in and of 
themselves, there has been little research in terms of how well the measures compare 
with each other.  Few studies include more than one measure, and many use the same 
tool to both diagnose participants and measure their RRBs.  More research is needed 
to understand how these measures relate to one another. 
1.2.3 The factorial structure of RRBs 
 As mentioned previously (page 35), most researchers now conceptualise RRB as 
a multi-dimensional construct, but there is not universal agreement upon the precise 
sub-groups of RRBs.  The DSM-5 (APA, 2013) divides RRBs into: stereotyped and 
repetitive speech, motor movements or use of objects; adherence to routines, rituals 
and resistance to change; restricted and circumscribed interests; and hyper- and hypo-
sensory responsivity and unusual sensory interests.  The ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) also sets 
out four sub-categories which are: motor stereotypies; preoccupations with parts of 
objects; CI; and adherence to routines.  These generally map onto one another, with 
the exception of the DSM-5’s sensory category and the ICD-10’s preoccupations with 
parts of objects.  As mentioned previously, RRBs have also been divided in to higher- 
and lower-order RRBs (e.g. Prior & Macmillan, 1973; Turner, 1999a).  However, it can 
be conceptually difficult to categorise individual RRBs as either a higher- or lower-
order behaviour.  For example, preferring to wear the same clothes may stem from a 
desire to maintain sameness, or it could be because other clothes cause sensory 
discomfort.   
 Several researchers have attempted to identify the sub-categories of RRB using 
statistical methods, specifically exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis (EFA or 
CFA) and PCA.  EFA and PCA are used to express datasets arising from measures that 
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comprise numerous variables as a smaller number of factors or components made up 
of inter-correlating items (Kline, 2000; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  They are an 
empirical method for determining the number and composition of a construct’s sub-
categories, as well as assessing conceptual and construct validity (Briggs & Cheek, 
1986; Shuster et al., 2014; Williams, Brown & Onsman, 2010).  Running these analyses 
results in a series of factor loadings for each item on each identified factor, which 
indicate how strongly the item is correlated with the factor (Kline, 2000).  They are 
particularly useful for assessing measures of phenomena that are not directly 
observable; as is the case for IS behaviours.  The range of different factor solutions of 
RRBs in participants with ASD found across studies is displayed in Appendix 2 (Table 
8.2, pages 243-249).  
 The majority of studies (N=17 [63%]) investigating the structure of RRBs in ASD 
have identified two sub-groups; one comprising RSMBs such as pacing, hand flapping 
and rocking, and the other comprising more abstract behaviours such as routines and 
CI, which are collectively referred to as insistence on sameness (IS; e.g. Bishop et al., 
2013; Cucarro et al., 2003; Honey et al., 2012; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014; Richler et 
al., 2010), although the precise naming of factors may vary slightly between research 
groups.  This binary grouping has also been found in studies of TD children (e.g., Evans 
et al., 1997; Leekam et al., 2007). 
 However, this is not always the case.  Other studies have identified alternative 
solutions comprising three (Honey et al., 2008; Lam, Bodfish, & Piven, 2008; Mirenda 
et al., 2010), four (Anagnostou et al., 2011) or five factors (Bishop et al., 2013; Lam & 
Aman, 2007; Mirenda et al., 2010; Scahill et al., 2014).  In the case of three factors, 
these usually comprise factors equivalent to RSMB and IS, along with an additional 
factor equivalent to CI (e.g. Honey et al., 2008; Lam et al., 2008) or self-injury factor 
(Mirenda et al., 2010).  There is somewhat more variety within the solutions of four or 
more subgroups, however they generally map on to the four DSM-5 categories, and 
may include self-injury (e.g. Bishop et al., 2013; Lam & Aman, 2007; Mirenda et al., 
2010; Scahill et al., 2014); with the notable exception of Bourreau, Roux, Gomot, 
Bonnet-Brilhault, and Barthélémy (2009) who identified four factors equivalent to 
RSMB and IS and two epiphenomenal factors. 
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 Such differences are likely due to the use of RRB measures that are different in 
terms of their scope and format; I have already discussed the difficulties of comparing 
across measures in the previous section.  The largest proportion of studies (N=14 
[52%]) use the ADI-R (e.g. Bishop et al., 2013; Mooney et al., 2009; Shao et al., 2003).  
All of these studies demonstrate two sub-groups, RSMB and IS, with two exceptions 
(Honey et al., 2008; Lam et al., 2008).  The next most common measure is the RBS-R 
questionnaire, used in four studies (e.g. Lam & Aman, 2007; Mirenda et al., 2010).  
Although the RBS-R was conceptually designed with six sub-scales, factor analysis 
generally results in five sub-scales; although Mirenda et al. (2010) found evidence for 
both a three- and five-factor model depending on how the scale is to be used, and 
Georgiades, Papageorgiou and Anagnostou (2010) found two subscales in the Greek 
version of the RBS-R.  Comparing just these two measures, the RBS-R covers a much 
wider range of behaviours than the ADI-R, which may account for the difference 
between factor solutions.  Most of the factor analysis studies have been conducted on 
interview/questionnaire measures, with one exception; Bourreau et al. (2009) devised 
a measure based on observation, supplemented by parental report, the Restricted and 
Repetitive Behaviour Scale. 
 As mentioned, there is disagreement over whether or not certain behaviours 
should be included as RRBs.  For example, the RBS-R includes several items on self-
injurious behaviours, which may explain why a separate self-injury sub-scale emerges, 
whereas there is just one self-injury item in the ADI-R and no self-injury item in the 
RBQ-2 (Lidstone, Uljarević, et al., 2014).  Even when different research groups use the 
ADI-R, there may be considerable variation in terms of what items are included.  For 
example, Lam et al. (2008) did not include unusual sensory interests because at the 
time they weren’t included as part of RRB under the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) and several 
studies do not include CI as this item is only administered to older children (e.g. Honey 
et al., 2008; Mooney et al., 2009; Richler, Bishop, Kleike & Lord 2007).  There is also 
evidence that inclusion of different items considerably alters the results; Smith et al. 
(2009) replicated the usual two-factor model of the ADI-R but found a four-factor 
model was a better fit when including verbal rituals, which falls under the 
communication domain of the ADI-R.  Finally, there is variation in terms of whether 
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researchers use the current or ever codes for the ADI-R; although Szatmari et al. (2006) 
used both and found no difference between the solutions. 
 Another reason for the variety in factor solutions may lie in the nature of PCA 
and EFA themselves.  There are few hard and fast rules when carrying out factor 
analytic studies, and a number of decisions need to be made that can affect the 
outcome of the analysis.  These decisions include whether or not to carry out EFA or 
PCA, what method of rotation to apply to the data, how to extract factors and what 
cut-off to use for item loadings.   These issues are discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter (page 61).  The range of different factor analyses and rotation 
methods alone can be seen from Appendix 2 and may account for some of the 
differences between solutions.  For example, the majority of studies (N=15 [55%]) 
employ orthogonal rotation only, and N=6 (22%) employ oblique rotation5 only; 
however, 53% (N=8) of studies using orthogonal rotation identify two factors, and 50% 
(N=3) of studies using oblique rotation identify two factors.  Therefore differences in 
rotation may not explain the difference in number of factors identified. 
 In summary, there is considerable variation in terms of the factor analytic 
solutions of RRB, due to the variety of measures and methods used.  Most commonly, 
researchers identify a two factor solution comprising RSMB and IS (or equivalently 
named factors), which maps on to the conceptual distinction between lower- and 
higher-order RRBs (Turner, 1999a).  This is most strongly supported by the fact CFA 
using the ADI-R supports a two-factor solution (Richler et al., 2007; Richler et al, 2010).  
However, most of these studies used the ADI-R, so while it seems that RSMB/IS reflects 
the genuine structure of RRBs, this may not be the case, and further research using 
other measures is required.  The findings from this review highlight the importance of 
assessing the factor analysis of the RBQ-2A as part of this thesis; especially given the 
fact that none of these studies were conducted exclusively with adults.  The following 
section will consider evidence from previous research about the presentation of RRBs 
in adulthood. 
                                                          
5 See pages 66-67 for an explanation of orthogonal and oblique rotation 
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1.2.4 RRBs in autistic adulthood 
 Autistic traits are known to vary over time (e.g. Fecteau et al., 2003; Piven, 
Harper, Palmer & Arndt, 1996; Seltzer et al., 2004), and therefore when assessing any 
autistic trait in adults, it is important to understand how they may differ in comparison 
to children.  However, there is markedly less research on RRBs in autistic adults 
compared with children, especially older adults with ASD (e.g. Chowdhury et al., 2010).  
To my knowledge there are no studies that compare the profiles of RRBs in autistic 
adults with NT adults or adults with other conditions, although some studies may 
include autistic adults in their sample (e.g. Troyb et al. [2014] found that in 8- to 21-
year-olds, individuals with ASD showed significantly higher levels of RRBs than TD 
individuals).   Lack of research with autistic adults has implications for the 
measurement and sub-division of RRBs in this thesis, which focuses on adults.  As I 
have mentioned, other than observation methods, measurements of RRBs tend to rely 
on parent-report, which may be particularly limited in terms of adults (pages 3-4) and 
none of the factor analytic studies described previously analyse an exclusively adult 
sample.  Seven of the factor analyses include young adults between the ages of 18 and 
23 (e.g. Cuccaro et al., 2003; Hanson et al., 2016; Papageorgiou, Georgiades & 
Mavreas, 2008; Smith et al., 2009; see Table 8.2) and five include older adults up to the 
age of 48 years (e.g. Bourreau et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2008; Tao et al., 2016; see Table 
8.2).  However, when running factor analysis the adults were not separated from the 
children and therefore we cannot determine whether the factor structure of RRBs 
differs among adults compared to children.  This section will review the evidence 
regarding RRBs in adults compared to children in order to illustrate the need for a 
factor analysis of only adults with ASD. 
 A review paper that examined changes in ASD symptoms and diagnosis over 
time found evidence that although RRBs do decrease with age in ASD this is at a lower 
rate than social communication and interaction difficulties (Seltzer et al., 2004).  Three 
studies have compared current and ever codes from the ADI-R to examine how autistic 
traits, including RRB, have changed over time (Fecteau et al., 2003; Piven et al., 1996; 
Seltzer et al., 2003).  Piven et al. (1996) included individuals aged 13-28 years and 
found that there was a significant reduction of symptoms in the social and 
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communication domains but no changes in the RRB domain across the whole sample, 
and fewer participants improved in terms of RRBs.  Fecteau et al. (2003) sought to 
replicate Piven et al.’s results in a sample of individuals aged 7-20 years, but instead 
found significant improvements across all three domains.  However, only RRB was 
significantly associated with chronological age and when looking at individual items 
there were fewer improvements in RRBs compared to the other two domains.  Seltzer 
et al. (2003) improved on the previous studies by assessing individuals with ASD aged 
between 10 and 53 years, more than half of whom had an additional diagnosis of LD, 
and found that RRBs reduced with age across the sample.  Adults showed fewer RRBs 
overall, and in terms of unusual preoccupations and complex mannerisms, adults 
showed a more pronounced reduction than did adolescents.  The greatest reduction 
was seen in motor behaviours such as repetitive use of objects and complex 
mannerisms (e.g. rocking), whereas the least improvement was seen in unusual 
preoccupations, unusual sensory interests, verbal rituals, compulsions/rituals and CI. 
Findings from the ADI-R are therefore mixed, with two studies showing a 
reduction of RRBs with age (Fecteau et al., 2003; Seltzer et al., 2003) and Piven et al. 
(1996) not finding this.  However, as I have discussed, this tool does not exclusively 
measure RRBs and is limited with relation to RRBs (see page 40).  This may explain the 
inconsistencies across studies as the ADI-R does not give a complete, detailed picture 
of RRBs.  Georgiades et al. (2010) found that youths and adults aged 13-48 years 
scored significantly higher in terms of Compulsive Ritualistic Sameness Restricted 
Behaviours scores on the RBS-R compared to children under the age of 12 years, but 
there was no difference in terms of Stereotyped and Self-Injurious Behaviours.  Also 
using the RBS-R, Esbensen et al. (2009) focused solely on the relationship between age 
and RRBs in a cross-sectional design.  They found that age was significantly negatively 
correlated with total RBS-R score and all of its subscales, with adults showing fewer 
RRBs than children, even when controlling for age, psychotropic medication and 
presence of an LD.  Age-related reduction in RRBs was most pronounced in the 
subscales of restricted interests and stereotyped movements.  Additionally, 
stereotyped movements reduced less with age in participants with both ASD and LD 
compared to participants with ASD only.  Overall these findings support those of 
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Fecteau et al. and Seltzer et al., but there is some evidence from both studies that in 
cognitively able participants, the reduction in terms of RSMBs are more pronounced 
than those of IS. 
 Although it is useful to understand the differences between RRBs in adults and 
children, none of these studies look exclusively at adults.  Chowdhury et al. (2010) 
examined RRBs in a small sample of individuals with ASD aged 19 to 28 years using 
both the ADI-R and the RBS-R (informants rated their child on both current and lifetime 
presence of RRBs).  There was improvement across all aspects of RRB, in particular for 
the repetitive use of objects according to the ADI-R and compulsive behaviour (which 
includes repetitive use of objects) subscale of RBS-R.  The least improvement was seen 
in CI on the ADI-R and restricted behaviour (including restricted interests) on the RBS-
R.  The only behaviour that did not change over time was self-injurious behaviour, 
although it was also the behaviour that was least endorsed overall.  These findings 
suggest that IS behaviours are more prevalent than RSMBs in adults compared to 
children, supporting Esbensen et al. (2009) and Georgiades et al. (2010).  The sample 
was however limited in that the oldest participant was 28 years and there was only 
one female participant.  A study of a wider age range (20-78 years) of adults with ASD 
and LD found that there was no difference between younger (<49) and older (>49) age 
groups, suggesting that once participants have reached adulthood RRBs remain stable 
in this population (Hattier, Matson, Tureck & Horovitz, 2011).  However, it should be 
noted that this study is limited in terms of analysis, as the correlation between RRBs 
and age was not assessed.  Furthermore, the authors used the Stereotypies subscale of 
the Diagnostic Assessment for the Severely Handicapped-Second Edition (Matson, 
1998); although Hattier et al. (2011) state this measure has good reliability and validity, 
it is unclear how this measure performs compared to more standard measures of the 
RRB in ASD.  Finally, the profile of RRBs may differ within autistic adult samples.  A 
study of 827 adults (aged 18-75) diagnosed with an ASD found that men scored 
significantly higher than women in terms of RRB according to the ADI-R regardless of 
diagnostic group; although the authors argued it may be that women showed 
‘different’ rather than ‘fewer’ RRBs, and these RRBs are not picked up by standard 
diagnostic tools (Wilson et al., 2016). 
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 It is the case that RRBs continue to be present in adults with ASD and are 
related to other behavioural, sensory and cognitive functions (e.g. Kargas, López, 
Reddy, & Morris, 2015; Miller, Ragozzino, Cook, Sweeney, & Mosconi, 2015; 
Minassian, Paulus, Lincoln & Perry, 2007; Travers, Kana, Klinger, Klein & Klinger, 2015).  
However, the findings reviewed here indicate that RRBs in adulthood may present 
differently than in childhood; not just in terms of overall frequency and severity, but in 
terms of which behaviours are prevalent.  Specifically, the findings of Chowdhury et al. 
(2010) and Esbensen et al. (2009) suggest that RSMBs decrease with age at a greater 
rate than other RRBs, whereas Georgiades et al. (2010) found that IS behaviours were 
higher in adults compared to children.  In addition, there is evidence across studies 
that the developmental trajectory may depend on intelligence quotient (IQ; e.g. 
Esbensen et al., 2009).  This has implications for clinical practice, in that when 
assessing participants for RRBs it must be borne in mind that adults may present 
somewhat differently to children and that a reduction of RRBs is a natural part of the 
developmental trajectory (e.g. Fecteau et al., 2003; Piven et al., 1996).  There are also 
implications for research, in that care should be taken when drawing conclusions from 
across a range of ages.  This may account for the variability in findings among the 
factor analytic studies; as I have noted, there has not been a single factor analysis 
carried out among only adults with ASD.  Given that RSMB and IS have in some cases 
been determined by factor analysis and appear to present differently in adults 
compared to children, there is a need to analyse the factor structure of adults with 
ASD separately as it is not unreasonable to expect that the factor structure may vary 
across ages.  This reinforces the importance of assessing the factor structure of a new 
measure of RRBs (in this case, the RBQ-2A). 
1.2.5 Conclusion: RRBs in ASD 
 In this section I have reviewed the literature on measuring and categorising 
RRBs in ASD, as well as the literature on RRBs in autistic adulthood.  There are several 
tangential issues not been covered here, as the literature is relatively large and 
complex, and several questions are beyond the scope of this thesis (e.g. the cause of 
RRBs).  In terms of measurement, there are several methods for assessing RRBs in ASD, 
and as is usually the case, they have complementary strengths and weaknesses and so 
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use of more than one measure is recommended.  From the factor analytic evidence, it 
seems that RRBs can generally be divided into RSMBs and IS, although the exact 
solution depends on the measurement and type of analysis employed.  Finally, 
although adults do present with fewer RRBs than children, these remain an important 
aspect of ASD.  Having reviewed the imagination and RRB literatures separately for 
ASD, the following section will review evidence regarding the relationship between 
these two constructs. 
1.3 The relationship between imagination and RRB in ASD 
 This section will focus on previous research that has explored the relationship 
between imagination and RRB.  Several researchers have argued for the existence of a 
relationship between generativity and RRBs, and between imagination and RRBs (e.g. 
Hanson & Atance, 2013).  Indeed, it has been suggested that executive dysfunction, 
such as generativity and inhibition, are the cause of RRBs; although the evidence for 
this is mixed (e.g. Leekam et al., 2011).  Generativity is particularly relevant here as I 
have identified it is a key component of imagination, although they are not 
synonymous.  Generally, it is argued that there is a negative relationship between 
imagination and RRBs, in that imaginative difficulty results in high rates of RRBs.  Early 
observations of autistic children noted the limited behavioural repertoires coupled 
with lack of spontaneous imaginative activity (Wing & Gould, 1979).  Turner (1999b) 
later drew a more direct link between high rates of RRBs and dislike of change in 
autistic children with difficulty in spontaneously generating novel ideas and 
behaviours.  Happé (1999) noted that children with ASD tended to engage in 
obsessive, repetitive sensory and motor actions with toys and objects rather than 
playing pretend; she argued that these obsessive rituals give way to obsessional 
interests in autistic adults.  As such a link was made between a lack of early pretend 
play and restricted interests in both childhood and adulthood.  Similarly, Boucher 
(2007) argued that difficulty with memory results in difficulty with generativity and 
imagination, which in turn leads to a reliance on routines.  Furthermore the majority of 
this work suggests that it is specifically the routines, rituals and restricted interests of 
autistic people that is related to imagination.  This suggests that this relationship is 
specific to IS rather than RSMBs; although Happé’s (1999) suggestion that RSMBs 
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replace pretend play suggests some degree of relationship between imagination and 
RSMBs.  Regardless, this relationship has received very little empirical attention (Honey 
et al., 2007; Leekam et al., 2011).  In typical populations, there is little evidence related 
to this relationship; although Kloosterman, Keefer, Kelley, Summerfeldt, and Parker 
(2011) noted that imagination as measured by the AQ correlated with 
communication/mindreading abilities but not resistance to change in an 
undergraduate NT population.   
  Honey et al. (2007) compared RRB, play and communication in children with 
and without ASD aged between two and eight years old.  They examined these using 
the Activities and Play Questionnaire Revised, an original parental questionnaire based 
on the RBQ and DISCO, which assesses RRB and play behaviours (including symbolic 
play) in children.  Although there were two age groups for both TD and ASD children, 
the older TD children were excluded as their language reached ceiling level, and the 
ASD groups were collapsed into one due to a lack of variation in language ability.  For 
children with ASD, there was a significant negative correlation between total RRB and 
total play, and both expressive language and RRB significantly predicted play.  
However, for the TD children RRB was not a significant predictor, nor did it correlate 
with play; the latter was only predicted by expressive language.  The authors 
interpreted this as a three-way relationship between RRB, imagination and 
communication specific to ASD. 
 This finding lends some support to the argument that difficulties with 
imagination are reflected by excessive RRB.  However, Honey et al.’s (2007) results also 
support the placement of imagination with communication in the DSM; a three-way 
relationship is difficult to reconcile with the distinction between RRBs and social 
interaction/communication, although these two are somewhat related.  It may be that 
imagination is related to both but this association is stronger with either RRBs or 
communication.  The finding that expressive language predicts play in TD children 
supports Kloosterman et al.’s (2011) later finding that imagination and 
communication/mindreading are associated in a large NT population (N=222).  There 
are some limitations to Honey et al.’s (2007) work.  Most notable is the fact that 
different types of play and sub-types of RRB were not separately measured and 
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analysed.  The different sub-types of RRBs may associate markedly differently with 
other variables, such as age and IQ (e.g. Militerni et al., 2002; Richler et al., 2010; 
Moore & Goodson, 2003).  In terms of imagination, this is especially important given 
that it is specifically symbolic play which is thought to be an indicator of imagination, 
and these findings assess all play behaviours but have been interpreted in terms of 
imagination.  Honey et al. also used a questionnaire to assess play and RRB, which has 
inherent limitations, and just two DISCO questions to measure language.  In addition, 
there was also no information about specific ASD diagnosis or symptom severity for 
the participants.  Nevertheless these findings provide preliminary evidence of the 
relationship between imagination and RRB, which may be expanded by using more 
detailed measures of both RRB and imagination. 
 A later study (Harrop et al., 2014) of TD and autistic children (aged between 
two and five years) assessed the developmental trajectory of RSMBs, measured 
observationally by coding the frequency of RSMBs in a free play session; however, the 
authors also assessed correlations between the ADOS algorithm measures and 
frequency of RSMBs at the first time point.  Harrop et al. found a significant positive 
association between frequency of observed RSMBs and the ADOS-G imagination 
algorithm, which is primarily based on a structured play scenario as well as free play.  
As higher scores on the ADOS indicate more difficulties with imagination, this indicates 
that a higher level of RSMBs was associated with more imagination difficulties, 
supporting the findings of Honey et al. and demonstrating convergence across 
different methods while having the advantage of confirmed diagnoses of ASD for all 
the participants.  Harrop et al.’s finding also supports the suggestion by Happé (1999) 
that RSMBs may replace pretend play in autistic children.  This observational study 
specifically measured only RSMBs, and while an association was found, it is not 
possible for this method to assess IS behaviours.  The study also focused on younger 
children who mostly engage in RSMBs rather than IS (e.g. Militerni et al., 2002; Moore 
& Goodson, 2003).   
 Several studies have examined the relationship between generativity – as 
measured by fluency tasks - and RRB (Turner, 1997; Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Dichter et 
al., 2009).  Although generativity is just one aspect of imagination, and fluency tasks 
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have their methodological flaws, these studies may provide some insight into the 
relationship between imagination and RRBs.  Turner (1997)6 assessed four groups of 
individuals (ASD, ASD with LD, LD only and non-ASD clinical control participants7) using 
the UOT, PMT, a design fluency task and the RBI.  A significant negative association 
was observed between performances on both ideational fluency tasks with sameness 
behaviour and CI for both ASD groups, but not for the clinical control groups.  This was 
supported by median split comparisons; autistic individuals who produced few novel 
responses on the UOT showed significantly more extreme sameness behaviour and CI.  
Importantly, there were no significant correlations between ideational fluency and 
stereotyped movements or repetitive use of language, suggesting that generativity is 
only associated with certain sub-categories of RRB, which are equivalent to IS.  
Performance on design fluency tasks was also related to CI.  This study is somewhat 
limited by the large age range of participants (between six and thirty-two years) within 
relatively small group sizes (N=21/22).  Moreover, an online study of ASD traits and 
divergent thinking reported a significant negative correlation between fluency score on 
the PMT test and the rigidity subscale of the SATQ (Best et al., 2015).  However, they 
did not find a relationship between rigidity and the Alternate Uses task, and their 
sample included both NT and autistic participants. 
 Turner’s (1997) findings have not always been replicated.  Bishop and Norbury 
(2005) compared children with different language impairments with children with ASD.  
In particular, children with pragmatic language impairment share some of the 
communicative difficulties of children with an ASD but fewer social difficulties and 
fewer RRB.  Bishop and Norbury found that children with pragmatic language 
impairment performed at the same level on the UOT and PMT as children with ASD; 
they interpreted this to mean that the poor performance on fluency tasks was not due 
to RRB.  Furthermore, generativity (percentage correct) on both tasks was significantly 
related to the pragmatic language composite (measured by the Children's 
Communication Checklist; Bishop, 1998) and the ADOS communication scale, but not 
                                                          
6 NB Participants performance on these fluency tasks were also reported later by Turner (1999b), but 
the latter paper did not include the RRB results. 
7 These were participants referred to psychiatry services for reasons other than ASD, including 
attentional problems, anxiety, depression and eating disorders. 
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RRB. Bishop and Norbury treat their own results with caution as they did not use a 
complex measure of RRB, which was assessed using the ADOS and the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & Bailey, 1999), and 
did not distinguish sub-categories of RRB which may have masked any relationships.  
Finally, levels of RRB were generally low, even within the ASD group.  Dichter et al. 
(2009) assessed ASD and TD children using an Animals Fluency task, UOT, the 
Children’s Communication Checklist and the RBS-R.   When controlling for non-verbal 
intelligence, there were significant relationships between communication and the 
number of total and correct responses on the Animal Fluency task for participants with 
ASD but not TD participants.  In contrast to Turner’s (1997) findings, there was no 
significant correlation between measures of generativity and RRB or its sub-scales.  
Dichter et al. argue these findings support those of Bishop and Norbury (2005) while 
using a more detailed measure of RRB.  These findings are not entirely consistent 
however, as UOT was not significantly related to communication.  In another domain 
of imagination, Lind et al. (2014) did not find evidence of a significant relationship 
between EFT and RBS-R total scores; although they did not report correlations from 
the subscales. 
 The studies considered thus far have looked at generativity, the frequency of 
different play behaviours (Honey et al., 2007) and the imagination algorithm from the 
ADOS (Harrop et al., 2014).  Therefore this research has focused only on the fluency 
aspect of imagination rather than other aspects such originality, flexibility and 
elaboration; although fluency is important to imagination, it is just one component 
according to my definition of imagination (page 12).  Liu et al. (2011; see page 27) 
measured these dimensions in boys with AS and found that they scored significantly 
higher than matched TD boys in terms of originality and elaboration.  The authors 
noted that boys with AS tended to draw pictures within idiosyncratic restricted 
interests; for example one child was interested in biology so only drew microscopic 
organisms such as dust mites, viruses and bacteria.  Liu et al. suggested that the 
tendency to draw within unusual special interests contributed to the ASD group’s 
significantly higher score on originality compared to the TD group.  Conversely, this 
also may have negatively affected their flexibility score, as it reduced the number of 
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categories that the ASD group used.  This pattern of findings illustrates how RRB - in 
this case CI – could both positively and negatively affect imagination.  Unfortunately 
Liu et al. did not include a measure of RRBs so this relationship cannot be evaluated 
from these results.  However, the suggested relationship between restricted interests 
and originality contrasts with the more common hypothesis that imagination and RRBs 
are negatively associated in ASD.  Therefore Liu et al.’s study highlights the importance 
of considering different types of imagination, such as originality, as they may be 
differentially associated with RRBs in ASD.  In a similar vein, some previous research 
has indicated a positive relationship between the level of RRBs and the presence of 
“savant” skills or special talents in both ASD and non-ASD populations (e.g. Lyons & 
Fitzgerald, 2013; O’Connor & Hermelin, 1991; Vital, Ronald, Wallace & Happé, 2009), 
although it should be noted that such abilities are not always creative.   
 A related issue is how the different subtypes of RRBs are associated with 
imagination.  Two of the above studies examined the relationship between 
imagination (as measured by generativity or play) and RRBs without taking subtypes 
into account (Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Honey et al., 2007).  When there is evidence 
that a construct is multi-dimensional, it is misleading to only assess a composite of said 
construct, as this obscures which dimension accounts for any effects (Briggs & Cheek, 
1986; Strauss & Smith, 2009).  As described in section 1.2.3 (page 42), there is 
evidence that RRBs divide into at least two subtypes, RSMB and IS.  There is scarce 
empirical evidence showing how the subtypes of RRBs relate to imaginative ability.  
Only two studies to my knowledge have assessed a full range of RRB subtypes, and 
these only measured generativity rather the whole construct of imagination (Dichter et 
al., 2009; Turner, 1997). 
Turner (1997) identified significant relationships between generativity and 
sameness and CI, but not stereotyped movements.  This supports the hypothesis that 
relationship between RRBs and imagination is specific to IS.  Similarly, Best et al. (2015) 
found a significant association between one of their creativity measures and the 
rigidity subscale of the SATQ.  However, the rigidity subscale of the SATQ is the only 
subscale that corresponds to RRBs and does not include any RSMBs and so no 
conclusions can be drawn from this study about the specificity of the relationship.  It 
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should be noted that Harrop et al. (2014) investigated RSMBs in ASD and discovered a 
significant positive association with imagination on the ADOS, although the authors did 
not test IS.  In contrast, Dichter et al. (2009) found no association between any RRB 
subscale and generativity.  This inconsistency may be partially explained by the fact 
that the sub-grouping of RRBs varies across measures (see Appendix 2, Table 8.2, page 
243).  Given the existing conflicting evidence, it is important to consider the different 
subtypes of RRBs when investigating the relationship between RRB and imagination.  
Theoretically, it is specifically IS that drives the potential relationship between 
imagination and RRBs rather than RSMBs; this is supported by evidence from Turner 
and Best et al.  This is not supported by the finding that RSMBs are also related to 
imagination (Harrop et al., 2014).  Turner’s participants were aged from six to thirty-
two and Best et al.’s participants were all adults, whereas the children in Harrop et al.’s 
study were aged from two to five years.  As Happé (1999) argued, pretend play is 
replaced by RSMBs that may become obsessive rituals, and in adults this may be 
replaced by restricted interests.  Therefore in younger children the relationship with 
imagination may be driven by RSMBs, and in older children and adults it may be driven 
by IS. 
1.3.1 Conclusion: Imagination and RRB 
 In summary, the precise nature of the relationship between RRB and 
imagination in ASD has not been definitively established.  The empirical evidence is 
equivocal; there is some evidence that related constructs – generativity and play – are 
indeed associated with RRB (Best et al., 2015; Harrop et al., 2014; Honey et al., 2007; 
Turner, 1997); however, this is not a consistent association (Bishop & Norbury, 2005; 
Dichter et al., 2009).  There is some evidence that this relationship is specific to IS 
(Turner, 1997), although this is not definitive (e.g. Harrop et al. [2014] found a 
relationship between imagination and RSMBs).  Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that imagination is related instead to communication (Dichter et al., 2009; Honey et 
al., 2007; Kloosterman et al., 2013), reflecting the placement of imagination in 
international diagnostic manuals.  Part of the difficulty in establishing this relationship 
lies within methodological issues, particularly in terms of assessing subtypes of both 
constructs.  So far, most of the studies have focussed on fluency and generativity, 
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rather than other aspects of imagination such as originality and flexibility and 
researchers do not always take into account the different sub-types of RRB.  Therefore 
the potential relationships between imagination and RRB may be ‘masked’ by using 
composites of variables.  This issue is exacerbated by the fact that the imagination 
literature is relatively underdeveloped and has not satisfactorily established whether 
or not imagination is a multi-dimensional construct.  Little consideration has also been 
given to the potential positive effects of RRBs on imagination, in particular restricted 
interests (e.g. Liu et al., 2011; Vital et al., 2009).  Importantly for this thesis, only two 
out of the six studies investigating this relationship in ASD included adults (Best et al., 
2015; Turner, 1997).  Furthermore, what we can conclude from these studies in terms 
of the relationship between imagination and RRB in autistic adults is limited by the fact 
Best et al. did not separate out ASD participants from NT participants in their analyses, 
and Turner tested generativity only.  Therefore the relationship between RRBs and 
imagination has yet to be fully explored in an adult ASD population. 
1.4 Summary and Aims of the Thesis 
This chapter began by considering the overlap between behavioural inflexibility 
in ASD – now conceptualised as RRBs – and the more elusive concept of imagination 
that may be related to it.  My overall goal was to examine the relationship between 
imagination and RRBs in autistic adults.  However, before this issue can be properly 
considered, there are a number of obstacles to overcome; the first being arriving at a 
definition of imagination.  I began this literature review by undertaking a conceptual 
analysis of imagination, resulting in the following definition: generation and flexible 
manipulation of existing concepts to form novel ideas, which may be rooted in past 
experience and may result in adaptive outputs (creativity).  In reviewing the 
imagination literature, I described a wide variety of measurements and evaluated their 
usefulness in relation to this definition, and also found that few studies took into 
account different dimensions of imagination.  Most studies focus on fluency to the 
neglect of originality and flexibility, including studies that examine the relationship 
between imagination and RRBs, and so most previous research does not assess a 
complete picture of imagination in ASD.  Related to this, few studies have measured 
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imagination in autistic adults, and therefore very little is known about this construct in 
adulthood. 
Reviewing the literature regarding the measurement and categorisation of RRBs 
in ASD, the lack of empirical information about RRBs in autistic adults became 
apparent.  RRBs have been measured in a variety of ways, and generally can be 
categorised into RSMB and IS, but little effort has been made to assess RRBs in autistic 
adults.  Many of the measures that have been developed are unsuitable for use with 
autistic adults, as they focus on child behaviours and rely on parent-report, which 
leads me to the next issue that should be addressed before assessing the relationship 
between imagination and RRBS.  At the time of designing the studies for this thesis 
there was no published measure of self-reported RRBs suitable for autistic adults.  The 
YBOCS, described earlier (page 40), can be used as a self-report measure but it has not 
been adapted for use with adults with ASD, unlike the child version (Scahill et al., 2006) 
and was originally designed for use with individuals with OCD, which as I have 
described may not be useful for assessing the presentation of RRBs in ASD (page 40).  
The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) includes items related to RRBs (e.g., It does not 
upset me if my daily routine is disturbed).  However, the original sub-scales of the AQ 
do not include RRBs, and only two factor analyses have identified an RRB subscale 
(Kloosterman et al., 2011; Lau, Kelly, & Peterson, 2013) and therefore it is not suitable 
as a measure of RRBs.  Finally, there is an adult version of the Childhood Routines 
Inventory (Evans et al., 1997); however, this had not yet been published at the time of 
designing the studies for this thesis8.  Therefore I developed the RBQ-2A in order to 
provide a self-report measure of RRBs in autistic adults.  As a major part of assessing 
the RBQ-2A’s reliability, I analysed its structure using PCA in Chapters Three and Four.  
As with imagination, different sub-categories of RRBs should be assessed when 
examining the relationship between RRBs and imagination, due to previous evidence 
that this relationship is specific to IS (Turner, 1997).  Therefore assessing the factor 
structure of the RBQ-2A is not only important for reasons of psychological validity (see 
Chapter Two, page 61), but also to distinguish items that relate to IS from items that 
relate to RSMBs, in order to assess whether or not the relationship between RRBs and 
                                                          
8 However, I did choose to include this measure in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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imagination is specific to IS.  The RBQ-2A’s other psychometric properties in terms of 
reliability and validity are assessed in Chapters Three to Five.   
Having developed and assessed a satisfactory measure of RRBs for autistic 
adults, I sought to address the primary question of this thesis in Chapters Four and 
Five.  That is: what is the nature of the relationship, if any, between imagination and 
RRBs in autistic adults?  Previous research is inconsistent; however, there is 
preliminary evidence that RRBs are related to imagination in ASD (e.g. Harrop et al., 
2014; Honey et al., 2007) and this may be specific to IS (Turner, 1997; although see 
Harrop et al., 2014).  Specifically I investigated the relationship between the different 
RRB subscales and imagination in accordance with the three key components of 
imagination that I identified at the beginning of this chapter (fluency, originality, and 
flexibility). 
My definition of imagination informed my decision making in terms of what 
types of imagination to assess and what tasks to use (see Chapter Two, page 75 
onwards for more detail).  Given that autistic individuals may show very different 
profiles of imagination (i.e. low fluency and high originality [Liu et al., 2011]), it was 
important to assess all three components as part of this thesis.  In Study Five, fluency is 
assessed across three tasks (design fluency, ideational fluency and thinking about the 
future), originality across two (design and ideational fluency), and flexibility in one 
(ideational fluency).  Study Four’s imagination measures do not map onto these 
components, as I used questions about past pretend play and the imagination subscale 
of the AQ.  Both measures have their weaknesses (see Chapter two, pages 75-77), and 
the use of the AQ subscale was opportunistic (page 77); however, I decided it was 
important to include a measure of pretend play as this is one of the most commonly 
used methods for assessing imagination in ASD.  It was not possible to measure the 
three key components of imagination from the pretend play questions, as I did not 
have enough detailed information from my participants.  However, pretend play is a 
construct which could be measured according to these three components using 
observational methods and this is discussed in Chapter six (pages 183-184). 
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 No study to my knowledge has investigated the relationships between different 
scales of RRBs and different dimensions of imagination in a single sample with ASD; as I 
have mentioned, Best et al. (2015) did not separate out their participants with ASD, 
nor were they able to confirm diagnoses.  As well as being able to assess the 
relationship between imagination and RRB in a more detailed fashion, this strategy 
enabled me to assess a wide range of imaginative abilities in autistic adults for the first 
time.  The relationship between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults is directly 
addressed in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, along with the relationship between 
the three components of imagination in Study Five.  The next chapter describes the 
main methodological issues that arose while carrying out the work for this thesis and 
how they have been addressed. 
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2 Chapter Two: Methodological Considerations 
 In the previous chapter, I reviewed evidence relating to imagination, RRBs and 
their relationship in ASD.  The main aim of this thesis was to further examine this 
relationship, with the additional aims of developing a self-report measure of RRBs and 
exploring imagination in autistic adults.  I have chosen to carry out these aims by 
developing a new measure of RRBs and assessing various aspects of its reliability and 
validity, in conjunction with measuring imagination using a range of tools.  Several 
methodological considerations arose in designing the studies for this thesis, including 
the most effective way of assessing RRBs in this population, the effect of self-report in 
autistic individuals, the procedure for running factor analyses, the selection of 
appropriate imagination measures that can be compared to the RRB measures, and 
finally the characteristics of participants.  This chapter will summarise the methods 
used to address the aims of this thesis before discussing the main methodological 
considerations and the decisions I have made in relation to them.   
2.1 Overview of methods and relevant issues 
As described at the end of the previous chapter, I began the empirical work of 
this thesis by developing a self-report measure of RRBs suitable for use with autistic 
adults.  The first methodological issues arose here: what is the best method of 
assessing RRBs in this population, given that they may be assessed using observation, 
questionnaire and interview methods?  This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section, with particular consideration of the limitations of using self-report measures 
with autistic individuals, as this is relevant to the chosen measure (the RBQ-2A).  
Throughout this thesis I assessed the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A across 
several studies in several different ways.  Reliability is an assessment of how 
consistently a tool measures a construct (Field, 2013).  One way of assessing this is by 
assessing a scale’s internal consistency; whether or not each of the items on a scale 
measures the same construct as the rest of the items.  This can be assessed by 
calculating the correlation coefficients between different items on a measure 
(Cronbach, 1951; Field, 2013), resulting in Cronbach’s alpha values, and I will report 
these for the RBQ-2A in Studies One to Five.  Another useful indicator of reliability is 
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test-retest reliability; that is whether or not an individual’s answers on a measure 
remain similar over time, which will be assessed in Study Five (Chapter Five).      
Construct validity means that a tool measures successfully its intended construct 
in a meaningful way and may be assessed in several ways.  One method is by 
examining its factor structure (e.g. Williams et al., 2010).  In Study One (Chapter Three) 
and Study Three (Chapter Four) I assessed the RBQ-2A’s factor structure in two 
samples, one comprising undergraduate students and the other autistic adults, 
comparing these with previous factor analytic studies.  The next methodological issue 
arose here, as there are several different ways of carrying out factor analysis, which 
may affect the outcome of results.  Construct validity can also be assessed by testing 
hypotheses derived from the construct being measured.  The most obvious hypothesis 
regarding RRBs is that a valid measure of RRBs should discriminate between ASD and 
NT groups, and I assessed this in Study Two.  Finally, a valid measure of RRBs should 
also be associated with other theoretically associated constructs and assessed this in 
Studies One, Two, Three and Four by assessing the RBQ-2A’s relationship with a 
measure of general autistic traits (page 84) and anxiety (page 146).  In a similar vein, 
correlational validity (sometimes called convergent validity) is a subtype of construct 
validity, which is demonstrated when different tools that aim to measure the same 
construct correlate with each other, which was tested in Study Five.  
The main aim of this thesis was addressed with Studies Four and Five.  In Study 
Four (Chapter Four), the relationship between RRBs and imagination was tested by 
assessing group differences in terms of autistic adults who reported playing pretend 
games as a child with autistic adults who reported not playing pretend games as a child 
and by assessing the correlation between the RBQ-2A and a questionnaire measure of 
imagination as part of a large online survey.  In Study Five, I tested this relationship in a 
smaller sample by administering several tasks designed to tap into various imaginative 
abilities, and testing their correlation with scores on the RBQ-2A and an RRB item from 
the DISCO.  I also examined their relationship with each other, to see to what extent 
the different measures all tap into the same construct.  This represents another major 
issue in designing studies for the thesis: given how many measures there are to assess 
imagination, which is an elusive construct, which measures should be chosen to assess 
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it?  The final methodological issues concern whether or not questionnaires and 
experimental tasks may be reliably compared to one another, and the characteristics 
of participants to be recruited.  The issues of diagnosis, age and ability should all be 
considered in relation to the different studies of this thesis.  The following sections 
address these methodological considerations in more detail. 
2.2 Assessing RRBs in autistic adults  
In Chapter One, I outlined the variety of methods that have been used to assess 
RRBs in children and adults with ASD (pages 36-42).  To summarise this discussion, 
RRBs tend to be measured using questionnaires, interviews, and observation methods.  
The former two methods may be used as self-report measures with the individual 
themselves, or as an informant measure.  The first methodological issue that arises for 
this thesis therefore is how best to measure RRB.  All of these measures have 
advantages and disadvantages; however, I would argue that the most limited are the 
observation methods, due to the fact they are poor tools for assessing complex 
behaviours such as routines and rituals that comprise the RRB subtype IS.  Given that 
the relationship between RRBs and imagination may be specific to IS in older children 
and adults, it is vital that the chosen measure is able to tap into both RSMBs and IS.  It 
is difficult to assess rituals and routines in an efficient manner other than by asking the 
individual themselves or a person who knows the individual well. 
The subsequent decisions then are whether to use questionnaires or 
interviews, and whether to use self- or informant-report.  The main advantage of 
questionnaires is that they can be completed independently, data may be collected 
online or by post and therefore they are able to reach larger audiences of participants 
simultaneously, in contrast to interviews where either the researcher or participant 
must travel, and only one participant can be seen by a researcher at a time.  Given that 
it can be difficult to recruit autistic adults, in order to maximise my recruitment 
potential, I decided that the initial study with autistic adults would be conducted 
online and as such a questionnaire rather than interview would be more appropriate.  
However, in order to avoid confounding effects from the disadvantages of 
questionnaires (e.g. misunderstanding or misinterpreting the questions, limited 
response options), I also chose to use an interview method in conjunction with the 
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questionnaire measure in a face-to-face study.  This will allow for comparison between 
the two methods and assure that valid conclusions may be drawn from the initial 
online study.  
Finally, in terms of the source of the information, I have described the potential 
advantages of self-report measures regarding the assessment of RRBs in adults 
(Chapter One, page 39) and I therefore chose to assess participants using self-report 
measures.  However, there are certain specific disadvantages to using self-report in 
autistic individuals.  I have noted that autistic individuals may differ in terms of their 
understanding of their psychological self (e.g. Jackson et al., 2012; Williams, 2010).  
Empirical research addressing the reliability and validity of self-report measures in ASD 
has been mixed.  The AQ itself demonstrates good test-retest reliability and good 
agreement between self- and parent-report in adults (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
Furthermore, Berthoz and Hill (2005) demonstrated good comprehension, convergent 
validity, test-retest reliability and discriminant validity in questionnaires assessing 
alexithymia in autistic adults and Hesselmark, Eriksson, Westerlund and Bejerot (2015) 
demonstrated good internal consistency in a personality measure, along with a high 
correlation between self-reported neuroticism and clinician ratings in autistic adults.  
In contrast, a study of autistic traits in children and adolescents (aged 9-18 years) did 
not find significant associations between self- and parent-reports on the AQ or related 
measures, the Empathising Quotient and Systemising Quotient (Johnson, Filliter, & 
Murphy, 2009).  Similarly, Dewrang & Sandberg (2011) found that no significant 
differences in self- and parent-report on the Child Obsessive Compulsive Impact Scale 
(Piacentini, Peris, Berman, Chang, & Jaffer, 2007) for TD young people, but parents of 
ASD young people scored their children significantly higher than the young people did 
themselves.  Given these conflicting findings, it is important to consider the reliability 
and validity of different self-report measures in ASD individually, and this was taken 
into account throughout this thesis (Chapters Three to Five).  Additionally, in Chapter 
Five I assessed the self-report measure against scores on the DISCO, as an attempt to 
assess whether or not there is an effect of self-report. 
Having decided on assessing self-reported RRBs using a questionnaire, it was 
then necessary to determine what questionnaire to use.  At the time of designing the 
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studies for this thesis, there was no published self-report measure of RRBs suitable for 
autistic adults (see page 39 in the previous chapter).  Therefore I aimed to develop the 
first such measure.  I decided to adapt an existing parent-report measure rather than 
designing an entirely new measure in order to ensure that the items chosen were 
reliable and valid measures of RRBs in ASD.  As described in the previous chapter (page 
37) there are two widely used questionnaires for RRBs, the RBS-R and the RBQ.  
However, both of these measures are relatively long and contain several items that 
refer to behaviours that are less relevant to an older, more able population such as 
self-injurious behaviours, particularly the RBS-R.  Therefore the short-form of the RBQ, 
the RBQ-2, was chosen as the measure to adapt.  The original purpose of the RBQ-2 
was to describe a profile of RRBs that may change with age.  The RBQ-2 has its origins 
in two interview measures, the DISCO and the RBI and comprises 20 RRB items 
including examples of both RSMB (e.g. rocking, pacing, and fiddling) and IS (e.g. 
arranging objects, resistance to changes in the environment, and routines).  Thirteen 
of these items are common to both the RBI and DISCO, five items are unique to the 
DISCO and two are unique to the RBQ-2 (Leekam et al., 2007).  The reason for choosing 
to adapt the RBQ-2 rather than other measures of RRBs lies in the fact that the RBQ-2 
is a brief measure that still taps into a range of RRBs, from stereotyped movements 
and sensory symptoms to more complex behaviours.  As 18 of the RBQ-2 items are 
based on DISCO items, and the design of the DISCO itself is based on Wing and Gould’s 
(1979) triad, the RBQ-2 seemed conceptually the most appropriate tool to use.  
Moreover, although the item content is drawn from a diagnostic interview method, its 
original design as a questionnaire to measure RRBs in TD children avoids the problem 
of circularity in using items which have been already used to decide the diagnosis of 
the person.  In comparison to the RBS-R and RBQ, there are few changes that need to 
be made to make the RBQ-2 age- and ability-appropriate for adults, preserving the 
comparability between the parent- and self-report versions.  As part of assessing the 
RBQ-2A’s reliability and validity, I conducted factor analysis on the data collected for 
this thesis.  The following sub-section discusses issues relating to the process of factor 
analysis. 
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2.3 Methodological considerations in relation to PCA and FA 
Factor analysis is a useful method of assessing the construct validity of a 
measure, and as such I conducted factor analyses on both the undergraduate and ASD 
questionnaire data.  As mentioned in the previous chapter (page 45), there are several 
decisions that need to be made when conducting factor analyses, and these decisions 
impact the resultant solution of the analyses.  Due to the fact there are a variety of 
ways to conduct factor analyses, the differing approaches across analyses may mask 
the ‘true’ structure of RRBs.  In order to avoid these issues, I decided to analyse the 
two datasets using the same approach, so that any differences between analyses is not 
attributable to analytic strategy.   
There are few hard and fast rules for running factor analyses, although there 
are some guides available (e.g. Osborne & Costello, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014; 
Williams et al., 2010).  One important decision is whether to use exploratory (EFA and 
PCA) or confirmatory analyses (CFA).  Both EFA and PCA are exploratory techniques 
and are particularly useful when a construct or measure has not yet been assessed.  
EFA estimates the factor structure using a mathematical model and is therefore helpful 
when assessing a construct that cannot be observed.  In contrast, PCA reduces the 
actual dataset into a number of components and is a better tool for reducing data and 
removing redundant items (Field, 2013; Kline, 2000).  On the other hand, CFA 
statistically tests a hypothesised model which may be based on theoretical knowledge 
or previous research (Kline, 2000; Williams et al, 2010).  As such one can test multiple 
models and determine which one is the best fit for the data, so this would be the best 
analysis to choose for a well-tested measure such as the RBS-R or ADI-R.  If one 
factor/component solution for RRB can be replicated using different techniques and 
different measures, this lends support to the validity of the identified sub-categories 
and to the validity of the measures (Briggs & Cheek, 1986).   
Having made the decision to use EFA, PCA or CFA, it is then important to decide 
what rotation to use.  Rotation of the data maximises high factor loadings and 
minimises low loadings, which simplifies and clarifies the data, resulting in a more 
easily interpreted factor solution (e.g. Osborne & Costello, 2009; Williams et al., 2010).  
There are two main categories of rotation: orthogonal (e.g. Varimax, Quartimax), 
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where the factors are independent of one another; and oblique (e.g. Direct Oblimin, 
Promax), where the factors correlate with each other.  There is a preference for 
orthogonal rotation as it results in more interpretable results; however, this is 
unsatisfactory for most research involving human participants, since behaviour is 
rarely partitioned in such a way and therefore orthogonal rotation may result in a loss 
of information if the factors are indeed correlated (Osborne & Costello, 2009).   
Other decisions include the number of factors to extract and what constitutes a 
significant loading.  The number of factors to extract has traditionally been decided on 
the basis of Kaiser’s criterion and Scree plots (Cattell, 1966).  However, these are 
limited by not being stringent or objective enough (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  
Statistical techniques, such as parallel analysis (PA; Horn, 1965) or checking the 
goodness-of-fit statistics, are preferable but not always used.  Whether or not an item 
significantly loads on to a factor is most often decided on by employing a cut-off.  
There is very little guidance on how to decide the cut-off, and this varies considerably 
among researchers. 
2.3.1 My decisions in relation to these methodological considerations 
Prior to data analysis, a number of data screening decisions were made in 
addition to testing the usual assumptions of factor analysis: the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy; multicollinearity; and factorability.  To maintain 
consistency with previous research (Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 
2014) item 20 was removed before FA as its response scale differs to the other items 
(Leekam et al., 2007); for a more detailed discussion see Chapter Three (page 84).  In 
addition, items were removed before analysis if 80% or more of the sample responded 
never or rarely to any question.  Finally, a Little’s Missing Completely at Random test 
was conducted on the samples to ensure there was no pattern to missing data.  
I decided to not analyse the data using CFA for two reasons.  Firstly, CFA ideally 
involves the use of two samples, one for carrying out an initial exploratory analysis and 
a second sample on which to perform the CFA itself, and  I did not anticipate recruiting 
sufficient participants in either study (although see Chapter 4, page 107) to allow for 
this type of analysis.  Secondly, although the RBQ-2A is an adult version of the RBQ-2, 
it is a new measure and the theoretical structure of RRBs has not been universally 
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agreed upon, therefore it is more appropriate to carry out EFA.  The decision between 
PCA and EFA was a less clear-cut one.  Although PCA is advantageous as its solution is 
based on the actual data, EFA is useful for identifying latent constructs.  Ultimately I 
decided to analyse using PCA as the RBQ-2A is in the early stages of development and 
assessment. 
It is possible to specify components in advance of PCA and therefore I could 
have specified two components, consistent with previous research.  However, I 
decided to use statistical methods, given the variety of numbers of 
factors/components identified in previous RRB research (Appendix 2, pages 243-249), 
and in order to increase objectivity.  I therefore decided on the number of components 
using PA (Horn, 1965) with the Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis program.  PA is a 
more stringent criterion for component extraction than Kaiser’s criterion or the Scree 
plot (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014), and occurs before data analysis, unlike goodness-of-fit 
models.  To carry out PA, an initial PCA is first run on the data with no rotation and no 
fixed number of components to obtain Eigenvalues for each component.  The Monte 
Carlo program is then run, specifying the number of participants, variables and 
replications of the data (in this case, 100).  This calculates criterion Eigenvalues for 
several components.  These criterion Eigenvalues are then compared to the actual 
Eigenvalue.  If the actual Eigenvalue is higher than the criterion Eigenvalue, the 
component is accepted.  Once the criterion Eigenvalue is larger than the actual 
Eigenvalue, the comparison ends and the analysis is re-run specifying the number of 
components equal the number of actual Eigenvalues that were larger than their 
respective criterion Eigenvalues. 
The method of rotation can largely depend on the outcome of the analysis 
itself; that is, it is better to use orthogonal rotation if the correlation between factors 
does not reach .32 (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  However, there can also be a 
theoretical basis to this decision.  If the sub-categories of a construct are related to 
each other, this should be reflected in research and theory, and oblique rotation 
should be used.  There is some evidence of correlation between sub-scales of RRB 
measures; however, this is not found across all studies (e.g. Bishop et al., 2013; 
Cuccaro et al., 2003).  In addition there is evidence for the familial aggregation of IS but 
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not RSMB (e.g. Lam et al., 2008; Szatmari et al., 2006) and that RSMB and IS are 
differentially associated with certain variables (e.g. Militerni et al., 2002; Moore & 
Goodson, 2003), therefore representing distinct constructs (Bishop et al., 2013).  This 
suggests orthogonal rotation is more appropriate as these constructs are independent 
of each other.  However, all RRBs are defined by the same essential criteria (see 
Chapter One, page 35), and when considering ASD traits as a whole, RRBs group 
together independently of social and communication criteria (Shuster et al., 2014).  
Therefore I deemed it most appropriate to employ oblique rotation in the first 
instance, but to be mindful of the correlation not reaching the threshold of .32. 
A final important decision to make is the threshold for an item loading on to a 
component.  Previous research in the ASD RRB literature uses several different cut-offs 
ranging from .3 (e.g., Bishop et al., 2013; Cuccaro et al., 2003), .35 (e.g. Shao et al., 
2003), .38 (e.g., Leekam et al, 2007; Lidstone, Uljarevic et al, 2014) to .4 (Honey et al, 
2008; Szatmari et al, 2006).  According to Guadagnoli & Velicer (1988) loadings above 
.3 or .4 are usually considered salient to that component (regardless of direction 
[Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014]).  Before analysis, .4 was chosen as the cut-off in order to 
be more conservative, given the relatively small sample size of the first sample (Study 
One); and therefore the same cut-off was applied in Study Four. 
2.3.2 Summary 
This section has provided an overview of my reasons for choosing to adapt the 
RBQ-2 into an adult self-report measure for the work presented in this thesis, as well 
as my analytic strategy in terms of carrying out PCA on these data.  In this thesis I 
analysed the data using PCA, as the RBQ2-A is still in its exploratory and development 
phase.  Following initial data screening and testing of assumptions, the number of 
components was determined using PA as it is the most objective measure.  Oblique 
rotation was prioritised in order to allow the components to be correlated with each 
other.  The following section describes the decisions made when recruiting participants 
for the studies in this thesis. 
2.4 Participants 
It is important to consider the characteristics of participants to be targeted for 
recruitment in each study of the thesis.  For the first study assessing the RBQ-2A, the 
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aim was to test whether the questionnaire is reliable in a typical population.  
University students were targeted as it is easy to recruit large numbers from this 
population and they form the starting point in the development of many 
questionnaires.  This population is of course inherently limited by the fact they tend to 
be young and, in the case of psychology students, female.  For the second study a 
more representative sample that included participants with ASD was analysed in order 
to provide a brief test of the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A in autistic compared 
to NT individuals.  The third and fourth studies were conducted with participants 
reporting a clinical diagnosis of ASD.  The data collection for these studies was 
conducted online in order to maximise the number of participants that could be 
recruited.  Initially this sample was intended to include only participants from the 
United Kingdom (UK); however, issues with recruitment resulted in individuals from 
other countries taking part (see Chapter Four, page 107 for further explanation and 
discussion of this).  As the original intention was to only recruit participants from the 
UK, and the survey’s demographic questions were aimed at British individuals, only the 
UK participants have been included in this thesis; however, this dataset does provide 
the opportunity to analyse the RBQ-2A in other national populations in the future. 
The final study of this thesis involves conducting a range of imagination tasks 
with participants.  For this study, another group of autistic individuals ranging in age 
and gender were recruited, and were asked to provide some evidence of their 
diagnosis (the DISCO was also used to confirm diagnoses).  When initially designing this 
study and selecting the imagination tasks to be used, I intended to recruit a control 
group.  However, due to time constraints this was not possible and so I intended to use 
population norms available for the standardised creativity measures (described in the 
following section) in lieu of a control group.  Unfortunately, it later transpired that the 
publishers of these creativity tests do not make the norms for individual subtests 
available to administrators, and therefore it was not possible to use norms as only 
subtests were used (see page 77 for a discussion).  Lack of a control group is not 
necessarily an issue for the central question of this thesis; namely, the relationship 
between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults.  The most important role for a control 
group in this thesis is in testing the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A, and a control 
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group was available in Study Two.  In terms of understanding the profile of imagination 
in ASD, the lack of a control group does limit this somewhat, but only in the sense of 
how imagination may differ from the general population.  However, it has been argued 
that studies employing a matched control group design are limited in terms of what 
they can tell us about the autistic population as a result of its heterogeneity (Jarrold & 
Brock, 2004). 
In terms of inclusion and exclusion criteria, Study One specifically targeted 
university students across several waves of recruitment, and in one of these waves 
male students were targeted in order to address the gender imbalance of the sample.  
Other than this study, there were no inclusion or exclusion criteria in terms of gender.  
In Study Two both autistic and NT participants were recruited.  Studies Three-Five 
targeted only autistic participants.  The only exclusion criterion for age that was 
implemented across studies was that participants should not be younger than eighteen 
years as I was specifically targeting adults; the exception is for Study Two.  Study Two 
consists of a secondary analysis of data collected as part of a study on the role of 
cortisol and melatonin in sleep disturbance in ASD.  As such participants’ ages were 
restricted to between 25 and 39 years due to the distinct developmental pattern of the 
melatonin rhythm cycle across the lifespan. 
A more pertinent issue relating to selection of participants is ability.  Ability in 
terms of IQ and independence varies greatly within the autistic population, ranging 
from people who are non-verbal and require a high level of support in their daily lives, 
to those who score extremely highly on IQ tests and need less support.  Research tends 
to focus on participants who are verbal with higher cognitive ability, which is a 
weakness of the ASD literature.  Due to the nature of the questionnaire and tasks 
implemented in this thesis, participants were required to be fluent in both written and 
spoken English to take part; although this was the only specific criterion relating to IQ 
or ability, this would result in a sample that is heavily skewed towards cognitively able 
participants (although many of my participants did have other support needs, for 
example in terms of social skills).  For the final study I also tested the IQs of 
participants to ensure that they met the cut-off of 70 for average intelligence 
(Wechsler, 1999), and participants who did not meet this criterion were excluded from 
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analysis.  As the characteristics of the target population limits the generalisation of any 
findings from the thesis to a cognitively able adult population of autistic adults, I will 
take this into account when interpreting the results from all of the studies.  The 
following section discusses methodological issues in terms of assessing imagination in 
ASD, as well as how these imagination measures may be used in a satisfactory way 
with the RBQ-2A given that the latter is a questionnaire and not an experimental task. 
2.5 Measuring imagination in ASD 
As described in Chapter One, there are several measures of imagination that 
have been used to assess this construct in ASD, ranging from pretend play to 
counterfactual reasoning.  In Chapter One I evaluated these methods against my 
working definition of imagination: the generation and flexible manipulation of existing 
concepts to form novel ideas, which may be rooted in past experience and may result in 
adaptive outputs (creativity).  I concluded that most of the measures I discussed in 
Chapter One did meet my definition, in the sense that these concepts can in some way 
be assessed through them; the one exception was verbal fluency tasks which only 
measure fluency or generativity.  Given the importance of dimensions other than 
fluency to imagination, I decided to assess fluency, novelty and flexibility in this work.  
However, it was then necessary to decide what ‘types’ of imagination to assess, and 
what exact measures to use within these types.  I have demonstrated that the findings 
related to imagination can be very sensitive to choice of task, so it was important to 
carefully consider these issues.  Another issue to be cautious of is the fact that I have 
chosen to assess RRBs using a self-report questionnaire whereas almost all measures 
of imagination discussed in Chapter One were experimental tasks.  Therefore this 
discrepancy may add noise to the comparison of imagination and RRBs, causing any 
relationship (or lack thereof) to be more difficult to interpret.  This is in some ways an 
inevitable problem, as RRBs are difficult to measure other than through self- or 
informant-report, and imagination (or creativity) tends to be measured using 
experimental tasks.  This potential problem will be addressed by the use of at least one 
self-report method to assess imagination in this population. 
As a starting point, I decided to assess pretend play as this is the basis of most of 
the imagination literature in ASD, and the only relevant criterion in the international 
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diagnostic manuals.  I decided to assess past pretend play (using self-report methods) 
in my participants to examine whether or not this has any effect on current RRBs.  
Asking participants about their past pretend play has inherent limitations; for example 
they are limited by the issue of self-report that I have already discussed.  There is also 
the issue of memory; however, there is some evidence of the reliability of 
retrospective recall of childhood in the general population (for a discussion see Lillard 
& Smith, 2012).  As mentioned in Chapter One (page 14), Sandberg et al. (2004) 
interviewed adults with disabilities including AS about their childhood pretend play 
and were able to gain detailed insight into these experiences; although they noted that 
recall of childhood experiences reflects the adults’ current perceptions, and that the 
relationship between perception and reality in memories is not clear.  Indeed, some 
research indicates that autistic individuals have difficulty with episodic and 
autobiographical memory (e.g. Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000; Crane & Goddard, 
2008; Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & Patel, 2007), although there is evidence that this is 
difficulty is limited to speed and specificity and that patterns of recall are similar to NT 
adults (e.g. Crane, Pring, Jukes, & Goddard, 2012).  Regardless, the comparison 
between retrospective recall of childhood pretend play with current RRBs may be 
conflated with the individual’s current perception of reality.  However, I decided to 
include questions about past pretend play as the diagnostic criteria for ASD only list 
pretend play as an example of imagination, and in turn pretend play is the focus of 
much of the imagination literature in ASD.  As adults generally no longer play pretend 
in the same way as children do (although see page 75), it is difficult to gauge their level 
of pretend play other than by questioning themselves or an informant.  This 
information was elicited in two ways for this thesis, and these methods are discussed 
in section 2.5.2 (page 76).  As I intended to measure imagination using a variety of 
methods, it was necessary to determine which other aspects of imagination should be 
assessed.  In order to assist with this decision making process, I ran a short 
consultation study to gain insights and opinions about the suitability and the relevance 
of different types of task.  This study is outlined in the sub-section below. 
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2.5.1 Consultation with experts 
I consulted with three autistic individuals, and two professionals with extensive 
experience in ASD.  I discussed drawing tasks such as design fluency and the impossible 
person task, tasks related to imagining the future and also pretend play questions with 
each participant.  In each case the tasks were explained rather than demonstrated to 
each participant, and each participant was able to ask for clarification on the tasks.  In 
most cases, the design fluency task was accompanied by an example of the 
meaningless line stimuli used in such tasks.  I asked them whether or not they thought 
these tasks were suitable for autistic adults, whether or not they were relevant to 
imagination in ASD, and whether or not they thought that imagination was an 
important aspect of ASD.  I had already started gathering responses to the pretend 
play questions at this point, and so this part of the interview was for evaluation 
purposes only.  Table 2.1 below provides an overview of participants’ responses. 
Table 2-1 Overview of participants’ opinions about imagination tasks and relevance of assessing 
imagination in ASD; Y=Yes, N=No, M=Maybe/Probably/Depends 
 Drawing Future thinking Pretend play Imagination 
Participant Suitable Relevant Suitable Relevant Suitable Relevant Relevant 
Autistic 
individual 
N Y M M M M Y 
Autistic 
individual 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Autistic 
individual 
Y Y Y Y M Y M 
Professional M N M M N N Y 
Professional Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
 
Importantly, four out of the five participants felt that imagination was an 
important area to explore in ASD.  In terms of these three particular areas, opinions 
were relatively mixed.  None of the tasks were dismissed outright, but also none of the 
tasks was universally praised.   The task that elicited the most concern was the pretend 
play questions, with concerns mostly due to understanding of the term pretend play 
(although examples were given) and the memories of individuals.  The first issue is 
addressed by collecting this information using both questionnaire and interview 
method (see the following sub-section), as interviews allow for more detailed 
explanation of what is meant by ‘pretend play’ and other specialised terms, and I have 
already considered the effect of memory on this task in the previous sub-section.  
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Thinking about the future was criticised as it may be confounded with both routines 
and anxiety; however, the former is not necessarily a problem for this thesis as I am 
interested in the relationship between imagination and RRBS.  Drawing tasks were 
mostly criticised in terms of measuring just one very specific part of imagination.  
There was an emphasis on having ‘starting points’ or prompts for tasks, in order to 
reduce the demands on the participant; open questions and tasks were seen as too 
demanding. 
I decided not to assess general measures of creativity such as drawing or writing 
ability as these could be affected by individual differences that are not unique to ASD, 
and may be too sensitive to confounding variables such as motor skills and narrative 
ability. In a similar vein, I chose not to assess counterfactual reasoning as this 
confounds with logical ability.  I also wanted to use tasks that are easily adapted to 
have cues, which were deemed important by the individuals with whom I consulted.  I 
decided to measure a wide range of types of imagination in order to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages identified by my consultants; therefore I chose to 
measure both design fluency and thinking about the future as discussed with my 
participants.  In addition, I included ideational fluency, to further ensure I was 
assessing a wide range of imaginative abilities.   I opted to assess drawing and future 
thinking using fluency tasks as these are a more ‘pure’ measure of imaginative ability 
since the task demands are simple; they only require participants to generate and 
produce ideas.   These tasks can also be scored in such a way as to assess flexibility and 
originality.  It should be noted that these tasks are still limited by confounding factors; 
the design fluency may be affected by motor skills, and the ideational and future 
thinking fluency tasks by verbal ability.  In the following sub-sections I shall describe in 
more detail why I chose the specific measures that I did. 
2.5.2 Specific imagination tasks used in this thesis 
2.5.2.1 Retrospective reports of pretend play 
Pretend play was included as this is a very important area of research in ASD.  
However, this is obviously more difficult to study in adults who likely no longer engage 
in pretend play – although two of the participants that I consulted raised the point that 
some autistic adults do engage in a form of pretend play such as pretending to be 
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another person “in their head” or by taking part in live action role play.  I have already 
discussed the issues surrounding the retrospective recall of pretend play, such as the 
effect of memory and self-perception (page 73). 
The relationship between childhood pretend play and RRBs was assessed in 
two studies.  The first, Study Four (Chapter Four, page 119), was carried out on data 
from an online survey of adults with self-reported clinical diagnoses of ASD.  The 
second, Study Five (Chapter Five, page 139), was carried out in a group of adults with 
ASD with diagnoses of ASD confirmed by clinical reports and/or the DISCO as 
administered by myself.  Since Study Four was designed as an online survey study I 
developed pretend play questions based on the DISCO (see Chapter Four, page 120).  
These were piloted with seven autistic individuals (see Chapter Three, page 82) who 
were able to answer them satisfactorily and did not report any specific problems with 
the questions.  These questions were taken from the DISCO as this interview is based 
on the early work of Wing and Gould (1979), and assesses imaginative abilities in more 
detail than other diagnostic tools such as the ADOS.  For Study Five, I administered the 
abbreviated form of the DISCO (see page 143), which includes the items on which I 
based Study Four’s pretend play questions as part of its schedule.  One disadvantage of 
this approach is the fact this makes it more difficult to compare the findings from 
Study Four (questionnaire items) with the findings from Study Five (interview).  
However, this disadvantage is balanced by the fact that administering these questions 
in interview format removes some of the issues surrounding the use of questionnaires 
as the interviewer is able to respond to participants’ queries directly, provide further 
explanation and examples for specialised terms, and elicit more information from 
participants.   
2.5.2.2 The AQ imagination subscale 
As Studies One and Three were conducted online and there are no diagnostic 
tools for ASD that can be administered entirely online and anonymously, I included the 
AQ (see page 85 for more details) in order to check that participants identifying as 
autistic met the clinical cut-off for ASD, and to ensure that participants in Study One 
did not meet this cut-off.  The AQ is not a screening or diagnostic tool, but it is useful 
as a measure of autistic traits.  The AQ is divided into five subscales, including one that 
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represents imagination.  Therefore, although I did not initially intend to measure 
imagination in this way, I used the AQ data as an additional assessment of imagination. 
However, the subscales of the AQ, in particular imagination, have certain 
weaknesses.  In their original paper, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) did not use factor 
analysis to determine the subscales; these were instead determined conceptually.  
Several factor analyses have failed to find support for the proposed subscales (e.g. 
Austin, 2005; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath & Boomsma, 2008; Kloosterman et al., 2011; 
Stewart & Austin, 2009).  The internal consistency of an imagination subscale is usually 
low (Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray, 2007; Kloosterman et al., 2011; 
Stewart & Austin, 2009) and not all factor analyses even identify an imagination 
subscale (Austin, 2005).  Nevertheless, it is the only measure of ASD traits that includes 
several items relevant to imagination that are not solely concerned with ToM or 
empathy.  As such,  the AQ was used as a measure of imagination but I will interpret 
findings from this scale with caution.  Notably, this will also address the issue I raised 
earlier of comparing questionnaire and task measures, as this enables the RBQ-2A to 
be compared to a questionnaire measure of imagination. 
2.5.2.3 Design and ideational fluency: The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
I initially chose to use two subtests from the TTCT (Torrance, 2008) to assess 
design fluency.  The TTCT is available in two Forms, A and B; these subtests were taken 
from Form A as these particular subtests have been used in previous studies with ASD 
participants (e.g. Pring et al., 2012).  The main reason I chose to use this version of the 
design fluency task was because they are standardised tests with normative data 
available.  However, I only included two subtests rather than the whole test in order to 
reduce the length of time for participants, given the amount of other measures 
included in the study (see pages 140-147).   
As discussed earlier, standardised norms were unfortunately not available for 
the TTCT tasks.  However, these tasks are still useful as they are similar to other 
measures of design fluency with the benefit of standardisation in terms of 
administration and scoring; such that originality scoring is based on normative data 
rather than the responses of the sample, which could lead to circularity in 
measurement.  These two design fluency subtests have also been used in previous 
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studies with ASD participants (Pring et al., 2012; Craig & Baron-Cohen, 1999).  Having 
decided to include these two design fluency tasks, I also chose to include an ideational 
fluency measure from the TTCT, equivalent to a use of objects task but with written 
rather than spoken responses.  I considered including a more conventional use of 
objects task; however, I decided upon this task to complement the figural TTCT 
subtests.  There were two available ideational fluency tasks, one based around unusual 
uses for a cardboard box (Form A) and one based around unusual uses for a tin can 
(Form B).  I initially planned to include both forms of the task; however, when piloting 
Study Five with an autistic individual, the study session was overly long.  I therefore 
decided to only include the cardboard box task as this originates from the TTCT Form A 
along with the chosen design fluency tasks. 
2.5.2.4 Thinking about the future: The personal future task 
When deciding on what tasks to include in this thesis, I reviewed a wide range 
of future thinking tasks that have been used both within and outside the ASD 
population.  Having chosen fluency tasks for two other measures of imagination, I 
identified a widely used future thinking fluency task that has not yet been used with 
autistic individuals, to the best of my knowledge; the personal future task ([PFT] e.g. 
MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1993).  The PFT asks participants to generate 
positive and negative future events across different time periods (see page 270 for 
task instructions).  This task has been used in other clinical populations and is 
conceptually similar to an ideational fluency task, so is a good analogue for that 
particular task. 
One potential limitation of the personal future task is the fact that previous 
studies have found that anxiety and/or depression affects performance on the PFT; for 
example individuals with anxiety generate more negative events than non-anxious 
participants, whereas those with both anxiety and depression generate fewer positive 
events than those with anxiety alone (e.g. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, 
Pankhania, Lee & Mitchell, 1997).  This may present an issue given that mental health 
problems are elevated in the ASD population (e.g. Leyfer et al., 2006) and so 
participants may generate more negative events and/or fewer positive events as a 
result of their mental health rather than ASD traits.  Previous research using other 
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methods has demonstrated that depression does not account for differences between 
autistic and NT participants’ performance on future thinking tasks (Crane et al., 2013).  
However, Crane et al. (2013) did not distinguish between positive and negative future 
thinking as the PFT does and did not include a measure of anxiety; therefore I decided 
to include a measure of both anxiety and depression for this sample in order to test 
whether there was any relationship between mental health symptoms and 
performance on this task.  
The time given for each condition varies across studies from thirty seconds (e.g. 
MacLeod et al., 1993) to three minutes (e.g. Quoidbach, Hansenne & Mottet, 2008).  
Initially I planned to allow two and a half minutes time limit, which is commonly used 
in the UOT to which the PFT is analogous.  However, the autistic individual I piloted this 
study with suggested it was too long and so was reduced to two minutes per condition.  
Finally, as I am interested in the relationship between imagination measures, and both 
the PFT and ideational fluency tasks are verbal (albeit one spoken and the other 
written), any relationship between the two may be entirely explained by verbal 
fluency.  Therefore I included a verbal fluency measure to control for this, based on 
previous studies (Benton, 1968; Lezak et al., 2004; Turner, 1999b). 
2.5.3 Summary of imagination measures 
Study Four and Five include a wide variety of imagination measures, in order to 
assess as much of the construct as possible.  Study Four and Five will include the 
pretend play questions and AQ subscale.  These were chosen in part because they are 
easily administered online; however, as I have noted, they have their limitations.  
Therefore the imagination measures for Study Five, covering pretend play, design 
fluency, ideational fluency and thinking about the future were chosen to improve upon 
Study Four’s measures, and to examine a wider range of imaginative abilities.   The 
latter three were also chosen to provide objective rather than subjective measures of 
imagination.  These measures also allow for the exploration of the three components 
of imagination identified in Chapter One (page 12).  Table 2.2 overleaf shows how 
these different measures relate to these components of fluency, originality and 
flexibility.  Note that the pretend play questions do not map on to these components, 
which should be addressed in future research (page 183). 
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Table 2-2: Relationship between imagination tasks in Study Five and the three key components of imagination 
identified in Chapter One. 
Component Task 
Fluency Incomplete and Repeated Figures 
Unusual Use of Cardboard Boxes 
Personal Future Task 
Originality Incomplete and Repeated Figures 
Unusual Use of Cardboard Boxes 
Flexibility Unusual Use of Cardboard Boxes 
2.6 Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter I identified several methodological issues that 
arose over the course of this body of work.  Firstly there was the issue of how to assess 
RRBs in an adult autistic population.  I decided upon a self-report questionnaire, 
specifically an adapted version of the parent-report RBQ-2.  Secondly there was the 
issue of the best procedure for running a factor analysis.  I have addressed this by 
considering how previous research has approached this and deciding on one analytic 
strategy that I shall use throughout this thesis.  There was then the issue of how to 
measure imagination, given there is no one preferred measure of imagination that 
purports to measure the entire construct.  A related issue arose with the use of 
questionnaire methods to assess RRBs and experimental tasks to assess imagination.  
Therefore I addressed both issues by assessing imagination using a variety of methods, 
including both interview and questionnaire measures.  This in and of itself presents a 
limitation as it means in-depth evaluation of each measure is not possible; however, 
for the purpose of this thesis I decided the priority should be on capturing as much of 
the imagination construct as possible.  Finally I have discussed some of the issues 
relating to the recruitment of participants, which I shall take into consideration when 
interpreting findings from this thesis.  The next chapter presents the early 
development and testing of the RBQ-2A.  
  
 81 
 
3 Chapter Three: The Development of the Adult Repetitive 
Behaviours Questionnaire -2 
 The main aim of this chapter is to develop a self-report measure suitable for 
use with autistic adults.  In order to achieve this aim I adapted an existing parent-
report measure of RRBs, the RBQ-2 (Leekam et al., 2007), into a version suitable for 
adults and assessed this questionnaire using PCA in a sample of undergraduate 
students, and then assessed group differences between NT adults and adults with 
confirmed diagnoses of ASD.  Studies One and Two reported in this chapter have been 
published in the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders (Barrett et al., 2015).  
The RBQ-2A is free available to download online9. 
3.1 Background 
As described in the previous chapter (page 65), the RBQ-2 was chosen as the 
measure to develop into an adult self-report questionnaire.  The RBQ-2 was originally 
tested in a large sample (N=679) of TD two-year-olds (Leekam et al., 2007).  There was 
satisfactory endorsement of all RRBs, and EFA supported both a four- and two-factor 
solution.  The four-factor solution comprised: repetitive motor movements, adherence 
to routine, restricted interests, and unusual sensory interests.  The two-factor solution 
comprised RSMB, which corresponded to repetitive motor movements and unusual 
sensory interests, and IS, which corresponded to adherence to routine and restricted 
interests. The reliability and validity of the RBQ-2 has since been further supported in 
TD 15-month-olds (Arnott et al., 2010).  
 
 The RBQ-2 has also been assessed in children and adolescents with ASD 
(N=120; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014).  Reflecting Leekam et al.'s (2007) findings, PCA 
for this ASD sample also resulted in two components: RSMB and IS, with good internal 
consistency across the whole scale (α=.86) and for both RSMB and IS (α=.79, α=.83, 
respectively).  Overall, the similarity of results across studies, satisfactory endorsement 
of items and good internal consistency support the construct validity of the RBQ-2 in 
children.   
 
                                                          
9 The RBQ-2A can be downloaded here: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/rbq2a/download/  
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 The RBQ-2A was initially developed as part of a Master’s dissertation (Barrett, 
2013). The original RBQ-2 was adapted for use with adults by editing the phrasing of 
questions.  The phrase “does your child” was changed to “do you”, and question 20 
was changed from “what sort of activity will your child choose if they are left to occupy 
themselves?” to “what sort of activity will you choose if you are left to occupy 
yourself?”  Child-specific words such as toys were either replaced with other similar 
concept words (e.g., objects) or removed entirely from items 1, 2, 11 and 14.  In 
addition to piloting with NT participants (see Barrett et al., 2015), the RBQ-2A was also 
piloted with a small group of adults with ASD (N=7; 5 male, 1 female, 1 agender) aged 
20-44 (M=27.61, SD=7.95).  The total mean score for the RBQ-2A ranged from 1.3 to 
2.35 (M=1.97, SD=.51) with a Cronbach’s α of .94, indicating excellent internal 
consistency.  Five participants provided feedback and reported finding the questions 
easy to understand and answer.  This chapter continues this research and assesses the 
RBQ-2A in terms of reliability and validity across two different samples.  
 
 In Study One of this thesis reported below, I followed the pattern taken by 
previous RBQ-2 research by assessing the new RBQ-2A initially only with NT adults.  In 
contrast to research on RRBs in NT children, research on the full range of RRBs in NT 
adults is sparse and generally this research is limited to particular behaviours (e.g. 
Markt & Johnson, 1993).  Therefore, new evidence on self-reported RRBs in NT 
individuals will enable comparison with evidence from adults with ASD, providing 
further insight into the presentation of these behaviours in adults both with and 
without ASD.  Beyond comparison purposes, it will be useful to further our 
understanding of the pattern of RRBs in an adult NT population.  In Study Two, I then 
carried out additional assessments of internal consistency and construct validity with a 
smaller sample of adults in collaboration with colleagues in Australia.   
3.2 Study One: Principal Components Analysis of undergraduate 
students 
 In this study, the RBQ-2A was administered to a university student sample and 
the structure of the RBQ-2A assessed using PCA.  It was expected that two components 
would emerge, which would be consistent with most previous research, and that they 
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would be broadly similar to that found in the original RBQ-2 (Leekam et al., 2007; 
Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014) and show good internal consistency.  However, it 
should be borne in mind that some researchers have found evidence for models with 
three or more components (e.g. Honey et al., 2008; Bishop et al., 2013).  Indeed, 
Leekam et al. found evidence for both a two- and four-factor solution for the RBQ-2.  
The internal consistency of the RBQ-2A was also assessed using Cronbach’s alpha.  
Finally, the AQ was included (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001), which has been used widely 
to assess the presence of a variety of autistic traits in the general population (e.g., 
Hurst et al., 2007; Kloosterman et al., 2011; Stewart & Austin, 2009).  It was expected 
that scores on the RBQ-2A would be significantly correlated with scores on the AQ, 
demonstrating construct validity.   
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
 One hundred and sixty three UK university students were recruited, aged 
between 18 and 50 years (M=21.32 years, SD=4.67; 5 female, 67 male, 1 unreported).  
Participants were undergraduate and postgraduate students recruited via the 
university and social media.  The first wave of participants (N=76) were recruited for 
my Master’s dissertation, and the remainder were recruited during my PhD.  In order 
to increase the number of male participants, male non-Psychology students (N=20) 
were also specifically targeted via the university Notice Board.  Psychology 
undergraduates (N=120) received course credits in exchange for participation.  Two 
participants scored at or above the clinical cut-off of 32 on the AQ and were removed 
from further analyses, resulting in a new sample (N=161) comprising 95 women and 65 
men (1 unreported) with a mean age of 21.28 years (SD=4.69).  The majority (N=136) 
were aged 18-22 years. 
3.2.1.2 Materials 
3.2.1.2.1 The RBQ-2A 
The twenty items comprising the RBQ-2A are presented overleaf (Table 3.1) 
and these items are presented with full response options in Appendix 3 (pages 250-
253).  For thirteen items, there are four available responses, corresponding to never or 
rarely (1), mild or occasional/one or more times daily (2), marked or notable/15 or 
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more times daily (3), and serious or severe/30 or more times daily (4), with additional 
information given regarding the effects of behaviour for eight items.  For the 
remaining seven items, only the first three response levels are offered. 
Table 3-1 Full list of RBQ-2A items and number of responses per item. 
Item Full question Shorthand Response 
options 
1 Do you like to arrange items in rows or patterns? Arrange 4 
2 Do you repetitively fiddle with items? (e.g. spin, twiddle, bang, tap, twist, 
or flick anything repeatedly? 
Fiddle 4 
3 Do you spin yourself around and around? Spin 4 
4 Do you rock backwards and forwards, or side to side, either when sitting 
or when standing? 
Rock 4 
5 Do you pace or move around repetitively? (e.g. walk to and fro across a 
room, or around the same path in the garden?) 
Pace 4 
6 Do you make repetitive hand and/or finger movements? (e.g. flap, wave, 
or flick your hands or fingers repetitively? 
Hand/ finger 4 
7 Do you have a fascination with specific objects? (e.g. trains, road signs or 
other things?) 
Fascination 3 
8 Do you like to look at objects from particular or unusual angles? Angles 3 
9 Do you have a special interest in the smell of people or objects? Smell  3 
10 Do you have a special interest in the feel of different surfaces? Feel 3 
11 Do you have any special objects you like to carry around? Carry 3 
12 Do you collect or hoard items of any sort? Collect 3 
13 Do you insist on things at home remaining the same? (e.g. furniture 
staying in the same place, things being kept in certain places, or arranged 
in certain ways?) 
Home 4 
14 Do you get upset about minor changes to objects? (e.g. flecks of dirt on 
your clothes, minor scratches on objects?) 
Change 4 
15 Do you insist that aspects of daily routine must remain the same? Routine 4 
16 Do you insist on doing things in a certain way or re-doing things until they 
are “just right”? 
Redoing 4 
17 Do you play the same music, game or video, or read the same book 
repeatedly? 
TV/Music 4 
18 Do you insist on wearing the same clothes or refuse to wear new clothes? Clothes 4 
19 Do you insist on eating the same foods, or a very small range of foods, at 
every meal? 
Food 4 
20 What sort of activity will you choose if you are left to occupy yourself? Activities 3 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (page 67), item 20 is typically removed 
from factor analytic studies of the RBQ-2.  This is because it has a non-quantitative 
response scale that is distinct from the other items (Leekam et al., 2007).  Although all 
of the RBQ-2A’s response scales are ordinal, the first nineteen items focus on the 
frequency or severity of a behaviour and therefore have a natural order (e.g. one or 
more times daily is clearly lower than thirty or more times daily).  In contrast, item 20 
asks about the quality of activities (e.g. a restricted range of activities, or a flexible and 
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varied range of activities); whether or not these items represent the higher or lower 
end of a scale is determined by the researcher.  That is, a high score could reflect more 
restricted behaviours, or a high score could reflect more flexible behaviours depending 
on the design of the survey.  In the case of the RBQ-2A, high scores on this item reflect 
more restricted behaviours.  As a result of its removal from factor analysis, item 20 is 
usually included only in the total score rather than the subscale scores.  Therefore item 
20 has been neglected in previous research despite containing a potentially rich source 
of information regarding RRBs; I shall return to this item in Chapter Four (page 119). 
The most extreme responses are rarely endorsed and so in order to make all 
items comparable with each other, the two most extreme responses for items 1-6 and 
13-19 are collapsed into one, resulting in a three-point scale in accordance with 
previous research (Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014).  Mean scores 
are used when analysing the RBQ-2A so as to counteract the effects of missing data, 
calculated by dividing the participant’s total score (out of 60) by the number of items 
actually answered, resulting in a mean total score between 1 and 3 for each 
participant.  Subscale scores may then be calculated according to previous research, or 
as is the case here by running PCA in order to determine components. 
3.2.1.2.2 The AQ 
The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a self-report questionnaire assessing the 
presence of autistic features in the general population.  It comprises 50 statements 
based on the original triad of impairments (social interaction, social communication 
and social imagination; Wing & Gould, 1979), and other aspects of cognitive processing 
in ASD and was originally divided into five subscales (imagination, social skills, 
attention switching, attention to detail and communication) although this was not on 
the basis of empirical evidence.  Each item is answered on a four-point scale ranging 
from definitely disagree to definitely agree.  The questionnaire is then scored in a 
dichotomous manner, such that for half of the items the agree responses represent an 
autistic trait that is scored 1, and the disagree responses are scored 0; and vice versa 
for the remaining half of the items.  The total number of 1s and 0s are then calculated 
and each participant receives a score out of 50, with higher scores indicating greater 
endorsement of autistic traits.  In most studies, a score of 32 is considered the clinical 
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cut-off for ASD in accordance with the original paper (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Later 
research has recommended a more stringent cut-off of 26 (Woodbury-Smith, 
Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005).  Here I chose to implement the the 
original cut-off score of 32 in order to preserve a larger sample size and greater 
variation in  responses. 
In order to assess the correlations between the individual AQ subscales and the 
RBQ-2A, the full range of scores (from 1 to 4) were analysed rather than the traditional 
dichotomous scoring described above (e.g. Kloosterman et al., 2011; Stewart & Austin, 
2009).  This was to increase the amount of information captured by the AQ and so that 
the AQ responses were more comparable to the RBQ-2A.  The necessary items were 
reversed so that a higher score on the AQ subscales indicated a higher level of autistic 
traits; that is, a higher score on the AQ imagination subscale indicates more difficulties 
with imagination.   
3.2.1.3 Procedure, data screening and statistical analyses. 
 Ethical approval was obtained from the university’s School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, and informed consent was obtained from the participants before they 
completed the questionnaires.  The online questionnaires were presented on Google 
Documents, with the RBQ-2A presented first followed by the AQ10.  The data were 
analysed using SPSS 20.  The PCA was run according to the analytic strategy outlined in 
the previous chapter.  The internal consistency for the whole scale and each of the 
resultant components was also assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha (α) values.  
The correlations between age and RBQ-2A score, and between AQ and RBQ-2A scores, 
were also assessed.  Finally, the difference in scores between resultant sub-scales were 
also tested, along with the correlations between the sub-scales. 
3.2.2 Results 
 Table 3.2 on the next page shows the endorsement, mean total scores and 
standard deviations (SDs) for all 20 RBQ-2A items (see Appendix 3 [page 250] for the 
full RBQ-2A questions and responses).  For every item, at least 14.9% of the sample 
                                                          
10 At the time of designing this study, Google Documents was the only tool available to me that was free 
to use without restricting the amount of responses that could be collected; however, it does not allow 
for randomisation of question blocks and therefore there was a fixed order for questionnaires.  The 
RBQ-2A was presented first as it is the primary measure for this study. 
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endorsed mild or occasional or higher.  However, 81.9% of participants responded with 
never or rarely to item 18 (clothing), which resulted in this item being excluded from 
the analysis.  The mean total score for all RBQ-2A items for the sample (N = 161) 
ranged from 1 to 2.55 (M=1.51, SD=.30).  The internal consistency of the whole scale 
was good (Cronbach’s α=.83).  
Table 3-2 Study One: Frequencies, percentages, means and SDs of NT participants’ responses to all 
twenty RBQ-2A items (N=161). 
 
Never or 
rarely  
Mild or occasional/one 
or times daily 
Marked or notable/15 
or more times daily 
Mean (SD) 
1. Arrange 90 (55.9%) 69 (42.9%) 2 (1.2%) 1.45 (.52) 
2. Fiddle* 31 (19.4%) 70 (43.8%) 59 (36.9%) 2.18 (.73) 
3. Spin ** 121 (76.1%) 33 (20.8%) 5 (3.1%) 1.27 (.51) 
4. Rock *** 83 (52.5%) 53 (33.5%) 22 (13.9%) 1.61 (.72) 
5. Pace * 99 (61.9%) 49 (30.6%) 12 (7.5%) 1.46 (.63) 
6. Hand/ finger 65 (40.4%) 59 (36.6%) 37 (23%) 1.83 (.78) 
7. Fascination 120 (74.5%) 39 (24.2%) 2 (1.2%) 1.27 (.47) 
8. Angles* 120 (75.0%) 34 (21.3%) 6 (3.8%) 1.29 (.53) 
9. Smell  125 (77.6%) 27 (16.8%) 9 (5.6%) 1.28 (.56) 
10. Feel* 97 (60.6%) 54 (33.8%) 9 (5.6%) 1.45 (.6) 
11. Carry* 124 (77.5%) 30 (18.8%) 6 (3.7%) 1.26 (.52) 
12. Collect 106 (65.8%) 48 (29.8%) 7 (4.3%) 1.39 (.57) 
13. Home** 74 (46.5%) 68 (42.8%) 17 (10.7%) 1.64 (.67) 
14. Change 86 (53.4%) 60 (37.3%) 15 (9.3%) 1.56 (.66) 
15. Routine 96 (59.6%) 54 (33.5%) 11 (6.8%) 1.47 (.62) 
16. Redoing 72 (44.7%) 70 (43.8%) 19 (11.8%) 1.67 (.68) 
17. TV/Music* 57 (35.6%) 74 (46.3%) 29 (18.1%) 1.83 (.71) 
18. Clothes* 131 (81.9%) 24 (15.0%) 5 (3.1%) 1.21 (.48) 
19. Food* 118 (73.8%) 35 (21.9%) 7 (4.4%) 1.31 (.55) 
20. Activities 53 (32.9%) 91 (56.5%) 17 (10.6%) 1.78 (.62) 
* N = 160; ** N = 159; ***N = 158; Percentages given as valid percentages 
 
3.2.2.1 Principal components analysis 
 Several participants had missing data (N=13) across the 18 RBQ-2A items being 
included in the analysis.  A Missing Value Analysis was conducted on the dataset for 
these 18 items.  As Little’s Missing Completely at Random test was non-significant 
(Z[227]=194.60, p=.94) and the percentage of participants with missing data was small 
(8.07%) it was appropriate to exclude these participants from the analysis (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2014). 
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 The final sample used for the PCA comprised 148 participants (87 female, 60 
male, 1 unreported) with a mean age of 21.3 years (SD=4.79) and a mean total RBQ-2A 
score of 1.52 (SD=.30), and 18 items were entered into the analysis.  The mean total 
RBQ-2A scores of the participants were significantly positively skewed, as found in the 
analysis of other RRB questionnaires in the typical population.  Age was also positively 
skewed with five outliers.  However, age was not significantly correlated with RBQ-2A 
score (rs=.01, p=.88).  Therefore, to preserve variation and sample size these five 
outliers remained in the PCA.  Mean total AQ score was 13.82 (SD=5.99), which was 
normally distributed.  Initial screening indicated that the assumptions of sampling 
adequacy (KMO=.79), multicollinearity and factorability (Z[153]=643.61, p<.001) were 
all met.  The initial PCA solution resulted in six components with eigenvalues greater 
than one, explaining 62.03% of the variance.  PA indicated that two components 
should be retained, so the analysis was re-run specifying two components.   
Table 3-3 Study One: Pattern matrix for PCA of NT data, percentage of variance explained, internal 
consistency and descriptive statistics for each component 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Rotated item loadings: Repetitive Motor Behaviour 
(RMB) 
Insistence on Sameness (IS) 
1. Arrange .45 .14 
2. Fiddle  .61 .05 
3. Spin .71 -.08 
4. Rock .87 -.21 
5. Pace .72 -.07 
6. Hand/finger  .69 .03 
7. Fascination .39 .26 
8. Angles .23 .22 
9. Smell .18 .31 
10. Feel .38 .25 
11. Carry .18 .42 
12. Collect -.08 .50 
13. Home  .00 .70 
14. Change -.10 .70 
15. Routine -.10 .72 
16. Redoing .18 .51 
17. TV/Music .16 .51 
19. Food -.04 .44 
Percentage of variance 
explained: 
25.67% 10.16% 
Cronbach’s alpha (α): .78 .73 
Mean (SD) 1.65 (.46) 1.54 (.37) 
Median (IQR) 1.50 (.67) 1.50 (.47) 
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When running the PCA with oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin), the correlation 
between the two components was above .32, confirming that this was an appropriate 
method of rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  This solution explained 35.83% of the 
variance after Direct Oblimin rotation.  Table 3.3 on the previous page shows the 
rotated item loadings (from the pattern matrix), percentage of variance explained and 
Cronbach’s alpha values for each of the components.   
There were no cross-loading items, but four items did not load sufficiently on to 
either component.  The first component corresponds approximately to RSMB but with 
no sensory items; therefore it is named Repetitive Motor Behaviours (RMB).  The 
second corresponds to insistence on sameness IS as in previous research.  The internal 
consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of both scales is acceptable (> .70). 
3.2.2.2 Correlations and subscale analyses. 
 For the following analyses, non-parametric statistics were used where the data 
were not normally distributed.  Mean total scores on both RMB and IS were 
significantly positively skewed, although there were no outliers.  Table 3.3 on the 
previous page shows the means, standard deviations, medians and interquartile ranges 
(IQRs) of the two components.  There was a significant correlation between the two 
components (rs=.35, p<.001).  A Wilcoxon’s signed ranks test indicated that 
participants scored significantly higher on RMB than IS (Z=-2.79, p=.005).  These results 
indicate that there is a small but significant difference between sub-scale scores. 
 Mean total score on the RBQ-2A was significantly and positively correlated with 
mean total score on the AQ (rs=.57, p<.001), which remained significant when 
removing two outliers on RBQ-2A (rs=.56, p<.001).  Mean total AQ score was also 
significantly positively correlated with both RMB (rs=.35, p<.001) and IS (rs=.54, 
p<.001).  The social skills and communication subscales were positively skewed, with 
four outliers; however, removal of these outliers did not affect the pattern of results so 
they remained in the analyses.  Table 3.4 overleaf shows the correlations of the AQ 
and RBQ-2A subscales with each other.  All of the subscales of the AQ were 
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significantly correlated to the RBQ-2A and its subscales, with the exception of the 
imagination subscale. 
Table 3-4 Study One: Spearman’s ranked correlation coefficients between the RBQ-2A and the subscales 
of the AQ. 
 Social skills Attention 
switching 
Attention to 
detail 
Communication Imagination 
Total RBQ-2A rs=.33** rs=.52** rs=.43** rs=.36** rs=.15 
RMB rs=.19* rs=.28* rs=.34** rs=.30** rs=.13 
IS rs=.34** rs=.58** rs=.37** rs=.25** rs=.12 
**Significant at the .01 level; *Significant at the .05 level 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 This chapter represents the first stage of meeting my aim to develop a self-
report measure of RRBs for adults in order to assess the relationship between 
imagination and RRBs in autistic adults.  The specific aim of Study One was to test the 
RBQ-2A in NT adults.  In addition to being a useful stage in the development and 
testing of RBQ-2A, Study One provided new data on the pattern of RRBs in NT adults.  
An adapted version of a parent report measure of RRBs, the RBQ-2A, was administered 
to a university student sample.  PCA resulted in a two-component structure, one 
comprising motor behaviours, RMB, and the other behaviours related to routines and 
a preference for sameness, IS.  As predicted, scores on the RBQ-2A were also 
correlated with another measure of autistic traits, the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001); 
in addition all of the AQ subscales, with the exception of imagination, were 
significantly associated with the RBQ-2A and its subscales.  Finally, undergraduates 
scored significantly higher on RMB than IS. 
 The RMB component identified in Study One is similar to a component that is 
commonly found in previous research, RSMB (e.g., Cucarro et al., 2003; Leekam et al., 
2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014; Richler et al, 2010).  Five of the six RMB items 
consistently load onto the factor that in previous research included motor and sensory 
items (RSMB), the exception being item one, arranging objects, which loaded here and 
in Leekam et al.’s (2007) analysis but not in Lidstone, Uljarević et al.’s (2014) analysis.  
Whereas it was predicted that the RBQ-2A would form two components, the results 
here were not entirely in line with predictions.  The major difference between RMB 
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found here and RSMB in previous research is the lack of sensory items loading onto 
this component, which was not predicted.  The second component corresponded to IS.  
This result was more comparable to previous research using the RBQ-2 in an ASD 
sample, with five items (13-17) loading in exactly the same way as in Lidstone, 
Uljarević et al.'s study. 
 In summary, the components yielded by the present PCA are similar to previous 
research with NT children and autistic children using the RBQ-2, with the exception of 
sensory items.  Items two to six11 load onto RSMB in the child version of the 
questionnaire (Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014) and RMB in the 
present study, and items 13 to 17 load onto IS across all three studies, supporting the 
construct validity of the questionnaire. 
 To my knowledge this the first study to look at the component structure of 
RRBs in NT adults, and so there are no analogous populations to compare them 
against.  Therefore the most probable reason for the difference between the present 
PCA solution and previous research is that the present sample comprised NT adults 
whereas previous research examined NT children (Leekam et al., 2007) and children 
and adolescents with ASD (Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014).  Certain types of behaviours 
may be associated with younger children or children with ASD rather than NT adults.  
For example, mean scores on items 3 (spinning) and 11 (carrying around objects) were 
higher in NT children (Arnott et al., 2010; Leekam et al., 2007) than in the present 
study.  Moreover, autistic individuals show higher levels of sensory symptoms than NT 
individuals (e.g., Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Kern et al, 2006; Leekam, Nieto, Libby, Wing, 
& Gould, 2007; Rogers & Ozonoff, 2005) and these items were not well endorsed by 
the present sample.  Interestingly however, the participants scored themselves 
significantly higher in terms of RMB than in terms of IS.  This may be because these 
items are tapping into behaviours associated with fidgeting and fiddling that are 
relatively common in typical populations. 
                                                          
11 These are: fiddling, spinning, rocking, pacing and repetitive hand/finger movements.  See Appendix 3 
(pages 250-253) for a complete list of RBQ-2A items. 
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 The different loading of certain items may also reflect the fact that certain 
behaviours do not clearly fall into one particular category.  For example, eating a small 
range of foods (item 19) formed part of IS in the present study but has previously 
loaded on to RSMB (Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014) as well as IS (Leekam et al., 2007); 
eating a small range of food may be a result of sensory issues or insistence on 
sameness and is therefore conceptually related to both subscales.  The fact that these 
sensory items do not load in this analysis may reflect the slightly different wording of 
the questions.  In particular, the sensory items 8 and 9 both ask about a special interest 
which is not a common or everyday term.  As a result participants may be more 
reluctant to endorse these items.  However, the wording is the same for the parent 
version of the questionnaire in which sensory items do load onto a component 
(Lidstone, Uljarević et al.; Leekam et al.).  It is not obvious why the wording of the 
sensory items would affect self-reporting NT adults differently to parents reporting on 
their children.  Furthermore, in the next chapter, I present data from an online study of 
autistic adults in which the sensory items do load onto a component (page 112).  
Finally, of the eighteen items included in the analysis, the four items that did not load 
onto any component were answered on a three-point rather than a four-point scale.  
Given that the responses are collapsed before any analysis takes place, it is unlikely 
that this had any effect on the analysis; although it may be the case that the lack of a 
fourth response option resulted in more participants endorsing the mild/occasional 
response option as the less ‘extreme’ response.  However, these same items are 
scored on a three-point scale in the parent-report version of the RBQ-2, and therefore 
this does not seem a likely explanation. 
 Although the primary goal of Study One was to assess the RBQ-2A’s reliability 
and validity in an undergraduate sample, the inclusion of the AQ allowed me to assess 
the relationship between imagination and RRBs, bearing in mind the criticisms I raised 
in the previous chapter regarding the imagination subscale of the AQ (page 77).  
Interestingly, in this sample the only subscale not associated with any of the RBQ-2A 
subscales was imagination.  This supports Kloosterman et al.’s (2011) previous finding 
that imagination as measured by the AQ is associated with 
communication/mindreading abilities but not resistance to change in an 
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undergraduate population.  This does not necessarily impact negatively on the case for 
a relationship between RRBs and imagination; indeed Honey et al. (2007) identified a 
relationship between RRBs and play that was specific to autistic children. 
 There are some limitations in terms of the sample.  Firstly, the sample 
comprised only university students and is therefore limited in age and IQ distribution.  
However, this will be addressed by assessing more representative samples later in this 
chapter (page 94).  A second limitation lies in the relatively small sample size for a PCA.  
There are no concrete rules for how large a sample size is needed for PCA (e.g. 
Hogarty, Hines, Kromey, Ferron, & Mumford, 2005).  Some argue that at least 100-300 
cases are needed, whereas others recommend a specific ratio of cases to variables, 
ranging from 3:1 to 10:1 (e.g. Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014; 
Williams et al, 2010).  However, such rules of thumb have been found to be unreliable 
(e.g. Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; MacCallum, Widaman, Shaobo & Hong, 1999).   
PCA was deemed appropriate here for the following reasons.  First and 
foremost, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .79 which is well above the 
acceptability criterion of .5 (Field, 2013).   The PCA also met all other assumptions of 
the analysis.  Secondly, if communalities are above .5 then samples between 100 and 
200 are adequate as long as there are few factors with a small number of salient 
variables (MacCallum, et al., 1999).  Here there are two components with six and eight 
variables each, and all communalities were greater than .5 before rotation (M=.62).  
Finally, it is desirable for a component to have five or more loadings at .5 or greater 
(Osborne & Costello, 2009); however, if a component has four or more loadings 
greater than .6 then the pattern may be interpreted whatever the sample size 
(Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988).  Here RMB has 5 item loadings above .6, suggesting it is 
reliable, although IS has just 3 loadings above .6 so does not meet this criterion.  
Nevertheless, both components meet Osborne and Costello’s (2009) criterion.  
Therefore, although the sample size is relatively small for PCA, given these strengths 
and the overall similarity of the PCA solution to previous research (with the exception 
of the sensory items), it presents only a minor limitation.  Furthermore, the RBQ-2A 
was assessed in a larger sample, comprising participants with ASD, which will be 
reported in Chapter Four.  
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As part of collaboration with researchers in Melbourne, Australia, RBQ-2A data 
were available from adults with ASD diagnosed by a clinician and confirmed by the 
researchers, along with a group of NT adults matched on IQ.  This enabled me to assess 
group differences with adults confirmed to have a diagnosis of ASD.  In addition, the 
effects of IQ could be ruled out.  Furthermore, when recruiting the NT control group, 
diagnoses of ASD were screened for as well as anxiety and mood disorders, allowing us 
more confidence in describing this group as NT.  The next study assessed the 
differences in RBQ-2A between these two groups as an additional measure of criterion 
validity. 
3.3 Study Two: Comparison between ASD and NT participants 
In Study Two, we assessed the group differences between a sample of adults 
confirmed to have an ASD diagnosis and an NT sample.  It was hypothesised that the 
ASD sample would score significantly higher than the NT group on the RBQ-2A.  If the 
expected group differences are found, then this supports the construct validity of the 
RBQ-2A.  This study also explored the reliability of the subscales found in Study One in 
a more representative NT sample.   
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
 Data were collected from two groups of adults who were participating in a 
larger study of the roles of melatonin, cortisol and psychopathology in sleep 
disturbance in adults with ASD being carried out in La Trobe University, Melbourne, 
Australia12.  All participants completed a screening questionnaire that included first 
language, ASD diagnosis or family history of ASD, comorbid diagnoses, employment 
and marital status, living arrangements and medication.  To be accepted into the 
study, ASD adults needed to have a confirmed clinical diagnosis of ASD (clinical reports 
were provided), while NT adults all had an AQ score <26 (Woodbury-Smith et al., 
2005).  Any individual with a diagnosis of schizophrenia was also excluded from the 
study.  Furthermore, NT adults were excluded if they had a first degree relative with 
ASD, or if they had an anxiety or mood disorder.  All participants had at least average 
                                                          
12 The sharing of this data was approved by both Cardiff University School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee and by La Trobe University’s Human Ethics Committee.  
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intellectual ability (IQ > 80) and the NT and ASD samples were group-wise matched for 
Performance IQ (PIQ), Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Full Scale IQ (FSIQ), as shown in Table 3.5 
(page 96).  
The ASD group (N=29) comprised 15 women and 14 men aged 21.86 to 44.23 
years (M=34.27, SD=6.29).  The NT group (N=37) comprised 23 women and 14 men 
aged 21.90 to 43.32 years (M=30.75, SD=6.21).  For the NT group, 48.6% were 
employed on a full time basis, 24.3% worked part-time, 24.3% were students and 2.1% 
were unemployed.  For the ASD group, 27.6% were employed full time, 24.1% worked 
part-time, 6.9% were home keepers, 13.8% were students and 27.6% were 
unemployed.  ASD participants were recruited through various Australian Autism 
Associations, the research centre’s Research Participant Registry as well as flyers 
displayed at clinics specialising in ASD.  The NT participants were recruited primarily 
through the School of Psychological Science participant registry, social media, and 
flyers placed around the university and in the general public.  This study received 
ethical approval from La Trobe University’s Human Ethics Committee.  Informed 
consent was obtained for all participants. 
3.3.1.2 Materials 
 As in the previous studies all participants completed the RBQ-2A and the AQ as 
part of an online survey comprising several different questionnaires.  The subscales of 
the AQ were not assessed in this study.  
 As noted above, all ASD participants provided a copy of their clinical report 
confirming their diagnosis.  They were also assessed using the ADOS-2 (Lord et al., 
2012), a semi-structured observation schedule that is used clinically to diagnose ASD 
and confirm diagnoses for research purposes.  ADOS-2 data were available for 27 of 
the ASD group; the remaining two participants were recruited interstate and funds 
were not available to travel to assess them.  The total ADOS-2 score ranged from 4 to 
19 for this sample (M=11.59, SD=4.23).  Six participants (21%) did not meet the criteria 
for ASD according to the recently revised ADOS-2 algorithm (Lord et al., 2012), which is 
similar to the rate reported by Bastiaansen et al. (2011).  However, when removing 
participants who did not meet ADOS-2 criteria for ASD from the analyses, the pattern 
of results did not change (with the exception that RMB no longer significantly 
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correlated with the AQ).  Therefore, as these participants had a confirmed clinical 
diagnosis of ASD they remained in the analysis to preserve statistical power. 
 Twenty-three (79%) of the ASD participants and 34 (92%) of the NT participants 
completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2008) to 
gain estimates of VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ.  Four of the ASD participants had recently 
completed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – III as part of their diagnostic 
assessment and IQ scores were obtained from their diagnostic reports.  Participants 
who were not assessed lived interstate (2 ASD, 3 NT).  No participants scored below 89 
on any of the IQ measures. Participants who did not complete an IQ assessment held, 
or were in the process of completing, a diploma or undergraduate degree and thus 
were considered high-functioning.  The means, SDs and ranges for all three IQ scores 
for both groups are shown in Table 3.5 below. 
Table 3-5 Study Two: VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ ranges, mean scores and SDs and correlation with mean total 
RBQ-2A scores for both NT and ASD groups. 
 NT ASD 
 Mean (SD) Range N Correlation 
with RBQ-2A 
Mean (SD) Range N Correlation 
with RBQ-2A 
VIQ 115.06 
(8.77) 
97-130 34 rs = -.17 
p = .34 
118.92 
(11.64) 
95–143 25 r = .07 
p = .73 
PIQ 115.74 
(9.93) 
96-134 34 rs = -.06 
p = .75 
116.48 
(13.68) 
89–150 25 r = -.07 
p = .74 
FSIQ 117.44 
(8.61) 
99-133 34 rs =-.10 
p = .59 
120.22 
(12.08) 
96-145 27 r = .03 
p = .90 
 
3.3.1.3 Data screening and statistical analyses 
 The age of the NT group was positively skewed, so square root transformation 
was applied to the ages of both samples; the ASD group was significantly older than 
the NT group (t[1, 60.26]=5.08, p=.03).  Therefore any group differences may be 
confounded by age.  However, age was not significantly correlated with participants’ 
mean total score on the RBQ-2A in either the NT (rs=.08, p=.645) or ASD group (r=-.02, 
p=.94).  Welch’s t-tests, which correct for unequal sample sizes, showed no significant 
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differences between the two groups in terms of VIQ (t[1, 42.8)=1.94, p=.17), PIQ (t[1, 
41.64]=.05, p=.82) or FSIQ (t[1, 45.39=1.02, p=.32).  Furthermore, mean total score on 
the RBQ-2A was not significantly correlated with VIQ, PIQ or FSIQ in either of the 
participant groups (see Table 3.5).  These data were assessed by testing the between-
group differences, the within-group differences for each group separately, and the 
correlations between the RBQ-2A and AQ, along with the correlations amongst the 
sub-scales. 
3.3.2 Results 
 The means, SDs, medians and interquartile ranges (IQRs) for the RBQ-2A across 
the two groups are shown in Table 3.6 below.  Mean RBQ-2A total scores ranged from 
1 to 1.8 in the NT group and from 1.05 to 2.75 in the ASD group.  Participants in the 
ASD group scored significantly higher on the RBQ-2A than participants in the NT group 
(Z=-5.43, p<.001, r=-.67), indicating a large effect size.  No significant sex differences 
were found in mean RBQ-2A score in either the NT or ASD group.  There were 
significant positive correlations between mean total RBQ-2A score and mean total AQ 
score in both ASD participants (rs=.56, p=.002) and NT participants (rs=.42, p=.01).  
Finally, the internal consistency of the RBQ-2A was acceptable in the NT group (α=.73) 
and excellent in the ASD group (α=.91).   
Table 3-6 Study Two: Means, SDs, medians and IQRs for the mean total RBQ-2A score and the 
components RMB and IS 
 ASD group NT group 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Mean (SD) Median (IQR) 
Total RBQ-2A 
score 
1.84 (.45) 1.90 (.78) 1.25 (.19) 1.20 (.25) 
RMB score 1.59 (.45) 1.50 (.58) 1.26 (.28) 1.17 (.33) 
IS score 2.04 (.55) 2.0 (1.0) 1.29 (.25) 1.25 (.25) 
RSMB score 1.64 (.47) 1.60 (.70) 1.20 (.24) 1.10 (.30) 
 
3.3.2.1 Subscale Analysis 
Mean scores on the two subscales identified in Study One, RMB and IS, were 
calculated for all participants.  The means, SDs, medians and IQRs of the mean scores 
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on each component for the two groups are shown in Table 3.6.  The ASD group scored 
significantly higher than the NT group on both RMB (Z=-3.32, p=.001, r=-.41) and IS (Z=-
5.51, p<.001, r=-.68), indicating medium and large effect sizes respectively.  Unlike the 
findings from Study One, there were no significant differences between scores on RMB 
and IS for the NT group (Z=-.90, p=.37).  However, in the ASD group participants scored 
significantly lower on the RMB subscale compared to the IS subscale (t[28]=-5.62, 
p<.001).  There were also no significant sex differences in either of the subscales in 
both groups (p>.05).  In the ASD group, the internal consistency was acceptable for 
RMB (α=.75) and good for IS (α=.87).  For the NT group internal consistency was 
questionable for RMB (α=.65) and poor for IS (α=.55).  In addition, RMB and IS were 
significantly correlated in the ASD group (r=.64, p<.001) but not in the NT group 
(rs=.15, p=.37). 
 The subscales of the RBQ-2A as identified from Study One exclude the sensory 
items  as defined by Lidstone, Uljarević et al. (2014; items 7, 8, 9 and 1013).  As sensory 
atypicalities are a behavioural feature of ASD, an RSMB variable was created with 
these items, comprising the RMB and sensory items (items 1-10, see Appendix 3, page 
250).  The mean RSMB score of the NT group was 1.20 (SD=.24; α=.76) and the mean 
RSMB score for the ASD group was 1.64 (SD=.47; α=.85).  The medians and IQRs are 
displayed in Table 3.6.  The ASD group scored higher than the NT group in terms of 
RSMB (Z=-4.20, p<.001, r=-.52), with a large effect size.  There was no significant 
within-participant difference between RSMB and IS for the NT group (Z=-1.68, p =.09) 
but there was for the ASD group (t[28]=-5.11, p<.001).  Again there were no significant 
sex differences in terms of RSMB in either group (p>.05). 
3.3.2.2 Subsidiary analyses 
The RBQ-2A scores of the Study One sample were also compared to the NT 
group from Study Two.  In order to create matched groups, only the older participants 
from each group (aged 23 years and older) and those with an AQ score <26 were 
selected.  This resulted in two NT groups: one from Study One (N=20) and one from 
Study Two (N=34), which did not significantly differ in terms of age (Z=-1.68, p=.09) or 
                                                          
13 Lidstone, Uljarević, et al. (2014) also included items 18 and 19 as sensory items.  However, these were 
not included here as 18 was excluded from the PCA and 19 loaded with IS. 
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AQ score (t[1, 36.77]=3.54, p=.07).  The mean age, RBQ-2A and AQ scores are 
displayed in Table 3.7 below.  RBQ-2A scores were positively skewed in the Study Two 
sample, so the RBQ-2A scores of both were transformed using natural logarithm for 
this analysis.  Group comparison of RBQ-2A total scores showed that the Study One NT 
group scored significantly higher on the RBQ-2A than the Study Two NT group (t[1, 
27.83]=12.04, p=.002).  The Cronbach's alpha of the older participants from Study One 
was good (α=.87), lending further support to the internal consistency of the RBQ-2A in 
older adults.  In addition, when this Study One NT  subgroup was compared with the 
Study Two ASD participants aged 23 years and older (N=26; M age=35.64 [SD=5.03]; M 
RBQ-2A score=1.83 [SD=.44]), the Study Two ASD participants still scored significantly 
higher than the Study One subgroup (t[1, 44]=8.02, p=.007).  
Table 3-7 Study Two: Means, SDs, medians and IQRs for the mean total RBQ-2A and components scores 
for the two NT groups 
 Study One NT group Study Two NT group 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Mean (SD) Median (IQR) 
Age (years) 30.0 (8.59) 25.51 (12.04) 31.52 (5.88) 30.01 (10.12) 
Total RBQ-2A  1.51 (.33) 1.40 (.39) 1.24 (.17) 1.20 (.25) 
Total AQ 14.4 (5.09) - 11.79 (4.60) - 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 This study explored the difference in RBQ-2A scores between NT and adult ASD 
participants.  In line with the hypothesis, participants with ASD scored significantly 
higher on the RBQ-2A than IQ-matched NT participants, in terms of both total score 
and scores on the subscales identified in Study One.  This supports the construct 
validity of the RBQ-2A in adults as it is able to detect differences in RRBs between 
autistic and NT groups.  Additionally, the internal consistency of the RBQ-2A was 
further supported in this study, with the exception of the IS subscale in the NT group.  
Although the RMB subscale was <.70 which is generally interpreted as questionable, it 
can be argued that when assessing psychological constructs, values below .70 can be 
expected and accepted (Field, 2013).  It may be that the internal consistency is higher 
 100 
 
for the ASD group as the items are more relevant for this group than the NT 
participants. 
 These results indicate that the RBQ-2A is able to distinguish between NT and 
ASD participants at a group level, as NT participants rate themselves lower on RRBs.  
However, this finding would be strengthened by assessing the accuracy of self-report, 
by testing the correlation between the RBQ-2A and another type of measure such as 
parent-report or observation.  Some argue that individuals with ASD find introspection 
and reporting their symptoms difficult (e.g., Williams, 2010).  Nevertheless, group 
differences were detected, indicating that adults with ASD are able to self-report RMB 
and IS behaviours with accuracy.   
 Interestingly, while there is no significant difference between both versions of 
RMB and IS in the NT sample, participants with ASD rate themselves significantly 
higher on IS compared to RMB.  This suggests that among older adults with ASD, 
reported IS behaviours are particularly high compared to RMB.  This is supported by 
some research that indicates whereas RSMBs have reduced by adulthood, levels of IS 
remain high, although this distinction is not always found (e.g. Esbensen et al., 2009).  
This pattern was repeated when including sensory items in the RMB factor to create 
RSMB. In addition, the NT group scored themselves significantly lower compared to 
the ASD group on all subscales. For both groups, addition of sensory items increased 
the internal consistency compared to RMB. For the NT group, addition of sensory 
items slightly reduced the mean (from 1.26 to 1.20) whereas for the ASD group, 
addition of sensory items increased the mean (from 1.59 to 1.64), increasing the 
difference between the two groups established on the RMB subscale. This reflects 
previous research that found autistic individuals show higher levels of sensory 
symptoms than NT individuals (e.g., Kern et al. 2006). Given these results, it is 
important to retain the sensory items in the RBQ-2A when it is administered to an ASD 
sample.  However, there is a caveat with this analysis in that this version of the RSMB 
subscale is theoretically driven rather than based on previous empirical evidence.  The 
issue of whether or not to include sensory items in the RBQ-2A will be returned to in 
Chapter Four, which describes a larger sample of autistic adults. 
 101 
 
Scores on the RBQ-2A were higher in Study One compared to the NT group 
from Study Two.  Interestingly, the students in Study One also rated themselves higher 
in terms of RMB compared to IS, whereas there were no within-group differences in 
the Study Two sample; this may reflect a different pattern of RRBs as well as different 
levels of RRBs.  However, when matching the two NT groups in terms of age and total 
AQ score, the Study One university students still scored higher on the RBQ-2A than the 
Study Two sample.  Therefore it seems unlikely that either differences in age or AQ 
score account for the differences in RBQ-2A scores of both two NT groups.  Although 
the two samples were recruited from different countries, both are Western countries, 
making country of origin an unlikely explanation for the difference in RBQ-2A score.  A 
more plausible explanation might be that in Study Two, NT participants with anxiety or 
mood disorders were excluded, while this did not occur in Study One.  Furthermore, 
the participants in Study One were university students and it has been shown that 
university students have high levels of anxiety symptoms compared to the general 
population (e.g., Andrews & Wilding, 2004; Stallman, 2010).  Anxiety may be related to 
RRB, for example via rituals in university students (Markt & Johnson, 1993) and in 
children and adolescents with ASD (e.g., Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014; Rodgers et al., 
2012).   
3.4 General Discussion 
 Overall, these results indicate that the RBQ-2A is a useful new self-report 
measure for assessing RRBs in adults.  Study One found a two-component structure in 
an NT university student sample that approximately corresponds to previous research 
using other measures of RRBs, with the exception of sensory items.  Study One also 
supported previous research (Kloosterman et al., 2011) by failing to show a 
relationship between the AQ imagination subscale and RRBs.  Study Two, using a more 
representative sample of adults, found that participants with ASD score significantly 
higher than IQ-matched NT participants on the RBQ-2A total and subscale scores, 
which would be expected from an accurate measure of RRBs.  The internal consistency 
of the RBQ-2A and its subscales was high for adults with ASD in Study Two, providing 
further support to its reliability as a measure of RRBs for adults with ASD; both studies 
also support the use of the RBQ-2A as a measure of RRBs in NT adults.  Additionally, 
 102 
 
both studies showed that RRBs are significantly associated with AQ score (with the 
exception of the imagination subscale in Study One), supporting the construct validity 
of the RBQ-2A.  Subsidiary analyses in Study Two also indicated that although the 
university sample in Study One had higher levels of RRB than the adults in Study Two, 
this was unlikely to be due to differences in age.  Given the potential relationship 
between RRBs and anxiety, it can be speculated that the higher incidence of anxiety in 
university populations (Andrews & Wilding, 2004; Stallman, 2010), alongside the 
screening for significant psychopathology in the Study Two NT sample, may have 
biased the Study One group to relatively higher scores14. Further research is needed to 
explore both the association between psychopathology symptoms and RRBs, and 
whether the RBQ-2A can accurately distinguish between ASD and psychological 
disorders that involve high levels of RRB, such as OCD and other specific anxiety 
disorders.   
 An unexpected finding from Study One is that most sensory items from the 
RBQ-2A did not load onto either component; although it should be noted that this was 
the first PCA carried out on an adult NT sample of RRB data.  Therefore it is not known 
whether this reflects a genuine finding, or reveals a weakness in the RBQ-2A, as 
discussed in this chapter (pages 91-92).  It may be that the RBQ-2A does not capture a 
wide enough range of sensory behaviours, as it includes just six items from the original 
set of 25 items in the DISCO (corresponding to items 7, 8, 9, 10, 18 and 19 in the RBQ-
2A15) and these items do not cover all sensory modalities.  Other questionnaires are 
more detailed, for example the Glasgow Sensory Profile (Robertson & Simmons, 2013) 
covers seven modalities, including auditory, vestibular and proprioceptive, which are 
not included in the RBQ2-A.  Another explanation could be that the participants in the 
present studies may report an unusually low number of sensory behaviours.  The 
Glasgow Sensory Profile has provided evidence of a wider range of sensory behaviours 
in the general population (Robertson & Simmons, 2013).  Furthermore, 45% of an NT 
sample (N=20) reported at least one marked sensory atypicality on the Sensory 
                                                          
14 However, see Study Five for a failure to show a relationship between the RBQ-2A and anxiety (pages 
158-159). 
15 Note that in Study One, item 18 was excluded due to too few endorsements (page 87), and item 19 
loaded on to IS (see page 92 for a discussion). 
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Preferences Questionnaire (Kent, 2014, unpublished doctoral thesis).  In contrast only 
15.54% of the participants entered into the PCA in Study One responded to items 7-19 
with marked or notable and no NT participant endorsed marked or notable on any of 
these items in Study Two.  These findings indicate that sensory symptoms are not 
common in the NT participants across both studies, whereas they are highly prevalent 
within the autistic population (e.g., Boyd et al., 2010; Kern et al., 2006; Leekam et al., 
2007) and in Study Two’s ASD sample. 
3.4.1 Limitations 
 There are some important limitations to consider for the studies reported here.   
As the RBQ-2A was adapted from a measure for children, it may be missing certain 
items that are applicable only to adults; for example, IS behaviours may increase with 
age (e.g. Bishop et al., 2013; Moore & Goodson, 2003), and therefore more detailed 
questions in relation to IS may improve an adult measure.  In addition, the RBQ-2A as a 
self-report measure is currently suitable only for more able adults.  Therefore the RBQ-
2A, and any associated findings, are only generalizable to this population.  In both 
studies, there was significant positive correlation between the AQ and the RBQ-2A.  
However, this correlation might be partly explained by the fact both are self-report 
measures.  As mentioned, it is therefore important to compare the RBQ-2A with other 
measures of autistic traits such as interviews or informant-report questionnaires.  In 
Chapter Five of this thesis, the abbreviated DISCO (Carrington, Kent, et al., 2014) was 
administered to participants alongside the RBQ-2A, so the relationship between self-
report and researcher ratings can be assessed.  Similarly, the RBQ-2A should be 
assessed alongside an independent measure of RRBs, as it is closely related to the 
DISCO, which will also be addressed in Chapter Five. 
 A general criticism of the RBQ-2A is the fact that it is a self-report measure, 
which is a somewhat contentious issue in ASD literature, as I noted in Chapters One 
and Two.  There is some evidence that self-report is not reliable in autistic populations 
(e.g. Dewrang & Sandberg, 2011; Johnson et al., 2009).  However, in the case of the 
RBQ-2A, ASD participants scored higher in terms of internal consistency than NT 
participants and the RBQ-2A successfully discriminated between ASD and NT 
participants, supporting the use of the RBQ-2A in this population.  As exemplified by 
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the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), certain RBQ-2A items do ask about preferences 
rather than actual behaviours (e.g. item 1: “Do you like to arrange items in rows or 
patterns?”).  Other questions ask about behaviours which may present more of a 
difficulty; however, these questions do not explicitly address psychological states.  
During piloting, participants were asked for feedback on questions and none reported 
any particular difficulty with the RBQ-2A questions, although two participants with ASD 
found it difficult to respond to the AQ.  The effect of self-report will be further 
examined in Chapter Five. 
3.4.2 Conclusion 
Chapter One described previous factor analytic studies of RRBs in ASD and 
research relating to adults with ASD, concluding that a self-report measure of RRBs for 
autistic adults is needed.    Therefore the studies presented here represent an 
important new contribution with the development of an adult self-report measure of 
RRBs, which can be used with both ASD and NT populations.  The need for such a 
measure is indicated by the findings of the studies, which indicate that self-reported 
RRBs in adulthood may present slightly differently than carer-reported RRBs in 
childhood.  In particular, although the subtypes of RRBs remain the same, the specific 
behaviours that are endorsed differ.  The potential clinical applications of the RBQ-2A 
include its use as a signposting questionnaire or as a supplement to diagnostic 
interviews such as the DISCO.  Its utility may be especially helpful given that the AQ 
does not give an adequate or reliable assessment of RRBs across typical populations 
(e.g., Kloosterman et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2013).  It may also be useful for other clinical 
conditions that show RRBs, such as OCD, Gilles de la Tourette syndrome and 
Parkinson’s disease (Langen et al., 2011).  From a research perspective, the RBQ-2A 
allows for the opportunity to accurately and reliably explore RRBs directly in adults 
both with and without ASD.  Overall, these results show that the RBQ-2A is a promising 
self-report measure of RRBs in adults.  However, further research should involve older 
and more diverse NT participants that include representation of a range of ethnic and 
socio-economic statuses, as well as a larger sample of adults with confirmed diagnoses 
of ASD.  Although the RBQ-2A is a descriptive questionnaire that can only identify a 
profile of behaviours as perceived by self-informants, further research comparing self- 
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and other-informant RBQ-2A questionnaires and its use with clinical interviews may 
help to assess how well the RBQ-2A complements and streamlines the diagnostic 
process in clinical practice.  Chapter Four addresses some of these issues and builds on 
this chapter by assessing the factor structure of the RBQ-2A in a larger sample of 
adults with ASD.  In addition, Chapter Five further tests the RBQ-2A’s reliability and 
validity in adults with ASD by assessing the RBQ-2A against additional measures of 
RRBs.  Both of these chapters also use the RBQ-2A as the primary measure of RRBs 
when addressing the main question of the thesis (“what is the nature of the 
relationship, if any, between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults?”). 
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4 Chapter Four: Assessing the RBQ-2A and its association with 
reported pretend play in autistic adults 
 In Chapter Three, I described the development and initial testing of the RBQ-2A 
in two samples, and showed the RBQ-2A to have acceptable reliability and validity.  In 
this chapter, I will extend these findings by analysing the component structure of the 
RBQ-2A in a sample of adults with ASD.  This chapter will also address any differences 
that arise when assessing the component structure of the RBQ-2A with an NT or ASD 
sample.  Finally, I will test the possible association between RRB and imagination in 
autistic adults using self-reported measures of imagination in childhood and adulthood 
as part of the main aim of the thesis.  A large online survey of RRBs, ASD traits and 
history of childhood pretend play in autistic adults was conducted for both studies. 
4.1 Background 
 In the previous chapter, a PCA carried out on NT undergraduate student data 
(Study One) revealed a two-component structure of RRB when assessed using the 
RBQ-2A.  Although the identification of two components is common in previous 
research (e.g. Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014), the items 
comprising these two components were somewhat unusual; specifically, the sensory 
items did not load onto either component.  However, as this was the first PCA carried 
out on RRB data from NT adults, it cannot be said for certain whether or not this 
finding is an anomaly or a reflection of the actual structure of RRBs in an NT 
population.  Study One also found that in an undergraduate population, imagination is 
the only AQ subscale not associated with RRBs.  In line with predictions, autistic adults 
scored significantly higher on the RBQ-2A and its two components compared to NT 
adults (Study Two).  This provides the first evidence that the RBQ-2A is suitable for use 
in research with autistic adults, which is the intended use for this questionnaire.  The 
next stage of the research was to assess the RBQ-2A in a larger sample of adults with 
ASD. 
 A survey comprising the RBQ-2A, the AQ, and a series of questions about 
participants’ childhood pretend play was distributed online.  As I have noted (see 
Chapter Two, page 73), there are issues regarding the reliability of retrospective recall 
of childhood experiences, as they can be affected by the adult’s current perspective 
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and episodic recall can be poor in ASD; however, I decided it was important to include 
a measure of pretend play as it is the most common context in which imagination is 
assessed in ASD.  The intent was to recruit only adults with ASD and it was indicated in 
the information sheet and consent form that only individuals with a clinical diagnosis 
of ASD should participate.  The survey did not explicitly exclude non-UK participants; 
however, it was designed for a UK audience (for example, participants were asked 
about British qualifications) and the initial recruitment was based in the UK (e.g. British 
charities).  Following publication of the RBQ-2A (Barrett et al., 2015), a successful press 
release resulted in international media interest.  However, some international 
websites misrepresented the study as a self-diagnostic test of ASD.  As a result, an 
extremely wide range of people took part in the survey globally (N=2593) reporting 
diagnoses of ASD, other conditions or no diagnosis at all.  Appendix 4 (Table 8.3, pages 
254-257) describes the breakdown of the whole sample according to country.  In order 
to analyse a more homogeneous group, the decision was made to analyse only those 
reporting a clinical diagnosis of ASD and those either living in or originally from the UK 
(N=352) for the thesis.  Care was taken to remove participants who indicated in any 
way that they thought the survey was a test.  However, the remaining data should be 
analysed in the future, particularly as it allows for confirmation of component 
structure and cross-sectional comparisons.   
 The main question addressed in this thesis is the potential relationship 
between imagination and RRB.  Although there is a sound theoretical case for a 
negative association between imagination and RRB (Chapter One, page 50), the little 
research examining this relationship has produced inconsistent findings.  The 
inconsistency may be due to methodological differences between studies, in particular 
only examining one or two aspects of each construct.  For example, not all studies 
examine the different subtypes of RRB (Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Honey et al., 2007) 
and there is evidence that this relationship may be specific to IS (Turner, 1997).  
Another issue is relying on one type of assessment in each study, for example relying 
only on one imagination task, or only assessing pretend play or future thinking.  Both 
of these limitations are addressed in this chapter.  The RBQ-2A can be divided into 
subscales using PCA, and each are examined separately in relation to imagination.  In 
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addition to the RBQ-2A’s subscale, I assessed the relationship between imagination 
and RRBs measured by item 20.  Item 20, as described in Chapter Three (pages 84-86), 
is generally excluded from factor analytic studies as its responses represent a non-
quantitative scale16.  However, this represents a potentially important source of 
information regarding RRBs.  There is no statistical evidence for what subtype of RRBs 
it falls under; however, given its focus on restricted interests and activities, it seems 
likely to be related to IS and therefore it is important to test its relationship with 
imagination. 
Moreover, as part of this online survey study, data were collected regarding two 
aspects of imagination.  The main measure of imagination was a series of questions 
regarding past pretend play activities derived from the DISCO (e.g. When you were a 
child, did you play pretend?).  I assessed whether or not participants who reported 
playing pretend as a children show lower levels of RRBs.  An alternative measure of 
imagination in adulthood comes from the inclusion of the AQ.  As I explained in 
Chapter Two (pages 76-77), the primary purpose of including the AQ in this study was 
to check levels of autistic traits in the sample as confirming diagnosis was not possible; 
however, the AQ does include an imagination subscale and so scores on this subscale 
were compared with scores on the RBQ-2A.   This is considered a subsidiary measure 
of imagination rather than the primary measure in this study given limitations 
regarding this subscale (see Chapter Two, page 77). 
4.2 Study Three: PCA of RBQ-2A data from autistic adults 
 In this study, a PCA was carried out on the RBQ-2A data from the online survey.  
It was hypothesised that there would be at least two components corresponding to 
RSMB and IS as in previous research with participants with ASD.  It was thought that in 
contrast to in Study One, the sensory items would load together with the RMB items. 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited through the Wales Autism Research Centre’s 
website and Research Recruitment Register, the RBQ-2A website, and several UK ASD 
                                                          
16 Summary of response options: one (range of different and flexible activities), two (some varied and 
flexible activities) and three (restricted and repetitive activities). 
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charities, along with the media attention described above which directed individuals to 
the websites.  There were 352 participants aged between 18 and 66 (M=37.0, 
SD=12.32) who reported a diagnosis of an ASD and were living in or originally from the 
UK.  There were 132 men, 215 women and 5 participants with a non-binary gender 
identity17.  The majority reported a diagnosis of AS (N=198, 56.25% of the sample).  
The majority of participants were white (92.6%), 41.8% had studied to degree level and 
57.1% were employed.  Table 4.1 below shows the proportions of all the ASD 
diagnoses for this sample.  Of the participants who reported the age of diagnosis 
(N=341), 251 (73.6%) were diagnosed as an adult and 90 (26.4%) were diagnosed as a 
child.  Eleven participants did not report age at diagnosis (N ASD=8; N AS=2; N HFA=1).  
Table 4-1 Study Three: Frequency and percentage of diagnoses reported by participants in Chapter 4 by 
age of diagnosis (N=341) 
Diagnosis Child (N=90) Adult (N=251) 
AS 46 (51.11%) 150 (59.76%) 
ASD* 27 (30.0%) 61 (24.3%) 
High Functioning Autism (HFA) 10 (11.11%) 22 (8.76%) 
Autistic Disorder (AD) 6 (6.67%) 8 (3.19%) 
Other* 1 (1.11%) 10 (3.98%) 
*Two of these participants (diagnosed as adults) reported a diagnosis of ASD Level One. 
**Other diagnoses include: “HFA or AS”, PDA, Childhood Autism, Atypical Autism, and PDD-NOS. 
 
Total scores on the AQ ranged from 5 to 50 (M=36.09, SD=8.34) and were 
positively skewed (SW[352]=.95, p<.001).  For this study, the more conservative cut-off 
of 26 was implemented so participants scoring below 26 were removed before 
analysis.  Forty-three participants were removed as they had scores below 2618. 
In addition, the structure of the RBQ-2A determined by the PCA in this study 
differed to the solution found in Study One (see results, pages 86-88).  Therefore 
further secondary analyses were carried out on the data from the Study Two ASD and 
NT groups to check the reliability and validity of this alternative solution (see Chapter 
Three, pages 94-95, for a description of this sample). 
                                                          
17 These include: agender, non-binary, and intersex. 
18 These participants all reported a diagnosis of ASD, however the AQ was employed here as a way of 
confirming that participants scored in line with other autistic individuals, and so participants scoring 
below the cut-off were not included in the analysis.  However it should be noted that the AQ was not 
originally intended to be a screening or diagnostic tool. 
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4.2.1.2 Materials 
All participants completed demographic information, including their diagnostic status, 
educational attainment, their employment information and ethnicity.  All participants 
completed the RBQ-2A, the AQ and a series of open-ended questions about past 
pretend play and current imaginative activities (these are described in Study Four, 
page 120). 
4.2.1.3 Procedure, data screening and statistical analyses 
 Data were collected using Google Documents.  Participants were first 
presented with an information sheet and consent form and could not progress to the 
next page until they had confirmed they had read both of these.  Participants were 
then asked for their age, gender and diagnostic information and the RBQ-2A was then 
presented, followed by the AQ, the pretend play questions and finally the remaining 
demographic questions.  After completing the survey participants were presented with 
a debrief sheet.  This study was approved by Cardiff University School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee.   The PCA was run according to the analytic strategy outlined in 
Chapter Two (pages 66-69).  As with Study One, internal consistency was assessed by 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha (α) values, along with the correlations between age and 
RBQ-2A score, AQ and RBQ-2A scores, and the RBQ-2A sub-scales and the within-group 
differences among sub-scales. 
4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 PCA 
Table 4.2 on the next page shows the endorsement, mean total scores and SDs 
for all 20 RBQ-2A items.  For every item, at least 18.2% of the sample endorsed mild or 
occasional or higher, and there were no items excluded on the basis of endorsement.   
There were 34 (11.0%) participants with missing data across the relevant nineteen 
items19.  Little’s Missing Completely at Random test was non-significant 
(χ2[369]=400.39, p=.125) so it was appropriate to remove these participants from the 
analysis. 
 
                                                          
19 As discussed (Chapter Two, page 67), item 20 is not included in the PCA of RBQ-2A data. 
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Table 4-2 Study Three: Frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations of ASD participants’ 
responses to all twenty RBQ-2A items (N=309) 
 
Never or 
rarely 
Mild or occasional/One 
or more times daily 
Marked or notable/15 
or more times daily 
Mean (SD) 
1. Arrange 69 (22.3%) 182 (58.9%) 58 (18.8%) 1.96 (.64) 
2. Fiddle** 38 (12.4%) 73 (23.8%) 196 (63.8%) 2.51 (.71) 
3. Spin* 236 (76.6%) 56 (18.2%) 16 (5.2%) 1.29 (.56) 
4. Rock * 125 (40.6%) 98 (31.8%) 85 27.6%) 1.87 (.82) 
5. Pace* 96 (31.2%) 121 (39.3%) 91 (29.4%) 1.98 (.78) 
6. Hand/finger** 95 (30.9%) 83 (26.9%) 129 (41.7%) 2.11 (.85) 
7. Fascination** 45 (14.7%) 117 (38.1%) 145 (47.2) 2.33 (.72) 
8. Angles**** 75 (24.6%) 144 (47.2%) 86 (28.2%) 2.04 (.73) 
9. Smell*** 132 (43.1%) 106 (34.6%) 68 (22.2%) 1.79 (.78) 
10. Feel**** 94 (30.8%) 105 (34.4%) 106 (34.8%) 2.04 (.81) 
11. Carry***** 124 (40.1%) 97 (31.4%) 83 (27.3%) 1.87 (.82) 
12. Collect** 51 (16.6%) 93 (30.3%) 163 (53.1%) 2.36 (.75) 
13. Home** 18 (5.9%) 65 (21.2%) 224 (73.0%) 2.67 (.58) 
14. Change*** 34 (11.1%) 88 (28.8%) 184 (60.1%) 2.49 (.69) 
15. Routine** 20 (6.5%) 92 (30.0%) 195 (63.5%) 2.57 (.61) 
16. Redoing* 16 (5.2%) 66 (21.4%) 226 (73.1%) 2.68 (.57) 
17. TV/Music** 30 (9.8%) 83 (27.0%) 194 (63.2%) 2.53 (.67) 
18. Clothes**** 74 (24.3%) 106 (34.8%) 125 (41.0%) 2.17 (.79) 
19. Food** 67 (21.8) 89 (29.0%) 151 (49.2%) 2.27 (.80) 
20. Activities 11 (3.6%) 117 (37.9%) 181 (58.6%) 2.55 (.57) 
*Missing=1 **Missing=2, ***Missing=3, ****Missing=4, *****Missing=5; Percentages given as 
valid percentages 
 
The final sample comprised 275 participants, aged from 18-66 years (M=36.56, 
SD=12.24; positively skewed [SW(275)=.96, p<.001] with no outliers).  The total AQ 
score ranged from 26 to 50 (M=38.51, SD=5.88) and was positively skewed 
(SW[275]=.98, p<.001) with no outliers.  The mean score for all RBQ-2A items for the 
sample ranged from 1.15 to 2.95 (M=2.21, SD=.36), which was positively skewed 
(SW[275]=.98, p=.002) with no outliers.  The internal consistency of the whole scale 
was good (α=.84). 
 Initial screening indicated that the assumptions of sampling adequacy 
(KMO=.85), multicollinearity and factorability (χ2[171]=1306.10, p<.001) were all met.  
The initial PCA solution resulted in five components with eigenvalues greater than one, 
explaining 56.06% of the variance.  PA indicated that three components should be 
retained and the PCA was re-run with Direct Oblimin rotation.  However, the 
correlation between components run during the PCA was less than .32, which suggests 
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that orthogonal rotation is more appropriate (see Chapter Two, pages 68-69).  
Therefore the PCA was re-run with Varimax rotation (see Appendix Five, Table 8.4, 
page 258); however, the pattern of loadings remained the same regardless of rotation.  
Table 4.3 below shows the pattern matrix from the Direct Oblimin rotation. 
Table 4-3 Study Three: The pattern matrix for the PCA of the ASD sample, after Direct Oblimin rotation 
(N=275) 
 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Rotated item 
loadings: 
Insistence on 
Sameness (IS) 
Repetitive Motor 
Behaviours (RMB) 
Repetitive Sensory 
Behaviours (RSB) 
1. Arrange .24 .21 -.34 
2. Fiddle  .04 .67 -.03 
3. Spin  -.11 .63 -.02 
4. Rock  -.07 .68 -.18 
5. Pace  .11 .66 .15 
6. Hand/finger  -.01 .56 -.23 
7. Fascination .44 .17 -.16 
8. Angles .13 .12 -.55 
9. Smell -.05 -.13 -.79 
10. Feel -.04 .11 -.76 
11. Carry .24 .20 -.44 
12. Collect .55 .07 -.16 
13. Home  .78 -.20 -.01 
14. Change .69 -.22 -.20 
15. Routine .69 .04 .09 
16. Redoing .67 -.15 -.11 
17. TV/Music .45 .32 .00 
18. Clothes .45 .34 -.00 
19. Food .54 .13 .19 
Percentage of 
variance explained: 
26.72 10.44 7.32 
Cronbach’s alpha (α): .79 .70 .67 
  
 The final rotated solution explained 44.47% of the variance.  Table 4.3 above 
and Table 4.4 overleaf show the percentage of variance explained, Cronbach’s alpha 
values, the means and SDs, and the medians and IQRs for each of the three 
components.  The first component corresponds to IS, and the second component 
resembles the RMB component from Study One.  The final component mostly 
comprises sensory items and was therefore named Repetitive Sensory Behaviours 
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(RSB)20.  The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of the IS and RMB subscales were 
acceptable (> .70), whereas it was questionable for RSB (although see the note in 
Chapter Three, page 99 regarding α values below .70).  The mean inter-item 
correlation for each subscale ranged from .31 to .34.  The full RBQ-2A scale 
significantly correlated with AQ (rs=.39, p<.001), but not with age (rs=-.01, p=.84).  
Table 4-4 Study Three: The ranges, means and SDs, and medians and IQRs for each of the three 
components (N=275) 
 IS RMB RSB 
Range 1.0-3.0 1.0-3.0 1.0-3.0 
Mean (SD) 2.46 (.42) 1.96 (.50) 1.94 (.56) 
Median (IQR) 2.56 (.56) 2.0 (.80) 2.0 (.75) 
4.2.2.2 Subscale analyses 
All three components were positively skewed.  There was one outlier who 
scored more than three SDs below the mean on IS; however, removing this participant 
from analyses did not affect the pattern of findings so the following results are 
reported from the full sample (N=275).  A Friedman’s test indicated a significant 
difference between scores on the three subscales (χ2[171]=183.63, p<.001).  Follow-up 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test demonstrated significant differences between IS and RMB 
(Z=-11.78, p<.001) and between IS and RSB (Z=-11.96, p<.001) but not between RMB 
and RSB (Z=-.56, p=.58).   
Finally, Table 4.5 overleaf shows the correlations between the three 
components and the full RBQ-2A scale, the AQ and age.  Although the correlation 
matrix resulting from the PCA did not reach the threshold of .32, Spearman’s 
correlation analyses did find significant associations between each of the three 
components, all above .3221.  The three components were all significantly correlated 
with the full RBQ-2A scale and with the total AQ score.  The only component 
significantly correlated with age was RMB, which had a negative association with age 
(rs=-.24, p<.001).  There were no significant gender differences, with the exception that 
                                                          
20 The PCA was also run only on participants scoring 32 or above on the AQ (N=236). IS and RMB 
remained the same, whereas RSB varied slightly depending on the method of rotation.  Therefore (PTO) 
the findings from the full sample (N=275) were used for the rest of the analyses given the consistent 
pattern of loadings across rotation.   
21 This difference is likely due to the fact that the PCA is run on a Pearson’s correlation matrix in SPSS. 
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women scored significantly higher than men on the AQ (Z=-2.16, p=.031) and RSB (Z=-
2.23, p=.026)22. 
Table 4-5 Study Three: Correlations between the subscales of the RBQA, the AQ and age (N=275) 
 RMB RSB RBQ-2A AQ Age 
IS .36** .45** .84** .42** .07 
RMB - .38** .70** .23** -.24** 
RSB - - .73** .20** .05 
*Significant at the .05 level **Significant at the .01 level 
4.2.2.3 Secondary analyses of data from Study Two 
 The present study identified a distinct component solution from that identified 
in Study One.  Therefore the ability of the current solution to distinguish between ASD 
and NT participants was assessed in the IQ-matched samples described in Chapter 
Three (see pages 94-95).  Mean scores on the three components identified in the 
present study were calculated for all participants.  The means, SDs, medians and IQRs 
of the mean scores on these three subscales for the two groups are shown in Table 4.6 
below.  
Table 4-6 Study Three: Means, SDs, medians and IQRs on the mean total RBQ-2A score and the 
components IS, RMB and RSB for the participants from Chapter Three, Study Two (N=66) 
 ASD group (Study Two; N=29) NT group (Study Two; N=37) 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Mean (SD) Median (IQR) 
Total RBQ-2A 
score 
1.84 (.45) 1.90 (.78) 1.25 (.19) 1.20 (.25) 
IS score 2.05 (.54) 2.11 (.89) 1.26 (.24) 1.22 (.22) 
RMB score 1.57 (.50) 1.40 (.60) 1.24 (.28) 1.20 (.40) 
RSB score 1.66 (.66) 1.50 (1.25) 1.14 (.26) 1.0 (.25) 
 
All variables, with the exception of IS for the ASD group, were positively 
skewed.  There were four outliers across the three variables in the NT group.  
However, removal of these outliers did not affect the pattern of results, so they 
remained in the analyses.  The ASD group scored significantly higher than the NT group 
on all three components: IS (Z=-5.67, p<.001); RMB (Z=-3.08, p=.002); and RSB (Z=-
3.73, p<.001).  Friedman’s test was significant for both the NT group (χ2[2]=10.60, 
                                                          
22 Participants who identified as another gender identity were not included in gender difference 
analyses as the N was too small. 
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p=.005) and the ASD group (χ2[2]=21.17, p<.001), indicating that there were significant 
within-groups differences between the three components.  For the NT group, there 
was no significant difference between RMB and IS (Z=-.60, p=.55) but there were 
significant differences between IS and RSB (Z=-2.22, p=.026) and between RSB and 
RMB (Z=-2.37, p=.018).  Conversely, for the ASD group there were significant 
differences between IS and RMB (Z=-4.10, p<.001) and between IS and RSB (Z=-3.23, 
p=.001) but not between RMB and RSB (Z=-.46, p=.65).  For the ASD group, all three 
components were significantly associated with each other (IS and RMB: rs=.66, p<.001; 
IS and RSB: rs=.56, p=.002; RMB and RSB: rs=.46, p=.012).  In contrast, only RMB and 
RSB were significantly associated for the NT group (rs=.40, p=.015).  However, there 
were no significant gender differences in either group for any of the subscales.   
4.2.3 Discussion 
This study repeated the procedure for Study One in a larger sample of adults 
with diagnoses of ASD, and represents the first PCA of RRB data from an entirely adult 
ASD sample.  The larger sample size and wide age range addresses Study One’s 
limitations while testing the RBQ-2A in a clinical population.  Overall, the results 
support the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A in terms of internal consistency and 
correlation with AQ for the whole scale.  Study One was partly replicated in terms of 
the components IS and RMB, and the group differences in Study Two were replicated 
here.  However, there is some inconsistency, in that sensory items did not load in 
Study One, whereas in Study Three they formed their own component. 
Three components were identified.  Two of these, IS and RMB, closely resemble 
those identified in Study One.  The IS component closely resembles that of most 
previous research using the RBQ-2; items 13-18 of the RBQ-2 have always previously 
loaded onto IS (Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014; Leekam et al., 2007).  The IS component 
is fairly similar to Study One, with the exception that item 11 (carrying objects) did not 
load on to this component, and that items 7 (fascination with objects) and 18 (wearing 
same clothes) did load; although item 18 was not included in Study One’s analysis due 
to poor endorsement.  The second component, RMB, very closely resembles that 
found in Study One.  The only difference was that item 1 (arranging objects) did not 
load onto this component.  
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The biggest difference lies in the loading of the sensory items.  In Study One, 
items 7-10 did not load sufficiently onto any component.  However, in the current 
study, items 8-11 formed their own component.  This is logical for items 8-10 as they 
are all sensory behaviours.  More unusual is the fact that item 11 (carrying objects) 
also loaded onto RSB, and item 7 (fascination with objects) loaded onto IS instead – 
although item 7 has previously loaded on to IS (Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014).  This 
may reflect the point raised in previous chapters that it is not always clear where an 
RRB may lie.  In terms of item 7, the source of one’s fascination with an object may be 
sensory (e.g. liking the look of an object), but it may also reflect a particular interest; 
restricted or circumscribed interests tend to fall in the category of IS rather than 
RSMB.  Similarly, item 11 refers to carrying around special objects.  The reason for 
carrying around an object maybe because that object is related to a particular interest; 
or it may be because of a sensory preference (e.g. liking the feel of an object).  It is 
important to note here that in some studies with other measures, such as the ADI-R, 
three factors or components are identified (e.g. Mirenda et al., 2010).  In two of these 
cases, the third factor or component specifically represents CI (Honey et al., 2008; Lam 
et al., 2008).  It may be then that items relating to special interests do not always fall 
neatly into the category of RSMB or IS.  In contrast, the three components found here 
are unique to the RBQ-2A23.  This may reflect an inherent weakness in terms of the 
sensory items, as these are the items that differed across the two samples.  Notably 
items 8 to 11, which are the items that load onto RSB, are also among the seven items 
that are answered on a three-point rather than four-point scale.  However, as I noted 
in Chapter Three (page 92), these items are also answered on a three-point scale in the 
parent-report RBQ-2, and these items neither fail to load nor do they form their own 
component in the parent version.  Therefore it is unlikely that this is an explanation for 
the unusual behaviour of these items. 
Relevant to the above discussion is the fact that the internal consistency was 
acceptable (and near to the threshold for good, .80) for IS and RMB but questionable 
for RSB.  This may, however, be a result of the fact that four items is relatively small for 
                                                          
23 Lam et al., (2008) named one of their three subtypes RMB, however, they excluded unusual sensory 
interests from the analysis as their study was conducted prior to sensory symptoms’ inclusion under RRB 
in DSM-5. 
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a component; it is preferable for a component to comprise 5 or more items loading ≥.5 
(Osborne & Costello, 2009).  In addition, as discussed in Chapter Three (page 99) an α 
value below .70 may be acceptable for psychological constructs (Field, 2013).  As in 
Study One, the RBQ-2A and its subscales are significantly associated with AQ score, 
supporting the construct validity of the RBQ-2A.   
However, the most important difference between the two studies is the 
diagnostic status of the two samples; Study One was conducted on an NT sample 
whereas Study Three was conducted on an ASD sample.  Therefore the differences in 
terms of sensory items may be due to genuine structural differences in RRB between 
ASD and NT individuals.  It has been suggested that RSMBs serve the purpose of 
developmental mastery in TD children and hence they reduce over time (Thelen, 
1981); in contrast, they are much more pervasive in ASD development and are 
associated with anxiety (e.g. Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014) and there is anecdotal 
evidence for the enjoyment of RRBs in individuals with ASD. 
 An additional difference between Study One and Study Three is the different 
methods used to rotate the data.  In Study One, I applied direct oblimin rotation as the 
correlation coefficient between the two components was >.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2014) when running the PCA.  Conversely, in Study Three, this was not the case and so 
varimax rotation was applied.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the type of rotation 
applied to EFA and PCA is important in RRB research as there is some disagreement 
over whether or not the sub-groupings would be correlated.  However, there was no 
difference between the two rotations in Study Three, and therefore this is unlikely to 
account for the differences between Study One and Study Three. 
A notable finding in this study is that RMB was significantly negatively 
correlated with age.  In addition ASD participants in both studies scored higher on IS 
than either RMB or RSB.  Previous research has shown that RRBs reduce across the 
lifetime, although they remain more stable than social and communication traits (e.g. 
Esbensen et al., 2009; Fecteau et al., 2003; Piven et al., 1995).  However, there is also 
some evidence that RSMBs are particularly associated with younger individuals and 
individuals with LDs (e.g. Esbensen et al., 2009; Militerni et al., 2002; Moore & 
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Goodson, 2003).  The findings from the present study support the possibility that 
whereas all RRBs reduce over time in an ASD population, RSMBs reduce at a faster rate 
than IS behaviours. 
In order to further assess whether Study Three’s alternative component 
structure was reliable and valid, I tested whether or not the new subscales were able 
to distinguish between ASD and NT groups by returning to the data from Study Two.  
As before, the Australian ASD group scored significantly higher than the IQ-matched 
NT group on the components identified in Study Three.  Moreover, there were no 
within-group differences for NT participants in terms of RMB and IS, replicating Study 
Two.  However, the NT group scored significantly lower on RSB compared to both of 
the other components.  This supports the discussion of the previous chapter relating to 
the fact that sensory symptoms are not particularly prevalent in the NT population.  It 
is known that people with ASD show higher levels of RRBs than NT individuals, but 
arguably this difference is even more pronounced in terms of sensory items.  This 
could explain why in Study One, none of the sensory items loaded onto any 
component.  In contrast, in both the online survey ASD sample and the Australian ASD 
group, there was no significant difference between levels of RMB and RSB.  This 
suggests that RMB and RSB are more closely related in people with ASD compared to 
NT individuals.  Indeed, it is common for RMBs to include an element of sensory 
feedback (e.g. Leekam et al., 2011). 
Finally, there were significant gender differences found in terms of both the AQ 
and the RBQ-2A in the Study Three ASD sample but not the Study Two ASD sample.  
Unusually, autistic women scored significantly higher on the AQ and the RSB subscale 
than autistic men.  Gender differences in terms of autistic traits are not found in every 
study; however, a meta-analysis found that from six years of age, autistic girls and 
women show significantly fewer RRBs then autistic boys and men, with no differences 
in social or communication traits (Van Wijngaarden-Cremers et al., 2014).  This finding 
may then indicate that the women in this sample are not representative of the female 
ASD population as a whole. 
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 Although there are many similarities between the two PCA solutions in Study 
One and Study Three, there is a clear difference in terms of sensory items.  Therefore it 
is necessary to decide which of these two PCA solutions is the most appropriate to use 
for the rest of the analyses in this thesis.   It is also necessary to judge which of these 
solutions more closely reflects the ‘true’ construct of RRBs, if the RBQ-2A is to become 
a useful research tool.  This will be discussed at the end of this chapter (page 130).  The 
analyses for Study Four were conducted on the same dataset for Study Three, and 
therefore the subscales as identified in Study Three were used. 
4.3 Study Four: Assessing imagination and RRB in the online survey 
 Having carried out the PCA of the online survey data in Study Three, these data 
were then analysed in Study Four to assess the relationship between RRB and both 
childhood and adult imagination.  Firstly, correlation analyses were run to test whether 
there is a relationship between the RBQ-2A subscales and adult imagination as 
measured by the AQ.  As described in Chapter One (page 56), it is specifically IS which I 
have hypothesised to drive the relationship between RRBs and imagination in older 
children and adolescents (e.g. Turner, 1997), although there may be a relationship 
between imagination and RSMB in younger children (e.g. Happé, 1999; Harrop et al., 
2014).  Therefore, I hypothesised that there would be a significant positive association 
(as higher scores on both questionnaires indicate higher levels of ASD traits) between 
imagination and total RBQ-2A score and IS, but not with RMB and RSB.  Although I 
hypothesised a relationship between the total RBQ-2A score and imagination, it was 
anticipated that this relationship may be masked by the hypothesised lack of 
correlation between RMB/RSB and imagination, and so this is a tentative hypothesis. In 
terms of item 20, I hypothesised that participants who scored themselves higher on 
item 20 would also score higher on the AQ imagination subscale. 
 Secondly, participants were split into two groups on the basis of their 
responses to questions about their past pretend play as children.  These two groups 
were: those who reported playing pretend as children and those who did not.  The 
difference between the groups in terms of scores on the RBQ-2A and its subscales 
were then analysed.  It was hypothesised that participants who reported that they did 
not play pretend as children would show significantly higher levels of RRB than those 
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who did; specifically they would show higher levels of IS rather than RMB or RSB.  I also 
hypothesised that there would be a relationship between pretend play group and 
responses to item 20, in that participants who reported not playing pretend would also 
be more likely to report a restricted range of self-chosen activities. 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
These analyses were carried out on the same UK sample used for Study Three 
(N=275).  Participants were aged from 18-66 years (M=36.56, SD=12.24), 100 were 
men and most participants (57.8%) were diagnosed with AS.  This sub-sample was used 
as they had no missing data on the RBQ-2A. 
4.3.1.2 Design 
For the analysis of the pretend play question, the independent variable (IV) was 
whether or not the participant played pretend as a child.  The dependent variables 
(DVs) were mean total score on the RBQ-2A and the mean subscale scores for each of 
the three components identified in Study Three (IS, RMB and RSB). 
4.3.1.3 Materials 
 In addition to the RBQ-2A, AQ and demographic information, participants were 
asked a series of questions related to their past pretend play and current imaginative 
activities.  The first question was closed (“When you were a child, did you play 
pretend?”) whereas the subsequent questions were open-ended.  Table 4.7 below 
shows the full set of questions presented to each participant. 
Table 4-7 Study Four: Pretend play questions 
1. When you were a child, did you play pretend? 
(Answers: Yes/No/I don’t remember) 
2. What kind of pretend games did you play? 
For example, did you feed dolls, play with toy cars or pretend to be someone else? 
3. What kind of pretend objects, people or animals did you play with? 
4. Now, as an adult, what imaginative or creative activities do you enjoy? 
5. What are your favourite interests? 
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4.3.1.4  Procedure, data screening and statistical analyses 
 As in Study One (Chapter Three, page 86), for the analysis of the AQ subscales, 
the full range of scores (from 1 to 4) were analysed rather than dichotomous scoring 
and a higher score on the AQ imagination subscale indicates more difficulties with 
imagination.  All five subscales were non-normally distributed.  There were outliers 
present on two subscales (social skills and communication); removal of these outliers 
did not affect the pattern of results so they remained in the analysis.  Non-parametric 
(Spearman’s correlation) analyses were used to account for the non-normality of the 
AQ subscales and the three RBQ-2A subscales.   
 In order to assess whether participants who played pretend as children differed 
on the RBQ-2A and its subscales (IS, RMB and RSB) compared to participants who did 
not play pretend, a MANOVA was carried out on the participants who answered yes or 
no to this question.  Participants who did not answer this question (N=3), or responded 
with I don’t remember (N=53), were not included.  This resulted in a smaller sample 
size (N=219) for the MANOVA (aged from 18 to 66 [M=36.54, SD=12.22]; 81 male; 134 
female; 4 non-binary).  This sample met the following assumptions of MANOVA: no 
univariate outliers; no multivariate outliers according to Mahalanobis’ Distance; and 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices according to Box’s M test.  However, 
there were some issues in that each of the DVs were skewed, the relationships 
between RMB and RSB were not linear in either group, and there was some evidence 
of multicollinearity.  Specifically, whereas the three subscales were moderately 
correlated (0.3-0.6) which is necessary for MANOVA, the RBQ-2A correlated very highly 
with each of the subscales, reaching the threshold for multicollinearity (0.8) with IS 
(see Table 4.8 below). 
Table 4-8 Study Four: Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients between the DVs for the MANOVA 
(N=219). 
 RBQ-2A RMB RSB 
RMB .686** -  
RSB .717** .354** - 
IS .843** .354** .433** 
**Significant at the .01 level 
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 This is unsurprising given that the three subscales are all derived from the RBQ-
2A (although the total score includes items 1 and 20, which are not represented in the 
subscales).  This high level of correlation suggests it is not appropriate to include the 
RBQ-2A mean total score in a MANOVA with the other three DVs.  Therefore it will be 
analysed separately using non-parametric analyses due to the fact that the data is not 
normally distributed.  To address the other assumptions not met, Pillai’s trace criterion 
will be used to determine significance as it is more robust to violations of assumption.   
Finally, participants were grouped in terms of how they responded on item 20, 
and non-parametric analyses were used to test group differences in terms of AQ 
imagination.  In order to address whether or not item 20 varied according to pretend 
play group, a chi-square analysis of item 20 and pretend play group was carried out on 
the sub-sample described above. 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Imagination in adulthood: The AQ  
Table 4-9 Study Four: The means and standard deviations for the five subscales of the AQ (N=275). 
 Imagination Social Skills Attention 
Switching 
Attention to 
Detail 
Communication 
Mean 2.81 3.33 3.40 3.09 3.17 
SD .59 .43 .38 .49 .47 
 
  Table 4.9 above shows the means and SDs for the AQ subscales of the sample 
(N=275; See Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for the means and SDs for the RBQ-2A and its 
subscales).  There were three outliers across social skills and communication; however, 
removal of these outliers did not affect the pattern of findings.  All five AQ subscales 
were significantly associated with the RBQ-2A (see Table 4.10 below).   The internal 
consistency of the imagination subscale was acceptable (α=.74). 
Table 4-10 Study Four: The correlations (rs) between the RBQ-2A and subscales of the AQ (N=275). 
 Imagination Social Skills Attention 
Switching 
Attention to 
Detail 
Communication 
RBQ-2A .16 (p=.007) .29 (p<.001) .38 (p<.001) .33 (p<.001) .36 (p<.001) 
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 There was no significant difference between male and female participants in 
terms of imagination (Z=-.71, p=.478).  Of the RBQ-2A subscales, imagination was only 
significantly associated with IS (rs=.23, p<.001) and RMB (rs=.14, p=.022) but not RSB 
(rs=-.04, p=.567).  When running partial correlations controlling for the RMB and RSB 
subscales, the association between IS and imagination remained significant (rs=.25, 
p<.001).  When controlling for IS, the association between imagination and RMB 
became non-significant, whereas the association with RSB became significant (rs=-.16, 
p=.009).  When controlling for the other AQ subscales, the only significant relationship 
that remained was between imagination and RSB (rs=-.18, p=.004). 
 In terms of item 20, only nine participants responded with option one (range of 
different and flexible activities) and therefore these participants’ responses collapsed 
into option two (some varied and flexible activities).  When collapsing responses, 
participants who responded with option one or two (N=113) had a mean score of 2.71 
(SD=.56) on the AQ imagination subscale and those who responded with option three 
(restricted and repetitive activities; N=162) had a mean score of 2.87 (SD=.61); mean 
scores were positively skewed with no outliers for either group.  There was no 
significant difference between the two groups in terms of score on the imagination 
subscale (Z=-1.95, p=.052) 24. 
4.3.2.2 Imagination in childhood: Pretend play 
4.3.2.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 4.11 overleaf shows the gender distribution, age and AQ score for 
participants responding Yes, No and Don’t Remember when asked about pretend play.  
Chi-Squared analysis indicated no significant relationship between gender and 
reported pretend play (χ2(4)=3.75, p=.441).  This relationship remained non-significant 
regardless of whether participants responding I don’t remember or identifying as 
another gender identity were excluded.   
 
                                                          
24 When removing participants responding with option one instead of collapsing them into option two, 
the difference remained non-significant (Z=-1.94, p=.053). 
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Table 4-11 Study Four: Gender distribution, means and SDs for age and total AQ score according to 
pretend play group (N=272). 
Pretend Play Gender Age Total AQ Score 
Yes (N=144) 48 Male 
93 Female 
3 Other gender 
identity* 
37.22 (12.44) 37.17 (5.69) 
No (N=75) 33 Male, 
41 Female 
1 Other gender 
identity* 
35.24 (11.76) 41.31 (5.66) 
I don’t remember 
(N=53) 
18 Male 
35 Female 
36.7 (12.42) 38.06 (5.37) 
*Includes the following gender identities: agender; non-binary; and intersex 
4.3.2.2.2 Group differences 
 For the smaller sample (N=219) described above, 144 (65.8%) reported playing 
pretend as a child and 75 (34.2%) reported not playing pretend as a child.  There was 
no significant difference between the two groups in terms of age (Z=-1.04, p=.297) but 
the group that did not play pretend scored significantly higher on the AQ (Z=-4.85, 
p<.001).  Participants who reported playing pretend scored significantly lower on the 
AQ imagination subscale (M=2.60, SD=.55) than participants who reported not playing 
pretend (M=3.20, SD=.50; Z=-6.92, p<.001).  Table 4.12 below shows the mean scores 
and standard deviations of the two groups on the RBQ-2A and its subscales.   
Table 4-12 Study Four: Means and SDs on the RBQ-2A mean total score and mean subscale scores, 
grouped according to whether or not participants played pretend as a child (N=219). 
Pretend Play RBQ-2A total IS RMB RSB 
Yes (N=144) 2.22 (.36) 2.43 (.42) 2.0 (.48) 2.02 (.55) 
No (N=75) 2.21 (.33) 2.57 (.38) 2.0 (.53) 1.93 (.53) 
 
 As explained previously, (page 122) the total RBQ-2A score was not included in 
the MANOVA due to high correlation with its subscales.  For the whole RBQ-2A scale, a 
Mann-Whitney test showed that there was no significant difference between the 
groups (Z=-1.19, p=.23).  The MANOVA was then carried out with pretend play group 
as the IV and the RBQ-2A subscales as DVs.  There was a significant difference between 
the two groups (F[3,215]=4.24, p=.006, ηp2=.056) with a borderline medium effect size.  
When examining the DVs individually, Bonferroni correction was applied to adjust for 
multiple comparisons (.05/3), resulting in an alpha level of .017.  The only subscale to 
reach significance was IS (F[1,217]=6.40, p=.012, ηp2=.029) with a small effect size.  
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Neither of the others reached significance (RMB: F[1,217]=.01, p=.941; RSB: 
F[1,217]=1.22, p=.271). 
 Table 4.13 below shows the number of participants endorsing options one 
(range of different and flexible activities), two (some varied and flexible activities) or 
three (restricted and repetitive activities) on item 20 according to whether or not they 
answered yes or no to the pretend play question.  A chi-square analysis determined 
that these two variables were significantly related to each other (Χ2[2]=6.4, p=.041).  
However, given the low number of respondents for option one, options one and two 
were collapsed as before (page 123) and the relationship then became non-significant 
(Χ2[2]=3.52, p=.06).   
Table 4-13 Study Five: Responses to pretend play question and RBQ-2A item 20 data from Chapter Four 
data (N=219). 
  Restricted and 
repetitive activities (3) 
Some varied and 
flexible activities (2) 
Range of different and 
flexible activities (1) 
Pretend play 
= No 
Count 50 (66.67%) 25 (33.33%) 0 
 Expected 
count 
43.5 28.8 2.7 
Pretend play 
= Yes 
Count 77 (53.47%) 59 (40.97%) 8 (5.56%) 
 Expected 
count 
83.5 55.2 5.3 
 
4.3.2.2.3 Re-categorisation of pretend play answers 
 As mentioned, participants were asked more than one question about pretend 
play (see Table 4.7, page 120).  The subsequent questions were open-ended so some 
participants chose to write descriptions of play activities as children.  All participants’ 
answers were checked for consistency with how they answered the first question, and 
in some cases participants were re-categorised.  For example, some participants 
answered No to pretend play, then gave an example of playing pretend as a child (e.g. 
“I liked pushing my mother's make-up around in a small tray as if they were people in a 
car”).  Several participants who answered I don’t remember also gave examples of 
pretence such as having an imaginary friend or role-playing.  Participants who did not 
provide enough detail for re-categorisation were left in their original category.  Overall, 
26 (9.5%) participants were re-categorised.  The majority (N=16) of re-categorisations 
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occurred in the Don’t Remember group.  This resulted in 73 participants in the No 
group and 160 in the Yes group.  The above MANOVA was re-run in the same way on 
this newly re-categorised data.  However, there was no difference in the pattern of 
results.  The overall MANOVA was significant (F[3,229]=4.24, p=.006, ηp2=.053) , with 
the only significant subscale being IS (F[1,231]=6.43, p=.012, ηp2=.027).  The chi-square 
analysis above was also re-run using the re-categorised answers and remained 
significant (Χ2[2]=7.43, p=.024), including when response options one and two were 
collapsed Χ2[2]=5.25, p=.022). 
4.3.3 Discussion 
 The aim of Study Four was to assess the relationship between RRBs and 
imagination in both childhood (pretend play) and adulthood (the AQ).  The RBQ-2A, AQ 
and a series of imagination and pretend play questions were administered as an online 
survey to a large sample of participants.  The majority of participants reported playing 
pretend games as a child; although in their descriptions of pretend play, some 
participants noted that their games were repetitive, socially isolated and/or different 
to that of their peers.  Reflecting the inconsistent nature of the previous research in 
this area, the findings from this study are mixed, although there is reasonably strong 
evidence for a relationship between IS and childhood pretend play. 
As hypothesised, there was a significant association between RRBs and the 
imagination subscale of the AQ.  Specifically, there was a significant association 
between the imagination subscale and IS, although there was also a significant 
association with RMB.  However, these findings became more complex when 
controlling for other variables.  As higher scores on any of the AQ subscales indicate 
higher levels of ASD traits, a higher imagination score actually indicates more difficulty 
with imagination.  Therefore participants with higher levels of IS and RMB showed 
more difficulty with imagination.  In the case of IS, this relationship remained 
significant when controlling for the effects of RMB and RSB, supporting the hypothesis 
that the relationship between RRBs and imagination is specific to IS.  A significant 
relationship between RMB and imagination was not hypothesised; however, it is not 
an unprecedented finding, as one study did find a significant relationship between 
imagination and RSMBs (Harrop et al., 2014), in that greater frequency of RSMBs 
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significantly correlated with a higher score on the imagination difficulties algorithm of 
the ADOS; although this previous study was carried out with young children.  However, 
when controlling for IS, the relationship with RMB was no longer significant, so it may 
be the case that RMB correlated with imagination due to shared variance with IS.  
Taken together with findings from Study One and previous research (Kloosterman et 
al., 2011) that imagination as measured by the AQ is not associated with RRBs in a 
typical undergraduate population, Study Four’s findings indicate there may be a 
relationship between imagination and RRBs that is specific to the autistic population 
and to IS. 
 However, when controlling for the other AQ subscales score, imagination as 
measured by the AQ was no longer significantly related to either IS or RMB.  The 
results of the latter analysis suggest that there is not a relationship specific to 
imagination but instead participants who score higher on any of the AQ subscales will 
also score higher on the RBQ-2A and its subscales.  Given that the two measures 
correlate and both measure autistic traits, this is not surprising.  What is more unusual 
is that when controlling for the other AQ subscales or IS, the relationship between 
imagination and RSB became significant and negative.  Indeed, when controlling for 
the AQ, there was a significant negative relationship between imagination and total 
RBQ-2A score, presumably driven by the relationship with RSB.  The direction of this 
relationship indicates that participants who engage in more sensory behaviours have 
less difficulty with imagination.  In terms of general creativity, a possible explanation is 
that those who have heightened sensory symptoms may be able to utilise their 
sensory sensitivity or sensory seeking behaviours to aid the creative process.  
However, not all of the AQ imagination items refer to imagination in that sense, and 
none refer to actively being creative, so further exploration of this potential 
relationship is required in order to understand it.  Finally, participants’ scores on the 
imagination subscale of the AQ did not significantly differ depending on their response 
to item 20.  However, when interpreting these findings it is important to bear in mind 
certain limitations of the AQ. The imagination subscale of the AQ has limited reliability 
in that it is not always identified by factor analyses, and often shows poor internal 
consistency (e.g. Austin, 2005; Hurst et al., 2007; Kloosterman et al., 2011; Stewart & 
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Austin, 2009).  Therefore any findings using the subscale must be interpreted with 
caution.  This may explain why the findings are somewhat inconsistent and unusual 
when using this scale.  However, it should be noted that in this particular sample, the 
internal consistency of the AQ imagination subscale was acceptable. 
I originally hypothesised that childhood imagination as measured by pretend 
play would be related to RRBs, in that there would be a significant difference between 
those who reported playing pretend and those who reported not playing pretend for 
total RBQ-2A score.  However, this was a tentative hypothesis (page 119) and indeed 
there was no significant difference between pretend play groups for the total RBQ-2A 
score.  As hypothesised, participants who did not play pretend scored higher in terms 
of IS, while there was no difference between groups for RMB and RSB, which may 
explain why there was no association between pretend play and overall RRBs as 
measured by the RBQ-2A total score.  This remained even after re-categorisation of 
some of the participants. 
There was also evidence of a significant relationship between pretend play 
response and response to item 20, such that a higher percentage of participants saying 
no to pretend play also endorsed the restricted and repetitive activities response to 
item 20; although when collapsing the scores to take into account the small number of 
participants endorsing option one, this result became non-significant.  However, when 
analysing the relationship between item 20 and the re-categorised pretend play items, 
this relationship remained significant regardless of whether or not the responses were 
collapsed.  Taken together, these findings support previous research showing a 
significant negative relationship between imagination and IS (e.g. Turner, 1997), in that 
a lack of imaginative play is associated with increased preference for routines and 
rituals.  This study expanded on previous research by showing that this association 
exists between imaginative behaviours in childhood, and IS behaviours in adulthood.  
However, limitations of this study should be borne in mind and are discussed in the 
following general discussion section. 
 129 
 
4.4 General Discussion 
 This chapter described two studies carried out using online survey data from 
adults with ASD in the UK.  Firstly a PCA was carried out on the data to determine the 
component structure of the RBQ-2A in a sample of adults with ASD, which to my 
knowledge is the first time RRBs have been assessed this way in an adult ASD sample.  
Support was found for three components, which were named IS, RMB and RSB.  
Secondly the relationship between imagination and RRB was tested using retrospective 
reports of pretend play and the imagination subscale of the AQ.  It was found that 
participants who reported not playing pretend as a child showed significantly higher 
levels of IS only, and there was some evidence that participants’ score on item 20 
(activities) from the RBQ-2A differed depending on whether or not they reported 
pretend play as a child.  These findings support the hypothesised relationship between 
IS and imagination.  Some support was found for this relationship using data from the 
imagination subscale of the AQ; however, this relationship was not stable and also 
extended to RSB. 
 Together with the findings from the previous chapter, it can be concluded that 
the RBQ-2A is a reliable and valid tool for assessing RRB in adults either with or 
without a diagnosis of ASD.  As well as being a useful tool in its own right, this allows 
for the assessment of the relationship between RRBs and imagination in autistic adults.  
For both developing an RRB measure and assessing this relationship, it is important to 
separate out different types of RRB, as these sub-categories have been shown to be 
differentially related to variables such as IQ and age (e.g. Militerni et al., 2002; Moore 
& Goodson, 2003) and I have hypothesised that imagination is specifically related to IS 
(page 57) as explanations of the relationship between RRBs and imagination 
specifically focus on routines and inflexible activities (e.g. Boucher, 2007; Wing & 
Gould, 1979), and there is some evidence for this being the case (Turner, 1997).  
Although the precise nature of the RSMB components of the RBQ-2A is not yet clear, 
the IS component remains relatively stable across studies.  From Study Four, it is not 
yet clear whether there is a relationship between RRB and imagination.  A weak but 
significant effect was found in terms of pretend play, but the relationship was less 
clear-cut in terms of the relationship with imagination in adulthood as measured by 
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the imagination subscale of the AQ; although this may be due to methodological issues 
with the AQ.  However, this small effect is worth exploring in more depth using a wider 
range of imagination measures and is the focus of the next chapter. 
 As discussed at the end of Study Three, this thesis has now identified two 
potential component structures for the RBQ-2A.  They are somewhat different to one 
another, particularly in terms of sensory items; however, the IS subscale comprises 
similar items in each solution.  The principal aim of this thesis is to assess whether or 
not RRBs are related to imagination in adults with ASD, along with developing and 
testing a self-report measure of RRB suitable for adults (the RBQ-2A).  The hypothesis 
is that IS will specifically be related to imagination and so it is important to determine 
which of these two PCA solutions best reflect the structure of the RBQ-2A in order to 
accurately assess the specificity of the relationship between imagination and IS.  EFA 
and PCA are useful tools for determining the reliability and validity of a measure (e.g. 
Kline, 2000; Shuster et al., 2014; Strauss & Smith, 2009), but are also known for being 
subjective statistical methods (e.g. Osborne & Costello, 2009; Williams et al., 2010).  
However, as explained in Chapter Two (page 66), the same PCA approach was adopted 
for both analyses so that any differences should not be explained by differences in in 
analytical approach.   
 Appendix 6 (pages 259-263) comprises a detailed discussion of the differences 
between the two solutions in terms of reliability, validity and similarity with previous 
research.  To summarise this discussion, the solution identified by Study Three is more 
reliable in terms of internal consistency, includes sensory items (which are important 
to consider in an ASD sample) and is also more similar to previous research than Study 
One’s solution.  In addition, given that the analysis presented in this chapter was 
carried out on a sample that was larger and comprised autistic adults, the Study Three 
solution appears to be the most logical solution to use for the final chapter.  Therefore 
I have chosen to perform the remaining analyses of the thesis using the PCA solution 
from Study Three (Table 4.3). 
4.4.1 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations shared by both studies.  Firstly, all of the 
measures used are self-report, the limitations of which I have already discussed 
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throughout this thesis in relation to RRBs (e.g. page 64).  Although there is evidence of 
both NT and autistic adults successfully reporting on their past pretend play (Lillard & 
Smith, 2012; Sandberg et al., 2004), this may be affected by their current adult 
perceptions (Sandberg et al., 2004).  Therefore, the comparison between retrospective 
recall of childhood pretend play with current RRBs may be conflated with the 
individual’s current perception of reality.  This relates to the fact that the participants 
have an ASD diagnosis and may therefore be aware that a lack of pretend play is an 
early indicator and a possible diagnostic criterion for ASD.  However, it could then be 
argued that participants will assume they did not play pretend.  Given that the 
majority of the ASD sample did report pretend play, this indicates they were answering 
honestly.  Moreover, participants who responded Yes to pretend play scored 
significantly lower on the AQ imagination subscale (indicating fewer difficulties with 
imagination) than those who responded No.  This provides some support for the 
convergent validity of the two measures, although both have their limitations.  This 
will be addressed in the following chapter which includes standardised measures of 
imagination and an interviewer-rated measure of RRBs.   
Secondly, the study was conducted online and so it was not possible to confirm 
the diagnoses of participants.  Although AQ scores were checked, the AQ has limited 
diagnostic use (e.g. Ketelaars et al., 2008; Murphy, Beecham, Craig, & Ecker, 2011) and 
it would be preferable to confirm ASD diagnoses using a diagnostic measure.  There 
were some participants who reported a self-diagnosis.  Although many individuals are 
now being diagnosed as adults, which presumably requires some level of self-
diagnosis, participants were only included if they reported a clinical diagnosis of ASD.  
However, simply reporting a clinical diagnosis of ASD is not sufficient proof of 
diagnosis; again this will be addressed in the following chapter.  Third, although data 
was not collected on participants’ IQs, completing the online survey relies on the 
participants having the necessary cognitive resources to complete the questionnaires.  
This results in a sample that may not be representative of the ASD population, which 
includes a relatively high proportion of individuals with learning difficulties (e.g. 
Charman et al., 2011; Fombonne, 2003).  As such findings from this study are not 
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generalizable to all individuals with ASD, which is a common problem with studies of 
adults with ASD. 
 The majority of participants included in the survey were diagnosed as adults 
and not as children.  Generally, individuals with ASD are diagnosed as children (Howlin 
& Asgharian, 1999).  Therefore this sample is not representative of the ASD population.  
I report group differences in terms of age at diagnosis in Appendix 7 (page 264).  There 
were no significant relationships between gender or pretend play and age of diagnosis; 
however, participants who were diagnosed as adults scored significantly higher in 
terms of AQ and RBQ-2A total score, as well as IS and RSB.  This is unusual, as it would 
be expected that individuals with higher levels of autistic traits would have been 
identified and diagnosed earlier in life. This could reflect masking in the early years; 
difficulty with IS and RSB may be less noticeable than RMB, which was not significantly 
different between groups.  It could also be explained by greater awareness of their 
autistic traits as individuals are likely have been more involved in their diagnosis as an 
adult than as children. 
Similarly, the majority of participants identified as female.  ASD is diagnosed 
much more commonly in boys and men (e.g. Begeer et al., 2013; Szatmari et al., 2011; 
Werling & Geschwind, 2013).  Therefore it is somewhat unusual that an ASD study has 
a higher proportion of women compared to men.  This is particularly pertinent for the 
pretend play findings, as there is evidence that pretend play occurs at higher rates in 
girls with ASD compared to boys with ASD (e.g. Knickmeyer, Wheelwright, & Baron-
Cohen, 2008), although this is not always the case (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1987).  However, 
there were no sex differences in terms of childhood pretend play or adult imagination 
measured by the AQ in the present sample. 
It is not clear whether the higher rate of ASD in boys and men represents 
genuine gender differences or is instead due to gender bias in diagnostic tools, 
misdiagnosis of girls and women, and the ‘masking’ of symptoms (e.g. Van 
Wijngaarden-Cremers et al., 2014; Wing et al., 2011).  Outside of ASD, it may be that 
women are generally more likely to volunteer for research studies than men.  In 
traditional studies, women form on average 71-77% of the sample, but just 57% in a 
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large web-based survey (N=361,703; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004); 
however, there is some evidence that women are more likely to participate in health-
related questionnaires (e.g. Eysenbach & Wyatt, 2002).  Regardless of the reason, the 
gender imbalance of Studies Three and Four also affects the generalisability of the 
findings, especially when considering the unusual finding in Study Three that the 
women in the survey sample scored significantly higher in terms of the AQ and RSB.   
4.4.2 Conclusion 
 To summarise, Study Three presents the first PCA, to my knowledge, of RRB 
data exclusively from autistic adults.  I identified a three-component structure of the 
RBQ-2A comprising RMB, RSB and IS that differs somewhat from previous research 
that has always included children and adolescents.  Study Three also supported the 
internal consistency and construct validity of the RBQ-2A in a larger sample of autistic 
adults.  In addition, Study Four provided evidence for a relationship between 
imagination and RRB, in particular a small but significant effect between IS in 
adulthood and retrospective reports of pretend play.  The next chapter describes a 
subsequent study of RRBs and current imaginative abilities, in which I was able to 
overcome some of the limitations of this study by carrying out several measures of 
imagination and confirming the diagnoses of participants.  The DISCO was also 
included as a measure which asks participants about their pretend play as a child.  As 
the DISCO is a researcher-led semi-structured interview, more detailed information is 
elicited from the participant and is interpreted by the researcher.  This enables a more 
objective judgment of level of pretend play achieved.  In addition the parents of 
participants, who may have more reliable and objective memories, were able to 
provide additional information about their children’s pretend play.  Therefore there is 
the opportunity to replicate the pretend play findings in a smaller but richer dataset.  
In addition, I administered several other measures of imagination to test the 
hypothesis that imagination and RRB, specifically IS, are related.  These measures 
objectively assessed creativity and thinking about the future at the time of data 
collection.  The standardised creativity measures also allowed for the assessment of 
novelty and flexibility in addition to fluency, test whether or not these variables 
associated differentially with RRBs.    
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5 Chapter Five: The Relationship between RRBs and Imagination 
5.1 Summary of findings in relation to aims of the thesis 
 The overall aim of this thesis is to answer the question: what is the nature of 
the relationship, if any, between imagination and RRBs in autistic adults?  Based on 
previous research and theory, I expect that there is a relationship between the two, 
but that it is specific to IS; in that routines, rituals and other examples of IS that are 
prevalent in ASD are associated with imaginative difficulties.  I also aimed to develop a 
self-report measure of RRBs suitable for use with autistic adults, and to assess a variety 
of different aspects of imagination in autistic adults, including the three key 
components of imagination I identified in Chapter One; generativity/fluency, 
novelty/originality and flexibility. 
Most of the thesis until this point has focused on the aim of developing a self-
report measure of RRBs, as this is crucial in enabling the testing of the relationship 
between imagination and RRBs.  In Chapters Three and Four I described the 
development and assessment of the RBQ-2A as a reliable and valid self-report measure 
of RRBs in both autistic and NT adults in terms of component structure, internal 
consistency and construct validity.  Two potential component structures were 
identified through PCA; however, the most reliable was identified in Study Three; a 
three-component structure comprising IS, RMB and RSB.  This chapter will build upon 
the previous findings by conducting further assessment of the reliability and validity of 
the RBQ-2A, specifically its test-retest reliability and correlational validity, in order to 
confirm its utility as a measure of RRBs.   
A clear picture has not yet emerged in terms of imagination.  In Chapter Four I 
assessed autistic participants’ past pretend play and current imaginative ability.  I 
demonstrated evidence for a small but significant association between IS and 
retrospective childhood pretend play.  There was also some evidence that the quality 
of self-chosen activities (as measured by item 20 of the RBQ-2A) in autistic adults is 
related to childhood pretend play, although this relationship was not entirely stable.  
Similarly, the evidence regarding imagination as assessed by the AQ was somewhat 
equivocal.  There was no relationship with restricted activities, whereas there was 
some evidence of a relationship with IS even when controlling for RRBs.  Unusually, 
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there was also evidence of a relationship with RSBs.  Further exploration and testing of 
the relationship between imagination and RRBs is required in order to draw more firm 
conclusions regarding the aims of this thesis. 
The aim of Study Five was to build on findings from earlier in the thesis in order 
to test whether or not IS is specifically related to imagination in autistic adults, along 
with exploring the profile of imaginative abilities in autistic adults and further testing 
the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A.  For this study, the participants were seen in 
person allowing for direct assessment of their imaginative abilities and RRBs, rather 
than solely relying on self-report as in the previous chapters.   
5.2 Issues addressed in this chapter 
5.2.1 Issues relating to imagination 
The main focus of this chapter is to assess imagination in autistic adults in a 
more detailed way in order to examine their relationship with RRBs, with particular 
focus on different components of imagination (generativity, novelty and fluency).  The 
penultimate section of Chapter One (page 50) discussed the potential relationship 
between imagination and RRBs, as well as the methodological difficulties that have 
impeded a definitive conclusion being drawn, which should be addressed before 
further examining this relationship.  
Firstly, evidence for the relationship between imagination and RRBs has been 
drawn from a wide range of contexts: play behaviours, ideational and verbal fluency 
and thinking about the future.  These represent very different areas of imagination, 
and although they are all compatible with my definition of imagination (the generation 
and flexible manipulation of existing concepts to form novel ideas, which may be 
rooted in past experience and may result in adaptive outputs [creativity]), it is not clear 
how these areas relate to one another and exactly what they are measuring.  Few 
studies (N=13) have assessed different types of imagination in one sample of 
individuals with ASD, and even fewer (N=5) have directly correlated the different types 
of imagination; overall significant associations have been found between different 
measures of imagination (Angus et al., 2015; Begeer et al., 2009; Lind & Bowler, 2010), 
although the relationship between generativity measures (e.g. UOT and design 
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fluency) and the impossible person task has been shown to depend  on planning (Low 
et al., 2009) or limited to TD children (Ten Eycke & Müller, 2016).  As the literature 
comprises such a variety of measures, the nature of imagination in autistic adults is not 
yet clear (see discussion in Chapter One, page 29).  Understanding imagination in 
autistic adults has a twofold purpose; in the context of this thesis, it is important to 
understand both imagination and RRB in order to draw conclusions regarding the 
relationship between them, and as I have noted (page 3), RRBs are currently better 
defined than imagination.  In a broader context, it is important to improve our 
understanding of imagination in autistic adults as it provides useful information for 
diagnosis.  
In order to address this first issue, I decided to include a variety of measures 
simultaneously, covering four domains of imagination: ideational fluency, design 
fluency, thinking about the future and retrospective reports of childhood pretend play.  
All of these domains have been previously explored in the context of understanding 
their relationship with RRBs, with the exception of drawing/design fluency, which 
forms a large part of the imagination literature in ASD.  These aspects were chosen as 
they all fit my working definition of imagination, and they encompass a range of 
imaginative activities (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Two).  Ideational and 
design fluency are measured by three subscales from the TTCT.  Thinking about the 
future is measured by the PFT, a fluency task that has not yet been tested in an autistic 
population.  Performance on this task may be affected by anxiety and/or depression 
(see Chapter Two, pages 78-79), and therefore the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS) was included.  Given that two of the imagination measures depend on 
verbal fluency, a verbal fluency measure was included to control for this in any 
significant associations.  Finally, a short form of the DISCO (see page 143) was 
administered which allows for the retrospective assessment of childhood pretend play.  
Measurement of several different aspects of imagination in a single sample may reveal 
how these different constructs relate to one another to form the single construct of 
imagination in autistic adults. 
 Related to this, there are several different dimensions of imagination that could 
be measured, relating to novelty, generativity and flexibility as shown in Figure 1 (page 
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12).  I have noted that ASD researchers often measure fluency while neglecting other 
dimensions of imagination such as originality or flexibility (e.g. page 26).  Although 
fluency is an important part of imagination, it may be confounded with EF difficulties – 
such as a difficulty with generativity - and it is therefore important to consider other 
ways of measuring imagination.  It is also important as RRBs may be differentially 
related to separate constructs; for example there may exist a negative relationship 
with fluency, but a positive one with originality (page 55).  As discussed previously in 
Chapter One, Wallach and Kogan (1965) consider the most important aspect of 
imaginative ability to be originality, which is conceptually equivalent to novelty in my 
definition of imagination.  This refers to thinking of ideas that are unusual or even 
unique to a participant.  Originality is usually scored in terms of how many other 
participants responded in the same way; for example, an idea may be original if no 
more than 5% of the sample had the same idea.  In addition to originality, flexibility 
may be an important reflection of imaginative ability.  The inflexibility of thought may 
also be logically related to a person’s RRB, which can be characterised at least in part 
as inflexible behaviour.  The TTCT allows for originality and flexibility to be scored in a 
standardised manner.  This represents the first time the relationship between RRBs 
and originality and flexibility have been assessed in an exclusively ASD sample. 
5.2.2 Issues relating to RRBs 
The main measure of RRBs in this study for assessing the relationship with 
imagination was the RBQ-2A.  As this study was carried out in a smaller sample, and it 
is therefore wise to reduce the number of analyses conducted, the total RBQ-2A score 
will not be used in this chapter to assess the relationship between imagination and 
RRBs.  This is especially pertinent considering the findings from the pretend play data 
in Study Four and in previous research (Turner, 1997) that the relationship with RRB is 
specific to IS.  Instead in terms of imagination analyses, the focus will be on IS only, 
using RMB and RSB as the control subscales25. 
 An important issue with regards to RRBs has been the reliance on self-report 
thus far.  This is also true for imagination, but will be addressed in this chapter by the 
use of standardised measures.  As I have mentioned, a short form of the DISCO (page 
                                                          
25 The total RBQ-2A scale will still be analysed for reliability and validity checks 
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143) was administered as part of this study.  Usually the DISCO is carried out with the 
parents of an individual, but in this case participants were interviewed directly, 
although they were offered to bring a parent with them.  Therefore the DISCO still 
relies in part on self-report, however, it allows for the trained interviewer to interpret 
the participant’s answers and code items accordingly.  The DISCO includes several 
items relating to RRBs.  As mentioned in Chapter One, the DISCO’s RRB items have not 
yet been validated as a standalone measure of this phenomenon, so caution is needed 
when interpreting them; nevertheless these items may help to validate self-report 
findings from the RBQ-2A.  Of particular interest here is the item limited pattern of 
self-chosen activities, which codes whether an individual has a wide range of activities 
and interests that they spontaneously engage in, or prefers to engage in repetitive 
tasks and routines, and is analogous to the RBQ-2A’s item 20 which was found in Study 
Four to be related to past pretend play. 
One of the aims of this study was to assess aspects of the reliability and validity 
of the RBQ-2A that I have not yet tested.  Firstly I aimed to assess the test-retest 
reliability of the RBQ-2A, by having participants complete the RBQ-2A at two time 
points and then assessing the correlations between their scores at each time points.  
Secondly, I aimed to assess the correlational validity of the RBQ-2A by comparing it 
with two measures, the RRB items from the DISCO and a recent questionnaire, the 
Adult Routines Inventory (ARI; Evans, Uljarević, Lusk, Loth & Frazier, 2017).  The ARI is 
an adult version of the Childhood Routines Inventory (CRI; Evans et al., 1997) that I 
noted in Chapter One (page 58) as being unpublished at the time of carrying out the 
work from this thesis.  Finally, I explained in Chapter Two (page 62) that construct 
validity is also demonstrated when a measure of a construct is associated with 
measures of other constructs to which it is theoretically related.  It has been suggested 
that RRBs both serve to alleviate anxiety, and are a consequence of feeling anxious 
(e.g. Lidstone, Uljarević, et al., 2014; Rodgers, Glod, Connolly, & McConachie, 2012).  In 
line with this, there is evidence that anxiety and RRBs are positively associated with 
each other (e.g. Joosten, Bundy & Einfeld, 2009; Stratis & Lecavalier, 2013); although 
there is some evidence that this is specific to IS rather than RSMBs (e.g. Rodgers et al., 
2012).  Indeed IS as measured by the parent-report RBQ-2 is significantly associated 
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with anxiety (Lidstone, Uljarević, et al., 2014).  Therefore, if the RBQ-2A is associated 
with a measure of anxiety in accordance with previous research and theory, this would 
support the construct validity of the RBQ-2A. 
5.3 Study Five: Assessing the relationship between self-reported RRBs 
and different aspects of imagination 
This study assessed the internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the 
RBQ-2A as well as its correlations with the ARI, DISCO and HADS.  The correlations 
between the different measures of imagination with each other and with the IS, RMB 
and RSB subscales of the RBQ-2A were also assessed.  Finally, this study also aimed to 
replicate findings from Study Four that IS and a limited pattern of activities is 
associated with childhood pretend play, using the imaginative activities and limited 
pattern of self-chosen activities items from the DISCO along with the RBQ-2A.  
Participants were seen in two sessions, and took part in several measures of 
imagination and RRBs, along with the DISCO, measures of IQ and a measure of mental 
health. 
It was expected that there would be significant associations between the 
imagination measures and RRBs.  It was generally expected that poor performance on 
imagination tasks would be associated with higher levels of RRBs; however, in the case 
of originality, this relationship may be reversed.  I hypothesised on the basis of 
previous research and Study Four that this relationship would be specific to the IS 
subscale of the RBQ-2A and the limited pattern of self-chosen activities item of the 
DISCO.  It was also expected that the different measures of imagination would be 
significantly associated with each other.  Finally, I expected that the RBQ-2A would be 
significantly and positively associated with both the ARI and RRB items from the DISCO, 
along with anxiety symptoms.  I also expected that the RBQ-2A would show good test-
retest reliability and continue to show good internal consistency. 
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
 Participants were recruited in a variety of ways: from the Wales Autism 
Research Centre’s Research Recruitment Register; through local charities in the South 
Wales area; personal contact; and the Cardiff University Noticeboard.  Inclusion 
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criteria for the study were: having a clinical diagnosis of any ASD, being aged 18 or 
older, with the ability to read and write English fluently.  The only exclusion criterion 
was having an IQ below 70 as the study was cognitively demanding.  Initially 29 
participants were recruited; however, one participant withdrew and another 
participant was excluded due to having an IQ below 70. 
 The final sample comprised 27 participants, aged between 19 and 63 at the first 
time point (M=35.69, SD=12.71), seventeen (63%) of whom identified as male.  All 
participants reported receiving a diagnosis of ASD from a clinician.  The majority of 
participants (N=20) were diagnosed with AS.  The remaining participants were 
diagnosed with ASD (N=4) or HFA (N=3), and eighteen participants were diagnosed as 
adults.  Twenty-two participants provided evidence of their clinical diagnosis in the 
form of reports or letters.  Twenty-three participants reported whether or not they 
had a diagnosis of anxiety or depression (N anxiety=5; N depression=2, N both=10, N 
neither=6).  Seven participants were currently attending college or university, eleven 
participants were employed and twenty-three participants identified as being white. 
5.3.1.2 Materials and measures 
5.3.1.2.1 Demographics 
 The following demographic information was collected: date of birth; gender; 
ASD diagnosis; age at diagnosis; anxiety and/or depression diagnosis if applicable; 
college/university status; age of leaving education; qualifications; employment status; 
current job; and ethnicity.  Where available, participants were also asked for proof of 
diagnosis (e.g. diagnostic report, letter from diagnosing clinician). 
5.3.1.2.2 RRBs 
5.3.1.2.2.1 RBQ-2A 
 The RBQ-2A as described in Chapters Three and Four and Appendix 3 (page 
250).  Total score and the subscales (IS, RMB and RSB) from Study Three were used for 
reliability and validity checks, and the subscales were assessed for their relationship 
with imagination. 
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5.3.1.2.2.2 Adult Routines Inventory 
 The ARI; Evans et al., 2017) is the adult self-report version of the Childhood 
Routines Inventory (Evans et al., 1997). The ARI comprises 55 items covering a wide 
variety of RRBs, scored on a 5-point scale: Not at all/Never (1); A little/Rarely (2); 
Somewhat/Sometimes (3); Quite a lot/Often (4); Very much/Always (5).  See Appendix 
8, pages 265-269 for a list of items.  Factor analysis of the ARI results in two factors: 
Repetitive Sensory-Motor Behaviours/Compulsions (RSMBC), equivalent to RSMB; and 
Rigidity/Insistence on Sameness (RIS), equivalent to IS. 
5.3.1.2.3 Imagination and related constructs (generativity, novelty and flexibility) 
Chapter Two (page 75) lists the different measures of imagination used in this 
thesis and the reasons for selecting them.  Generativity/fluency were measured using 
two verbal fluency tasks, the PFT, and the TTCT.  Originality and flexibility were also 
assessed by the TTCT.  Finally, the DISCO includes several items that code for the 
quality of childhood pretend play. 
5.3.1.2.3.1 Measures of generativity only 
5.3.1.2.3.1.1 Verbal fluency 
 As a baseline measure of generativity, participants completed letter and 
semantic fluency tasks (Benton, 1968; Lezak et al., 2004; Turner, 1999b).  In the letter 
fluency task, participants were first asked to name as many words they could possibly 
think of beginning with the letter T as a practice.  Once they named three correct 
words, they were asked to name as many different words as they could beginning with 
the letters F, A and S in one minute.  For the semantic fluency task participants were 
asked to think of words belonging to the category items of clothing as a practice task; 
once they named three correct words they were then asked to name as many animals 
and as many foods as they could in one minute without repetitions.  Participants’ 
responses were scored in terms of total correct responses (fluency), excluding non-
words, repetitions and responses that did not begin with the correct letter or belong in 
the given category.  
5.3.1.2.3.1.2 Personal future task 
This task was adapted from the PFT paradigm developed by MacLeod and 
colleagues (e.g. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1993).  For this task, 
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participants were given two minutes to name as many possible future events that may 
happen to them as they could.  They were instructed that the events could be trivial or 
important, but either definitely going to happen or quite likely to happen.  There were 
two conditions: positive (things that you are looking forward to, in other words, things 
that you will enjoy) and negative (things that you're worried about or not looking 
forward to, in other words, things that you would rather not be the case or rather not 
happen).  The exact instructions given to participants are provided in Appendix 9 (page 
270).  In each condition there were three time periods: next week (including today); 
next year; and next five to ten years.  As with the verbal fluency tasks, participants 
were scored in terms of total output and total valid responses.  Responses were 
counted as correct if they were a future event, not repetitions of a previous event in 
any timeframe of a condition, and were the correct emotional valence for the 
condition.   
5.3.1.2.3.2 Measures of generativity, novelty and flexibility 
5.3.1.2.3.2.1 Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking subtests 
 Three subscales from the TTCT (Torrance, 2008) were included to further assess 
imagination.  Two subtests were taken from Figural Form A: Incomplete Figures 
and Repeated Figures.  For the Incomplete Figures task (IFT), participants were given 
ten minutes to complete ten meaningless line drawings and give each one a title.  For 
the Repeated Figures task (RFT), participants had ten minutes to create as many 
drawings as possible from thirty stimuli consisting of a pair of parallel lines, again 
giving each one a title.  The third subtest was taken from Verbal Form A and was 
Unusual Uses of Cardboard Boxes.  In this test, participants were given ten minutes to 
think of as many new and unusual uses for cardboard boxes as possible and write 
down their answers.   
 For the IFT and RFT, participants were scored in terms of fluency (generativity) 
and originality (novelty).  The fluency score comprised the number of drawings 
completed and titled, excluding repetitions and uninterpretable responses.  This 
results in two total scores out of 10 and 30 respectively.  Only responses that were 
counted under the fluency score could be coded in terms of originality.  To assess 
originality, participant responses were compared against the most common responses 
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per stimulus derived from population norms by the authors of the TTCT.  Each 
participant response that was included under the common responses was given a 
score of 0, and all other responses a score of 1.  As originality may confound with 
fluency, the proportion of original responses was calculated by dividing the number of 
original responses by the fluency score. 
 For the Unusual Uses of Cardboard Boxes (UUCB) task, fluency and originality 
were scored in the same way.  In the case of fluency, any interpretable response that 
was not an impossible use (e.g. make a live dog) or a repetition was counted as a valid 
response. Unlike for the figural TTCT, there was not a strict upper limit in terms of how 
many uses a participant could generate (although the booklet provided 50 lines).  The 
UUCB task was also scored in terms of flexibility.  Each response was given a particular 
category, and the total number of unique categories generated formed the flexibility 
score for each participant.   
 Due to the potential subjectivity of scoring participants in terms of originality 
and flexibility rather than just fluency, two additional researchers coded participants’ 
responses on the TTCT.  One coded all participants’ responses to the figural TTCT, and 
the other coded seven participants’ responses to the verbal TTCT.   
5.3.1.2.4 DISCO-Abbreviated 
 The DISCO – Abbreviated, a shortened form of the DISCO, was used in this 
study for three purposes: firstly, to assess ASD traits and confirm diagnoses in the 
sample; secondly as an additional measure of imagination; and finally as an additional 
measure of RRBs.  The use of the DISCO in this study is particularly important since 
much of the work regarding the importance of imagination and its relationship with 
RRBs in ASD is derived from Wing and Gould’s early observations, which also served as 
the basis for the DISCO.  Therefore this interview provides a rich source of information 
regarding imagination in ASD, compared to other tools which neglect imagination. 
The full DISCO is an effective tool for diagnosing ASD that assesses the 
frequency, severity and impact of an individual’s behaviours and demonstrates good 
inter-rater reliability and discriminant validity (Leekam et al., 2002; Maljaars et al., 
2012; Nygren et al., 2009; Wing et al., 2002) and has been validated in Swedish 
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(Nygren et al., 2009), as well as showing strong agreement with outputs from the ADI-
R and ADOS (Maljaars et al., 2012; Nygren et al., 2009).  The items comprising the 
DISCO-Abbreviated were selected from the full interview on the basis of their 
predictive validity and ability to discriminate between ASD and non-ASD clinical 
diagnoses (Carrington, Kent et al., 2014).   
As mentioned (page 138), participants were interviewed directly in this study, 
although they were offered to bring a parent with them.  If a participant was unable to 
recall or did not know the answer to an item, they were asked to consult their parents 
or a close relative after the interview and inform the research team of the answer if 
possible.  For most DISCO items, participants are given two codes; one for whether 
they show the behaviour currently and another for whether they have ever shown the 
behaviour.  For the purposes of diagnosis, the ever codes are used.  Most DISCO items 
are coded in the following way: marked problem (0), minor problem (1) or no problem 
(2), although some items have their own specialised coding systems.   
5.3.1.2.4.1 Confirmation of diagnoses 
There are several algorithms available for determining whether or not an 
individual should be diagnosed with ASD.  In contrast to the full DISCO, to date the only 
published algorithm for the DISCO-Abbreviated is based on DSM-5 criteria (Carrington, 
Kent et al., 2014).  DSM-5 criteria have been criticised for not being sensitive or specific 
enough, particularly in terms of excluding more cognitively able individuals (e.g. 
McPartland, Reichow & Volkmar, 2012; Taheri & Perry, 2012), which represents a 
specific problem for the present study; although the DSM-5 algorithm for the full 
DISCO has been found to show good sensitivity and specificity across age and ability 
level (Kent, Carrington et al., 2013).  Another issue that may be pertinent for the 
present sample is the fact that the DSM-5 requires the presence of symptoms before 
the age of three, and such information is not always possible to obtain for adults 
depending on the age and health of their parents.  Nevertheless, as the only published 
algorithm for the DISCO-Abbreviated, I chose to implement the DSM-5 algorithm. 
In light of the potential issues with the DSM-5 algorithm, I also chose to 
implement Wing and Gould’s ASD algorithm.  This algorithm requires evidence for the 
following criteria: social impairment; communication impairment; imagination 
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impairment; and repetitive activities, but does not specify that symptoms have to be 
present in early childhood.   Therefore it represents a useful check of diagnosis that 
does not rely on information which may not be available to my participants. 
5.3.1.2.4.2 Imagination items 
Item 38 on the DISCO–Abbreviated is imaginative activities, and for this the 
interviewer asks participants “Does/Did [name]/you have any pretend play or 
imaginative activities?”  Unlike most DISCO items, imaginative activities is rated on a 
six point coding scheme (Table 5.1 below).  For adults, this item is coded in terms of 
the highest level reached by the individual.  The first three codes (0-2) represent not 
having imaginative pretend play in the DISCO DSM-5 algorithm, whereas the last three 
(3-5) represent having imaginative pretend play.  Therefore this item is conceptually 
similar to the pretend play question asked of participants in the previous two studies.   
Table 5-1 Study Five: Scoring guideline for imaginative activities from the DISCO. 
No pretend play 0 No play with model toys e.g. no interest in the function of trains, cars and 
dolls, although A may handle them in the same way as any other objects. 
1 Plays with real household equipment using it for its real purpose.  No 
interest in miniatures e.g. sweeps with real broom, digs with real spade. 
2 Holds doll, toy animals as if real, e.g. hugs and kisses toys. 
Pretend play 3 Goes through simple sequences of actions with toys as if they are real e.g. 
pushes toy trains and cars along floor as if real, and makes appropriate 
noises, or tucks doll in bed. 
4 Will pour and give a pretend cup of tea to other person spontaneously (if A 
only drinks from cup rate 3). 
5 Goes through longer sequences of actions with toys e.g. has a doll’s tea 
party, sets up a garage, road and road bridges for play with toy cars. 
 
Three other measures of childhood pretend play are also relevant.  Individuals 
are coded in terms of delayed pretend play (whether or not pretend play was so 
delayed as to cause concern), shared pretend play (whether or not pretend play was 
shared, and if it was shared, whether the child dominated the play), and repetitive 
pretend play (whether the play was varied and flexible, or repetitive).  Delayed 
pretend play is coded at two levels, whereas shared and repetitive pretend play are 
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coded at three levels corresponding to marked, minor or no problem.  Participants 
who are scored between 0 and 2 on imaginative activities are necessarily delayed in 
terms of pretend play, and are not scored in terms of repetitive and shared pretend 
play as they do not show pretend play. 
5.3.1.2.4.3 RRB items 
 There are twenty-three items that are coded under RRBs in the DISCO - 
Abbreviated DSM-5 algorithm (Appendix 10, Table 8.9, page 271).  However, as higher 
scores on the RBQ-2A indicate higher levels of RRBs, and lower scores on the DISCO 
indicate marked difficulties, the coding of RRB items in the DISCO was reversed and 
recoded in line with RBQ-2A scoring (i.e. marked problem [0] became marked problem 
[3]).  As the RBQ-2A measures current behaviour, the current codes from the DISCO 
were used as the measure of RRBs.   Of particular relevance is the DISCO item limited 
pattern of self-chosen activities.  Limited pattern of self-chosen activities codes 
whether an individual has a wide range of activities and interests that they 
spontaneously engage in, or prefers to engage in repetitive tasks and routines.  It is 
analogous to item 20 (what sort of activity will you choose if you are left to occupy 
yourself?) of the RBQ-2A and was used here to replicate the finding from Study Four26. 
5.3.1.2.5 Other measures 
5.3.1.2.5.1 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
 The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was included to assess anxiety for the 
purpose of assessing construct validity as described in Chapter Two (page 62), and also 
because performance on the personal future task may be related to both anxiety and 
depression (page 78).  The HADS was originally designed for use with physically ill 
patients but is now widely used as a measure of mental health symptoms, and 
demonstrates good reliability and validity (e.g. Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 
2002; Mykletun, Stordal, & Dahl, 2001).  The HADS comprises 14 items measured on a 
4-point Likert scale from 0-3.  Seven items relate to anxiety and seven relate to 
depression, resulting in a total possible score on each scale of 21; for each scale, the 
clinical cut-off point is eight. 
                                                          
26 This item was used rather than item 20 of the RBQ-2A, so that the two items were drawn from the 
same measure (the DISCO), and because two participants had missing data on item 20. 
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5.3.1.2.5.2 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
 FSIQ, VIQ and PIQ were measured using the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), which 
comprises the Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities and Matrix Reasoning subtests.   
5.3.1.3 Procedure and statistical analyses 
 This study was approved by the Cardiff University School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee.  Once contact had been established, the participant was sent the 
information sheet to read before taking part.  The study was conducted in two sessions 
at one of two locations; the university or a local charity.  At the start of the first 
session, the participant was offered another chance to read the information sheet.  
Once the participant had provided written informed consent, they filled in their 
demographic information.  The first session comprised the imagination and creativity 
tasks (verbal fluency, PFT and the TTCT subtests), followed by a break and then the 
WASI and questionnaires.  Nine participants completed the questionnaires digitally, 
and seventeen completed paper copies, depending on the available resources at the 
testing site.  The length of time between the two sessions varied depending on the 
availability of the participant.  The second session comprised the DISCO – Abbreviated 
interview, followed by filling in the RBQ-2A for a second time.  Following completion of 
the second session, the participant was then debriefed.  Participants were paid at the 
end of each session and their travel costs reimbursed.  
5.3.1.3.1 Counterbalancing in first session 
 All participants completed the demographics first.  They then completed the 
imagination and creativity tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced so that half 
the participants completed the verbal fluency and future thinking task first, and the 
other half completed the TTCT first.  Verbal fluency always came before the PFT, but 
the conditions of the PFT (positive and negative) were also fully counterbalanced.  IFT 
always came before RFT as they are presented this way in the TTCT; however, whether 
participants completed the figural TTCT subtests before the verbal TTCT subtest was 
also counterbalanced.   After a break, participants then always completed the WASI in 
the standardised order (Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities and Matrix Reasoning) 
and then the questionnaires.  Half the participants completed the RBQ-2A first, and 
half completed the ARI first.  All participants finished with the HADS. 
 148 
 
5.3.1.3.2 Statistical analyses 
 In order to address the issues of reliability and validity set out at the start of 
this chapter, test-retest reliability for the RBQ-2A was assessed by testing the 
correlations between total RBQ-2A score and scores on its subscales across the two 
time points.  The correlations were also tested while controlling for the time between 
sessions.  The correlational validity of the RBQ-2A was assessed by testing its 
correlations with the ARI and with relevant items from the DISCO - Abbreviated.  Inter-
rater reliability was assessed using intra-class correlations.  Correlation analyses were 
also conducted to test whether or not the HADS anxiety and depression scales were 
associated with the RBQ-2A. 
 To address the main aim of this study, correlation analyses were conducted to 
test the association between the RBQ-2A’s subscales only (not the total score) and the 
different measures of imagination.  Correlation analyses were also conducted to test 
whether or not the HADS anxiety and depression scales were associated with the PFT, 
as both anxiety and depression affect performance on the PFT.  I also compared scores 
on the RBQ-2A subscales and limited pattern of self-chosen activities from the DISCO 
between participants who reported pretend play with those who reported not playing 
pretend, in order to further test the association found in Study Five.  As I expect any 
relationship between RRBs and imagination to only occur with IS and not RSMB (see 
page 57 for a fuller discussion), only the three RBQ-2A subscales were used for this aim 
and not the total score.  Due to the relatively small sample size and to counteract the 
effect of multiple testing, the alpha level was set to .01 for the analyses involving the 
imagination measures.  Finally, the associations between the different measures of 
imagination were also assessed. 
5.3.2 Results 
5.3.2.1 Data screening and descriptive statistics 
 Age at time one (M=35.69, SD=12.71) was positively skewed with no outliers 
(SW[27]=.89, p=.009).  One participant attended the DISCO session with a parent, one 
parent completed the full DISCO interview on behalf of their child and fourteen 
participants provided supplementary information about past behaviour from their 
parents.  Only eight participants met the DSM-5 criteria for ASD using the DISCO-
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Abbreviated.  Of the five participants who did not provide evidence for their ASD 
diagnosis, only one met the DSM-5 criteria using the DISCO-Abbreviated.  However, 
twenty-two participants met Wing and Gould’s criteria for ASD.  Each of the five 
participants who did not meet these criteria were able to provide evidence for their 
diagnosis and their exclusion did not alter the pattern of results, with three 
exceptions27. Questionnaire data were available from twenty-six participants.  
Participants’ scores on the WASI ranged from: FSIQ=80.0-126.0 (M=107.81, SD=13.80); 
VIQ=75.0-120.0 (M=102.52, SD=14.35); PIQ=86.0-137.0 (M=111.96, SD=14.38).    
5.3.2.2 Reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A 
5.3.2.2.1 Test-retest reliability 
 RBQ-2A data were available for twenty-six participants at Time 1 and for 
twenty-five participants at Time 2.  Table 5.2 below shows the scores and Cronbach’s 
alpha values for the RBQ-2A total and subscale scores at Time 1 and Time 2.  
Table 5-2 Study Five: Range, mean, SDs, Medians, IQRs and Cronbach’s α values for the RBQ-2A 
subscales at Time 1 and Time 2 
 Range Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Cronbach’s α 
Time 1     
RBQ-2A Total 1.25-2.95 2.15 (.47) 2.18 (.74) .93 
RBQ-2A RMB 1.00-3.00 1.84 (.62) 1.80 (1.10) .88 
RBQ-2A RSB 1.00-2.75 1.92 (.51) 2.00 (.75) .71 
RBQ-2A IS 1.33-3.00 2.40 (.50) 2.56 (.72) .87 
Time 2     
RBQ-2A Total 1.11-2.75 2.02 (.47) 2.0 (.73) .90 
RBQ-2A RMB 1.0-2.80 1.74 (.55) 1.80 (1.10) .80 
RBQ-2A RSB 1.0-3.0 1.91 (.57) 2.0 (.88) .76 
RBQ-2A IS 1.0-3.0 2.24 (.54) 2.44 (.72) .88 
 
 Mean scores on the total RBQ-2A were normally distributed at both time 
points.  At Time 1, RMB and IS scores were positively skewed with no outliers, whereas 
RSB scores were normally distributed.  At Time 2, all three subscales were normally 
                                                          
27 The relationship between the RBQ-2A IS subscale and the ARI RIS subscale was no longer significant 
(rs=.39, p=.08).  The relationship between negative responses on the PFT and the HADS anxiety scale 
approached significance (rs=.49, p=.025) as did the relationship between RFT and IFT fluency (rs=.45, 
p=.035); however, as explained (page 148) the alpha level was set at .01 for the imagination analyses 
due to the small sample and large number of analyses. 
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distributed.  Mean scores on the RBQ-2A at Time 1 and Time 2 were significantly 
correlated (r=.93, p<.001).  Time 1 and Time 2 were also significantly correlated for 
RMB (rs=.82, p<.001), RSB (r=.82, p<.001), and IS (rs=.86, p<.001).  The amount of time 
between the two sessions varied considerably between participants, ranging from 1 to 
47 weeks (M=9.45, SD=10.57).  There were two outliers in terms of time between 
sessions; however, their removal did not affect the pattern of results.  All associations 
remained significant when controlling for the time between two sessions: RBQ-2A, 
(rs=.92, p<.001), RMB (rs=.83, p<.001), RSB (rs =.78, p<.001), and IS (rs=.89, p<.001). 
5.3.2.2.2 Correlational validity 
 Table 5.3 below shows the scores on the ARI and its subscales, which were all 
normally distributed.  The ARI and RBQ-2A were significantly correlated with each 
other (r=.82, p<.001).  In addition, the ARI RSMBC subscale was significantly correlated 
with both the RMB (rs=.75, p<.001) and RSB sub-scales (r=.64, p<.001), and the ARI RIS 
subscale was significantly correlated with the IS subscale (rs=.51, p=.008).   
Table 5-3 Study Five: Range, mean, SDs, Medians and IQRs for the ARI and its subscales 
 Range Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Cronbach’s α 
ARI Total 1.53-4.45 3.31 (.67) 3.34 (.75) .90 
ARI RSMBC 1.30-4.50 3.19 (.76) 3.36 (1.12) .88 
ARI RIS 1.73-4.61 3.51 (.80) 3.57 (1.15) .90 
 
 There are twenty-three items listed under RRB in the DISCO according to the 
DSM-5 criteria (see Appendix 10, Table 8.9, page 271).  Mean total scores were 
calculated for the current codes of all twenty DISCO RRB items, and these ranged from 
1.12 to 2.37 (M=1.67, SD=.32).  These items showed excellent internal consistency 
α=.9028.  These items were significantly correlated with the mean total scores from the 
RBQ-2A (r=.80, p<.001).  However, participants scored significantly higher on the RBQ-
2A compared to the DISCO (t[25]=-8.57, p<.001).   
                                                          
28 Due to low variance, repetitive acting out roles and twisting hands or objects near eyes were not 
included in this analysis. 
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5.3.2.2.3 Construct validity 
 Total scores on the HADS anxiety subscale ranged from 3 to 21 (M=12.08, 
SD=4.71) and were normally distributed.  Nineteen (84.6%) participants scored at or 
above the suggested clinical cut-off of 8 for both scales in terms of anxiety.  Anxiety 
was not significantly associated with any of the RBQ-2A subscales (see Appendix 11, 
Table 8.10, page 272). 
5.3.2.3 The relationship between RRBs and imaginative abilities 
 As the RBQ-2A and its subscales were significantly correlated at both time 
points, and most of the imagination measures were taken at Time 1, the RRB subscales 
from Time 1 were used in this study. 
5.3.2.3.1 Relationship between RRBs and verbal fluency 
 For the Letter Fluency task, valid responses ranged from 21 to 74 (M=42.11, 
SD=15.01) and from 19 to 63 (M=37.93, SD=11.10) for the Category Fluency task, and 
both were normally distributed.  These two measures were also significantly 
associated with each other (rs=.71, p<.001).  Neither of these measures was 
significantly associated with any of the RBQ-2A subscales (see Appendix 11, Table 8.11, 
page 272). 
5.3.2.3.2 Relationship between RRBs and the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
5.3.2.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 5-4 Study Five: Ranges, means (SDs), and medians (IQRs) for the TTCT data. 
 Fluency Originality* Flexibility* 
 Range Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Range Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Range Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Incomplete 
Figures (N=24) 
3-10 7.67 
(2.24) 
8.0 (4) .50-1.0 
 
.74 
(.16) 
.73 
(.26) 
- - - 
Repeated Figures 
(N=24) 
0-29 12.08 
(6.75) 
10.0 (8) .50-1.0 
 
.80 
(.16) 
.83 
(.24) 
- - - 
Unusual Uses of 
Cardboard Boxes 
(N=27) 
4-39 16.26 
(8.63) 
16.0 
(11) 
.47-1.0 .72 
(.13) 
.76 
(.21) 
.39-1.0 .65 
(.17) 
.63 
(.21) 
*As a proportion of fluency. 
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 The range of scores, means and standard deviations of the TTCT sub-tests are 
displayed in Table 5.4 on the previous page.  Two participants did not complete either 
the RFT or IFT.  One additional participant did not complete the IFT, and another did 
not complete the RFT.  Of the participants who did complete the tasks, out of a total of 
ten drawings on the IFT, participants completed a mean of 7.67 and a median of 8 
drawings, and for each participant at least 50% of their drawings were rated as 
original.  For the RFT, participants completed a mean of 12.08 and a median of 10 
drawings, and again for each participant at least 50% of their drawings were rated as 
original.  For the UUCB task, participants generated a mean of 16.26 and a median of 
16 uses, and at least 47% of participants’ responses were rated as original.  Table 5.5 
below shows examples from the participants in this study to illustrate original and non-
original responses.29 
Table 5-5 Study Five: Examples of original and non-original responses on the TTCT subtests 
 Not original Original 
Incomplete Figures 
(Titles) 
“Happy stickman” 
“Birds in the sky” 
“Mountain top view” 
“Heart” 
“Here comes summer” 
“Falling to Earth” 
“I’m not a ghost I’m a phantom” 
“Out to sea in umbrella” 
“Mr Cloud was content” 
Repeated Figures 
(Titles) 
“House with 4 rooms” 
“Front door” 
“Trees” 
“Book” 
“Curious llama” 
“Inter-dimensional gateway” 
“Finally I’m tall ” 
“Get off your high horse” 
“Coconut halves clapping” 
Unusual Uses of 
Cardboard Boxes 
“Improvised furniture” 
“Draw or write on the cardboard” 
“Building a fort” 
“Toys” 
“Lunar eclipse pinhole” 
“Tobogganing” 
“Use as a wormery” 
“To illustrate how to build bridges – 
outer framework” 
 
                                                          
29 Due to copyright restrictions, only the titles of the figural TTCT responses are shown here.  However, it 
should be noted that the TTCT emphasises the use of the stimulus when judging the originality of a 
response. 
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5.3.2.3.2.2 Relationship with RRBs 
 Fluency scores were normally distributed on the RFT, but positively skewed on 
the IFT (SW[24]=.88, p=.007) with no outliers.   The mean proportion of original 
responses on both the IFT and RFT were normally distributed.  Inter-rater reliability 
was excellent for all four measures (ICC ranged from .998 to 1.0, p<.001), therefore the 
first coder’s (SB) scoring was analysed.  There were no significant associations between 
fluency or originality on the Figural TTCT and any of the RBQ-2A subscales (see 
Appendix 11, Table 8.12, page 272).  Fluency on the RFT and IFT were not significantly 
associated with each other (rs=.28, p=.205).  The proportion of original responses on 
the IFT and the RFT were also not significantly associated with each other (r=.094, 
p=.669).   
 Fluency, originality and flexibility were all normally distributed in the UUCB.  
Inter-rater reliability was good or excellent for all three measures (ICC .89-.98, p range 
from 0.11 to <.001) and so the first coder’s scoring was analysed.  There were no 
significant associations between any of the UUCB scores and any of the RBQ-2A 
subscales (see Appendix 11, Table 8.12).  Fluency on the UUCB was not associated with 
the other TTCT fluency scores, and neither was originality associated with the 
originality scores on the Figural TTCT (see Appendix 11, Table 8.12). 
5.3.2.3.3 Relationship between RRBs and the Personal Future Task 
5.3.2.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5-6 Study Five: Range, means (SDs) and median (IQRs) for the three conditions of the PFT. 
 Range Mean (SD) Median (IQR) 
Total 5-85 37.22 (22.23) 34.0 (22) 
Positive 1-59 19.70 (12.49) 16.0 (13) 
Negative 4-54 17.52 (12.63) 15.0 (11) 
 
 Table 5.6 above shows the range, means, SDs, medians and IQRs for responses 
to the PFT.  All participants were able to complete this task, although several (N=7) 
expressed a difficulty with thinking about the future.  There was a large amount of 
variation in the amount of responses to this task; Table 5.7 overleaf shows some 
examples of the events that participants generated.  
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Table 5-7 Study Five: Examples of participant responses across all six conditions of the PFT. 
 Positive  Negative 
Next Week “Some time at the weekend to get 
into the garden” 
“Finishing a sewing box that I’m 
making for fiancée” 
“Spending time with my child” 
“My neighbours making a lot of noise” 
“On Saturday night my room-mate’s 
having a party” 
“Paying for the work that’s being done” 
Next Year “This year I’m hoping to pass all my 
exams” 
“I might get a job” 
“Getting to know my great nieces 
and nephew better” 
“My mother getting ill… or even dying” 
“There’s always the elections next year” 
“PIP assessment” 
5-10 Years “Buying a house” 
“I would like to be a chiropractor one 
day” 
“I think it’s the kids growing up more 
than anything and seeing how 
they’re gonna change” 
“I may have met somebody, but they’ll 
have broken up with me, that’s a 
possibility” 
“I suppose losing my parents, that’s a 
good possibility” 
“Well I’ll have even more benefit 
assessments” 
 
5.3.2.3.3.1.1 Relationship with RRBs and anxiety 
 Responses in all three conditions were significantly positively skewed, and 
there were two outliers in terms of positive and negative events.  However, the 
removal of these outliers did not alter the pattern of results so they remained in the 
analysis.  There was no significant difference between the number of positive and 
negative valid events (Z=-.74, p=.461).  None of the three conditions of the PFT were 
associated with either anxiety or depression as measured by the HADS (see Appendix 
11, Table 8.13, page 273).  Again there were no significant associations between total 
valid FTT responses and any of the RBQ-2A subscales (Appendix 11, Table 8.13).   
5.3.2.3.4 Relationship between RRBs and DISCO pretend play items 
5.3.2.3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Participants’ scores on the imaginative activities item from the DISCO ranged 
from 0 to 5 (see page 145 for scoring details).  Scores between 0 and 2 indicate that 
participants showed no evidence of pretend play as a child, and scores of 3 or above 
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indicate evidence of pretend play as a child.  Sixteen participants in total reported 
playing pretend as a child, and eleven indicated not playing pretend as a child.  
Participants who are scored 3-5 on imaginative activities are then scored in terms of 
whether or not the pretend play was delayed, shared and/or repetitive.  Table 5.8 
below shows the different patterns of scores that participants received on these 
variables, in terms of whether or not play was delayed, whether or not it was shared, 
and whether or not it was repetitive.  One participant had missing data on all three 
additional variables and is not included in the table. 
Table 5-8 Study Five: Patterns of scores for participants on the DISCO past imagination items; “-” 
indicates missing data.   
Imaginative 
Activities 
Delayed Shared Repetitive N 
No pretend play Yes N/A N/A 11 
Pretend play - No Yes 7 
 - Yes Yes 1 
 Yes No Yes 2 
 No Yes Yes 1 
 No No Yes 4 
 
5.3.2.3.4.2 Relationship with RRBs 
Participants were split into two groups in line with Study Four’s analysis, such 
that scores of 0-2 were recoded as ‘no pretend play’ and 3-5 were recoded as ‘pretend 
play’.  Table 5.9 overleaf shows the means and standard deviations for IS, RMB and 
RSB of each group.  All scores were normally distributed with the exception of RMB in 
the pretend play group, which was positively skewed with no outliers.  Participants 
who did not report playing pretend as a child scored between 1.33 and 3.0 (M=2.44, 
SD=.49) in terms of IS and participants who did report playing pretend as a child scored 
between 1.44 and 3.0 (M=2.37, SD=.52) on IS; however, there was no significant 
difference between the two groups in terms of IS (t[1,22.39]=.137, p=.715) or in terms 
of the other two RBQ-2A subscales (RMB: Z=-.37, p=.721; RSB: t[1,20.06]=.68, p=.419).  
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Table 5-9 Study Five: Means and standard deviations for IS, RMB and RSB, according to whether or not 
the participant showed evidence of pretend play.  
  IS RMB RSB 
Imaginative 
Activities 
0-2 (No pretend play) 
(N=11) 
2.44 (.49) 1.87 (.57) 2.02 (.55) 
 3-5 (Pretend play) 
(N=15) 
2.37 (.52) 1.81 (.67) 1.85 (.49) 
 
Finally, chi-squared analyses were carried out to assess the relationship 
between imaginative activities and limited pattern of self-chosen activities from the 
DISCO.  The two less extreme options of the latter item were collapsed together as in 
Study Four30.  Table 5.10 below displays the frequencies and percentages of 
participants’ scores on limited pattern of self-chosen activities according to whether or 
not they reported playing pretend. The chi-squared analysis was not significant31 
(χ2[1]=.004, p=.952); however, the expected count for one of the cells was below five, 
suggesting that chi-squared analysis should not be run. 
Table 5-10 Study Five: Frequencies and percentages of participants’ scores on the limited pattern of self-
chosen activities items from the DISCO, grouped according to whether or not they played pretend. 
 Limited pattern of self-chosen activities  
 Marked problem No / Minor problem 
Imaginative activities 0-2 (No pretend play) 7 (63.6%) 4 (36.4%) 
 3-5 (Pretend play) 10 (62.5%) 6 (37.5%) 
5.3.2.4 Relationships between the TTCT, PFT and DISCO results 
Appendix 11, Table 8.13 (page 273) shows the correlation coefficients between 
equivalent scores on each of the imagination measures: figural TTCT (RFT and IFT), 
verbal TTCT (UUCB) and all three conditions of the PFT.  The figural TTCT measures 
were not correlated with the PFT. 
Total, negative and positive PFT scores were significantly and positively 
associated with fluency on the verbal TTCT task.  However, when controlling for overall 
                                                          
30 Not collapsing the RRB items did not affect the significance of the analyses. 
31 This analysis remained non-significant regardless of whether the current or ever codes were entered 
for limited pattern of self-chosen activities. 
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verbal fluency, the only association that remained significant at the .01 level was 
between negative PFT responses and fluency on the verbal TTCT task (rs=.55, p=.005). 
 There were no significant correlations between participants’ scores on the 
DISCO imaginative activities item and any of the imagination fluency measures 
(Appendix 12, Table 8.14, page 274).  Table 8.14 also shows performance on the 
imagination fluency tasks in terms of participants’ scores on the DISCO pretend play 
items for descriptive purposes only; these were not statistically analysed due to the 
small sample size. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
 The main aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that IS behaviours are 
associated with imagination in autistic adults, while also assessing additional measures 
of the reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A.  This study extended the previous chapter 
and previous research, by measuring several aspects of imagination (design fluency, 
ideational fluency, thinking about the future and childhood pretend play) in one 
sample with ASD.  The findings presented here further support the reliability and 
validity of the RBQ-2A, along with demonstrating a varied profile of imagination and 
creativity in autistic adults.  However, there was no statistical evidence of a 
relationship between imagination and RRBs. 
5.3.3.1 Reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A 
 The RBQ-2A continued to demonstrate good reliability and validity in this study.  
Internal consistency was excellent for the scale as a whole at both time points (α≥.90) 
and good or acceptable for the subscales.  The RBQ-2A and its subscales show good 
test-retest reliability with all correlations at .82 or higher.  One potential issue is the 
large variation in terms of time between completing the RBQ-2A among participants; 
however, controlling for this and removing outliers did not alter the strong correlations 
between the two time points.  Finally, the whole RBQ-2A scale was strongly correlated 
with the whole ARI scale, and their equivalent sub-scales (RMB/RSB and RSMBC; IS and 
RIS) also correlated with each other.  These findings add strength to the use of the 
RBQ-2A as a measure of RRBs in autistic adults. 
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However, the positive association between the ARI and RBQ-2A may be 
explained by the fact they are both self-report measures.  Therefore the RRB items 
from the researcher-rated DISCO were also compared with the RBQ-2A.  There was a 
strong positive correlation between responses on the RBQ-2A and scores on the RRB 
items from the DISCO, although participants tended to score themselves higher on the 
RBQ-2A than they were scored on the DISCO.  There are some limitations to using the 
DISCO in this manner.  Firstly, the DISCO RRB items are not currently a recognised scale 
of RRB items; although their internal consistency in this study was excellent, which 
suggests that they may warrant further assessment.  Secondly, given that most items 
from the original parent-report RBQ-2 were derived from the DISCO, the two measures 
are closely related, and this may account for the strong association.  However, eleven 
of the twenty-three DISCO items do not have direct RBQ-2A analogues, which suggests 
that this is not necessarily an issue.  Third, the researcher making ratings still relies on 
self-reported information to score the participant (although information was available 
from sixteen parents in total).  A more reliable assessment of the effect of self-report 
would be to have a parent or other informant to fill in the RBQ-2A on behalf of the 
participant, which should be addressed in future research.  Finally, the questions on 
each measure are also qualitatively different, in that the DISCO tends to focus on more 
‘extreme’ behaviours as a result of its purpose as a diagnostic tool, whereas the RBQ-2 
(on which the RBQ-2A is based) was designed to assess a profile of RRBs that would be 
seen in both typical and atypical development.  Moreover, eleven of the RBQ-2A’s 
items are initially answered on a four-point scale that is later collapsed, compared to 
the DISCO items which are all rated on a three-point scale.  These two differences may 
explain why participants tended to rate themselves higher on the RBQ-2A compared to 
how they were coded during the DISCO.  In summary, the comparison with the DISCO 
provides some evidence of the correlational validity of the RBQ-2A, but this evidence 
should be treated with some caution. 
As discussed in Chapter Two (page 62) and the start of this chapter (page 138), 
construct validity can be assessed by testing a measure’s relationship with a 
theoretically related construct.  As a final assessment of construct validity, the 
correlation between the RBQ-2A and the HADS was tested, as there is substantial 
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evidence from previous research that RRBs and anxiety are related in ASD (e.g. Joosten 
et al., 2009; Rodgers et al., 2012; Stratis & Lecavalier, 2013).  Unusually, none of the 
RBQ-2A subscales significantly associated with anxiety.  Therefore this casts some 
doubt on the construct validity of the RBQ-2A.  Although the HADS is widely used as a 
measure of anxiety and depression, more recent studies have questioned its suitability 
for measuring these two distinct constructs (Cosco, Doyle, Ward & McGee, 2012; 
Norton, Cosco, Doyle, Done, & Sacker, 2013).  Therefore it may be an issue with the 
HADS rather than the RBQ-2A that results in a lack of correlation; for example, several 
previous studies that find a relationship between RRBs and anxiety (Lidstone, Uljarević, 
et al., 2014; Rodgers et al., 2012; Wigham, Rodgers, South, McConachie & Freeston, 
2015) have used the more detailed Spence Children Anxiety Scale (Spence, 1998). 
5.3.3.2 Performance on imagination tasks 
 In terms of imagination, there was a wide variety in performance on the TTCT.  
Most participants completed ten drawings on the IFT (N=9); although performance 
was more varied on the RFT, however, this may be due to the fact that the same 
stimulus is presented repeatedly, which may have made the task difficult for some 
participants.  Some participants (N=3) were unable to complete the drawing tasks, 
with one participant describing it as too “abstract”.  One previous finding has been 
that participants with ASD generate more original ideas than TD children (e.g. Liu et al., 
2011).  Although there is no comparison group, it is worth noting that across all three 
TTCT tasks at least 47% of each participants’ responses were original, which is a high 
proportion for a group that is thought to struggle with imagination.  Two participants 
also linked the different stimuli in their responses and created stories, which according 
to the TTCT scoring guidelines should be considered highly original.  
Fluency showed markedly more variation, although 33.3% of participants 
completed all ten drawings on the IFT.  As noted above, there were some particular 
difficulties with fluency on the figural form of the TTCT.  Fluency ranged from 3 to 10 
drawings on the IFT, 0 to 29 on the RFT and 4 to 29 unusual uses of cardboard boxes.  
Flexibility was measured in the UUCB by summing how many different categories a 
participant’s responses fall into, and then calculating the number of unique categories 
as a proportion of a participant’s fluency score.   For this sample, the scores ranged 
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from .39 to 1.0 and the mean score was .66; this is somewhat unexpected as previous 
research has shown difficulty with flexibility in autistic individuals (e.g. Craig & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; Liu et al., 2011); although Pring et al. (2012) did not find a difficulty in 
flexibility in design fluency.  Considering the variation in fluency with the high 
proportion of original responses, this pattern is compatible with the hypothesis that 
whereas some autistic individuals with ASD have difficulty with generating ideas, the 
ideas that they do generate tend to be original.  Further assessment of these 
constructs and comparison with a control group of NT individuals is necessary to test 
this hypothesis, and to explore flexibility in ASD.   
 It is more difficult to assess the profile of responses on the PFT as it is not a 
standardised task.  To my knowledge, this is the first study to employ the PFT in ASD, 
and so it cannot be compared to previous research with this population.  It is also a 
qualitatively different task compared to other future thinking tasks, as the quality of 
participants’ responses are not coded in terms of how specific and detailed the event 
is, or whether the event is categorical (e.g. going shopping) or extended (e.g. going on 
holiday).  Some participants expressed a difficulty with thinking about the future, 
making comments such as “I don’t really think forward”, “You can’t tell what’s gonna 
happen”, and “That’s a difficult one, I don’t tend to think that far into the future”.  
However, it was definitely not the case that all participants struggled with thinking 
about the future; indeed, one participant commented “I’ve always thought into the 
future” and enjoyed entertaining ‘what if?’ questions in their writing.   
Seventeen participants reported a clinical diagnosis of anxiety and/or 
depression, and the majority of participants scored above the clinical cut-off for 
anxiety on the HADS in the current sample.  Given the high levels of anxiety and 
depression in the present sample, it would be expected that the sample would follow 
the pattern of a clinical group with both anxiety and depression as described in 
Chapter Two (page 78); that is, positive events may be reduced due to depression, and 
negative events may be increased due to anxiety.  However, neither anxiety nor 
depression were significantly associated with performance on the PFT, supporting 
previous research in terms of depression (Crane et al., 2013) and there was no within-
group difference in terms of positive and negative events.  This lack of association may 
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be due to weakness of the HADS (see earlier discussion, page 159) or the low power of 
the study; or it may be that anxiety and depression do not affect future thinking in 
autistic individuals in the same way as they do NT individuals.  It would be interesting 
to directly compare groups of individuals with anxiety/depression either with or 
without ASD to see how performance on the task differs between these two groups. 
In terms of pretend play, more than half of the sample (N=15) reported playing 
pretend games as a child, which may reflect the relatively able nature of the sample.  
However, Table 5.9 (page 156) showed that all participants who did play pretend 
played repetitively as children, and additionally most participants indicated another 
difficulty (e.g. lack of shared play).  This is particularly notable given that diagnosis of 
ASD in the UK follows ICD-10 criteria which do not require difficulties in pretend play 
for a diagnosis, yet the entire sample showed some difficulty with past pretend play32.  
These difficulties with past pretend play are notable when considering the range of 
responses to the different imagination tasks included in this study; supporting the idea 
that imagination is a complex, multi-dimensional construct.  Indeed, there were no 
significant correlations between imaginative activities from the DISCO and the other 
imagination tasks.  Finally, this may provide some evidence that difficulties with certain 
aspects of imagination are central to ASD despite not being included as necessary 
diagnostic criteria in the ICD-10 or DSM-5. 
 The findings presented here may inform how the imagination literature in ASD 
should be approached.  As discussed earlier (page 21), there has been little research 
addressing the correlational validity of different imagination methods. Notably, neither 
of the design fluency measures here were significantly associated with future thinking; 
whereas the ideational fluency task was associated with future thinking, although this 
was mostly due to the fact that both depend to some extent on verbal fluency.  
Moreover, the imaginative activities item from the DISCO was not significantly 
correlated with the other imagination measures.  Table 8.14, Appendix 12 (page 274) 
shows the pattern of performance on the TTCT and PFT depending on how participants 
were coded on the pretend play items.  Due to existing issues with low power and 
                                                          
32 With one exception of a participant who scored 5 on imaginative activities but for whom there was no 
information on whether this play was delayed, shared or repetitive. 
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sample size (page 161) I did not run statistical analyses on these data; however, a 
strong qualitative pattern does not emerge when inspecting the table.  The lack of 
relationship between these measures suggests that although all of these measures 
ostensibly assess some facet of imagination, they are all measuring distinct constructs. 
 This may also reflect the distinction between imagination and creativity that I 
discussed in Chapter One (page 8).  Specifically, thinking about the future and 
generating novel uses for objects do not actually require an output, whereas drawing 
and playing pretend are outputs of imagination.  If an individual shows difficulty in 
terms of creativity, they do not necessarily have difficulty with imagination; however, if 
they are able to generate novel responses – as the majority of the sample did here – 
this implies they have imaginative ability.  This further highlights how estimates of 
imaginative ability are sensitive to task differences, and a range of measures should be 
used when assessing imagination.  Furthermore, careful consideration should be given 
to where the line is drawn between imagination and creativity in future research. 
Overall, the lack of relationship between different measures of imagination 
may explain why across the previous research, there is equivocal evidence across 
different methods.  Given the wide range of studies of imagination in ASD employing a 
variety of methods, this highlights how difficult it is to draw conclusions about 
imagination in ASD from the available literature.  Further research should assess 
imagination in more than one way in their studies, and explore how different 
measures of imagination may be related to allow for a better interpretation of the 
current literature. 
5.3.3.3 Relationship between imagination and RRBs 
Previous findings regarding imagination and RRB in ASD have been equivocal.  
Some studies find evidence of a relationship (Best et al., 2015; Harrop et al., 2014; 
Honey et al., 2007), and others find evidence that this relationship is specific to IS 
(Turner, 1997).  However, these findings have not always been replicated (Bishop & 
Norbury, 2005; Dichter et al., 2009; Lind et al., 2014).  Previous research into this 
relationship has focused almost exclusively on fluency and not assessed originality or 
flexibility as components of imagination (e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Turner, 1997), 
and tends to measure one type of imagination (e.g. Dichter et al., 2009; Honey et al., 
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2007) and/or not analyse the different subtypes of RRBs (e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; 
Honey et al., 2007), which has limited the conclusions that can be drawn about this 
relationship.  The present study aimed to address these weaknesses by simultaneously 
assessing the different subscales of RRBs and assessing different types and dimensions 
of imagination.  I expected there to be evidence that imagination and RRBs are 
significantly associated with each other, and that this is specific to IS and limited self-
chosen activities as in Study Four. 
In line with hypotheses, there was no relationship between imagination and 
either RMB or RSB.  Study Five is the first to my knowledge to explore this relationship 
in terms of RRBs and the drawing tasks from TTCT (equivalent to design fluency).  
Contrary to hypotheses, IS was not associated with any of the measures of 
imagination, and in contrast to Study Four, there was no difference in IS between 
participants who did and did not play pretend.  Also in contrast to Study Four, there 
was no relationship between imaginative activities and a limited pattern of activities as 
measured by the DISCO (ever and current codes).  This is despite the fact that, as 
demonstrated in Table 5.11 below, twenty-four participants (89%) showed a difficulty 
with both imagination and limited pattern of self-chosen activities from the DISCO. 
Table 5-11 Study Five: Patterns of scores for participants on the DISCO past imagination items and 
limited pattern of self-chosen activities from the DISCO (N=26); “-” indicates missing data.   
Imaginative 
Activities 
Delayed Shared Repetitive Limited Pattern of 
Activities 
N 
No pretend play Yes N/A N/A Yes 9 
 Yes N/A N/A No 2 
Pretend play - No Yes Yes 7 
 - Yes Yes Yes 1 
 Yes No Yes Yes 2 
 No Yes Yes Yes 1 
 No No Yes Yes 4 
 
It may be that the power and variation of the sample, in contrast to Study 
Four’s large sample, was too low to detect any relationship.  However, as can be seen 
from Table 5.11, all participants either showed no pretend play, or only showed 
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pretend play that was repetitive.  Therefore it is possible that a significant association 
with pretend play was not found in terms of IS or limited pattern of self-chosen 
activities because the participants with pretend play still showed some sort of 
imaginative difficulty.  This difficulty may have masked any group differences that 
might be present between a group of autistic participants who did show pretend play 
and a group of autistic participants who either show no pretend play, or their pretend 
play was limited in some way.   
As discussed in Chapter One (page 53), there is some evidence that RRBs are 
associated with ideational fluency (e.g. Turner, 1997); however, these findings are not 
supported here and in some previous research (Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Dichter et al., 
2009).  The present results also support the one previous study that has tested the 
relationship between RRB and future thinking (Lind et al., 2014); although the present 
study extended upon Lind et al.’s work by analysing the subscales of the RBQ-2A rather 
than a single RRB construct.  Few studies have reported the relationship between RRBs 
and other types of imagination such as originality and flexibility, with the one 
exception of Best et al. (2015), who only found an association with fluency, although 
they did not separate ASD participants from NT participants.  However, in the present 
study there was not a significant association between these variables and any RRB.  
In summary, I noted in Chapter One that the inconsistency of the research 
regarding the relationship between imagination and RRBs in ASD may result from the 
fact that researchers tend to not separate out the subtypes of RRBs in their analyses; 
this was supported by a specific relationship with IS identified in the previous chapter.  
However, I was unable to replicate the findings from the previous chapter, or identify 
any other significant associations between imagination and RRBs.  This may be as a 
result of insufficient sample size and power to detect what is potentially a subtle effect 
unique to IS and pretend play, or floor effects in terms of the childhood pretend play 
of the sample.  In the next chapter, I shall discuss the directions that future research 
should take regarding the relationship between imagination and RRBs in ASD. 
5.3.3.4 Limitations 
 One limitation of this study is that this sample may have been a particularly 
imaginative sample, given that the study was advertised as an imagination study in 
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order to be open about the purpose of the study and to generate interest.  This may 
have attracted a disproportionate number of participants who considered themselves 
imaginative or creative; however, it should be noted that this was not the case for all 
participants.  Another major limitation lies in the fact that, out of the 27 participants, 
only eight met the DSM-5 criteria according to the DISCO.  Whereas 22 participants 
were able to provide some evidence of a diagnosis by a clinician, five were not, and 
only one of these met DSM-5 criteria on the DISCO.  This may be because the present 
sample is relatively cognitively able; some have criticised the DSM-5 criteria for 
excluding individuals who are older or more able (e.g. McPartland et al., 2012; Taheri 
& Perry, 2012).  This may also explain why there were no significant findings, due to 
the lack of variation within the sample.  However, the lack of DSM-5 diagnoses may 
simply reflect the fact that use of just one diagnostic measure in a research setting 
may not be enough to diagnose a participant.  Indeed, Lind et al. (2014) argue that 
clinical judgment is a more reliable and valid inclusion criterion for research.  Another 
possible explanation for the discrepancy may come back to the issues of self-report 
and EM in ASD.  Although the administrator of the interview has to make their own 
judgment about whether or not a particular behaviour is a marked problem, and 
receives specialised training in this, the participant is still required to remember and 
report on their own behaviour.  This is particularly difficult in the case of older adults 
when asking about their childhood experiences, and when asking anyone about 
infancy.  Where possible, participants asked their parents about particular behaviours, 
but not everyone provided this information.  Therefore it was difficult in many cases 
(N=9) to ascertain whether or not there were any setbacks or delays in very early 
development, and this is essential for the DSM-5 criteria (APA, 2013; Carrington, Kent 
et al., 2014).  However, twenty-two participants did meet Wing and Gould’s ASD 
criteria according to the DISCO; those that did not were able to provide evidence of 
their diagnosis. 
 Finally, there is a limitation in terms of the issue of statistical power.  A priori 
power analyses were not conducted as the previous research is sparse and 
inconsistent, and therefore I was not able to predict effect sizes for the correlation 
analyses.  Autistic adults can be a difficult group to identify and recruit, and although 
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27 is a respectable sample size compared to many other experimental studies 
conducted with autistic adults, it is a small sample size for conducting a large number 
of analyses across several variables.  I attempted to control for the effect of multiple 
testing by interpreting only those correlations that were significant at the .01 level.  I 
also conducted post-hoc power analyses on the data, the results of which are 
presented in Appendices 11 and 12 (pages 272-274).  Unsurprisingly, these analyses 
were greatly underpowered, in some cases to a value of .01.  Therefore, it is a 
possibility that significant associations were not found because of lack of power. 
5.3.3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter aimed to assess how RRBs as measured by the RBQ-2A are related 
to imagination in ASD, along with further testing of the reliability and validity of the 
RBQ-2A.  The reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A was strongly supported in this 
study, with the exception that the RBQ-2A was not associated with anxiety.  
Limitations of previous research into imagination and RRBs were addressed assessing 
imagination in several ways, both in terms of method (drawing/design fluency, novel 
use of objects, and thinking about the future) and scoring (fluency, originality and 
flexibility).  Overall, the participants in this study performed well on the measures of 
imagination employed here, casting further doubt on the notion of autistic people not 
being imaginative.  Furthermore, it would be expected that if the same underlying 
construct was responsible for all types of imagination employed by these different 
tasks, there would be some correlation between the different measures, which has 
been found in some of the few studies to have explored this (e.g. Begeer et al., 2009; 
Lind & Bowler, 2010).  However, only one association was found, between the verbal 
TTCT measure and the PFT, and this was mostly explained by performance on the 
verbal fluency task.  Therefore this suggests that different measures of imagination are 
measuring quite distinct constructs (e.g. being able to come up with new ideas, and 
being able to create different drawings), and that general conclusions about 
imagination should not be drawn from studies investigating just one type of 
imagination, for example thinking about the future.  In addition, the different sub-
categories of RRBs were examined, as this has not always been the case in previous 
studies of imagination and RRBs in ASD.  However, thorough examination of the 
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different relationships among the imagination and RRB variables did not reveal any 
significant relationships, although there is a strong pattern in that difficulty with 
pretend play is almost always present with a limited pattern of self-chosen activities 
(Table 5.11).  The next and final chapter of this thesis will address what the difficulties 
of identifying an association with RRBs means for the construct of imagination and its 
importance to ASD, and discuss directions for future research.  
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6 Chapter Six: General Discussion and Conclusion 
 “Their unswerving determination and penetrating intellectual 
powers, part of their spontaneous and original mental activity, 
their narrowness and single-mindedness, as manifested in their 
special interests, can be immensely valuable and can lead to 
outstanding achievements in their chosen areas” (p.88) 
- Asperger (1944) 
 The focus of this thesis is the relationship between inflexibility of thought and 
behaviour in autistic adults.  These have been conceptualised as imaginative ability and 
RRBs, respectively.  Theoretical arguments have been put forward for the replacement 
of flexible, imaginative thought and action with restricted and repetitive patterns of 
behaviour (e.g. Happé, 1999; Turner, 1999b; Wing & Gould, 1979).  However, research 
on this subject has yielded equivocal results; some find evidence for this negative 
association between the two (e.g. Honey et al., 2007), whereas others do not (e.g. 
Dichter et al., 2009), and it has also been suggested that certain RRBs may foster 
aspects of imagination such as originality (Liu et al., 2011).  Given this conflicting 
theory and evidence, the question arises: what is the nature of the relationship 
between imagination and RRBs in ASD? 
 Throughout this thesis I have aimed to address this question and further our 
understanding of the relationship between RRBs and imagination in autistic adults by 
measuring these constructs in detail.  Having noted the lack of suitable measures of 
RRBs for adults, I also aimed to develop a self-report measure of RRBs suitable for use 
with autistic adults.  Finally, I aimed to provide a detailed profile of imagination in 
autistic adults, since a supposed difficulty with imagination as part of a ‘triad of 
impairments’ in ASD has informed most psychological research into ASD to some 
extent; and yet our understanding of imagination in autistic adults is under-developed 
(see Chapter One, section 1.1.3.2, page 29).  The preceding empirical chapters 
addressed these aims, firstly by developing and testing a self-report measure of RRBs 
for autistic adults (the RBQ-2A), and then by measuring several different aspects of 
imagination in order to test its relationship with RRBs and to describe the profile of 
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imagination in autistic adults.  Overall I was able to develop a reliable and valid 
measure of RRBs for autistic adults, and have provided evidence of a variety of 
imaginative abilities in autistic adults.  However, only one study (Study Four) 
demonstrated any strong evidence of the relationship between imagination and RRBs, 
and as expected, this was specific to IS, including a limited pattern of activities.  This 
final chapter summarises the findings and implications from these studies, reflects on 
why this relationship has been so difficult to tease apart in this thesis and in previous 
research, and offers suggestions for the directions of future research regarding this 
relationship between RRBs and imagination. 
6.1 Summary of findings 
 Before assessing the relationship between imagination and RRBs, I aimed to 
develop a self-report measure of RRBs suitable for use with autistic adults as the 
existing measures for this purpose were limited.  The goal of Chapter Three was to 
present the development and initial testing of the RBQ-2A, in order to demonstrate 
that it is a useful measure of RRBs for both autistic and NT adults.  This was achieved 
over two studies.  In Study One I conducted a PCA on RBQ-2A data from 
undergraduate students, and found that most items grouped into factors equivalent to 
RSMB and IS, with the notable exception of sensory items.  The level of internal 
consistency was good for the whole questionnaire and acceptable across its subscales.  
Additionally, I found that imagination as measured by the AQ is not associated with the 
RBQ-2A in an undergraduate sample.  In Study Two, I compared scores on the RBQ-2A 
and its subscales between a group of autistic adults and a group of NT adults matched 
on IQ.  As expected, autistic adults scored higher on the full questionnaire and 
subscales, supporting the construct validity of the RBQ-2A.  Therefore in Chapter Three 
I was able to show preliminary evidence that the RBQ-2A is a reliable and valid 
measure of RRBs in both autistic and NT populations, although there were still some 
issues remaining.  Firstly, the fact that sensory items did not load on any component 
presents an important limitation given that sensory symptoms form part of the criteria 
for ASD.  Secondly, the RBQ-2A had not yet been assessed in a large sample of autistic 
adults.  Finally, there was the issue of the fact that the RBQ-2A relies on self-report.  I 
addressed the first two issues in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four sought to further test the RBQ-2A in autistic adults, while also 
beginning to address the relationship between imagination and RRBs.  Study Three 
built on the findings of Study One and Two by assessing the RBQ-2A in a large sample 
of adults with ASD, representing the first time that the factor structure of RRBs has 
been assessed in an exclusively adult autistic sample.  Again the internal consistency of 
the whole scale was good.  However, the factor structure was distinctive, with sensory 
items forming their own component in addition to RMB and IS; although this factor 
structure is somewhat unusual, this solution includes sensory items, which presents an 
advantage over Study One’s solution.  In Study Four, I carried out the initial analyses 
exploring the relationship between imagination and RRBs.  In terms of the relationship 
between imagination and RRB, a small but significant association was found between 
retrospective reports of childhood pretend play and current scores on the IS subscales 
of the RBQ-2A in Study Four.  There was also a significant relationship between 
childhood pretend play and scores on RBQ-2A item 20 (activities), suggesting that 
participants who did not play pretend as a child then went on to have more restricted 
patterns of activities and interests as an adult; although this relationship was not 
significant when collapsing responses on item 20.   The associations between pretend 
play and both IS and item 20 remained significant when re-categorising participants’ 
pretend play answers.  Some significant association was also found between IS and 
RSB with the imagination subscale of the AQ, in contrast to Study One, suggesting that 
there is an ASD-specific relationship between the imagination subscale of the AQ and 
the RBQ-2A; however, this was not a wholly stable relationship.  In summary, Chapter 
Four met the goal of demonstrating the reliability of the RBQ-2A in a larger sample of 
autistic adults and beginning the exploration of the relationship between imagination 
and RRBs. 
The final empirical chapter aimed to bring together all three goals of this thesis 
within a small sample of autistic adults: examining the relationship between 
imagination and RRBs; developing and testing a measure of RRBs for autistic adults; 
and describing the profile of imagination in autistic adults.  With regard to testing the 
RBQ-2A, Study Five found that the RBQ-2A demonstrated good test-retest reliability as 
well as correlational validity with the ARI.  I assessed the correlation of the RBQ-2A 
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with items from the DISCO, a non-self-report measure, in order to address the 
potential critique of the use of self-report measure in ASD I raised earlier; this 
correlation was strong and positive, supporting the use of the RBQ-2A.  However, 
construct validity in terms of relationship with anxiety was not supported, potentially 
due to limitations with the chosen anxiety measure.  Overall, there is now strong 
evidence for the following types of reliability and validity in support of this measure 
and its subscales: internal consistency; test-retest reliability; construct validity 
(distinguishing ASD and NT participants); and correlational validity. 
Study Five also revealed important information about the presentation of 
imagination in adults with ASD.  Imagination was assessed in terms of ideational and 
design fluency (measured by the TTCT), thinking about the future (measured by the 
PFT), and past pretend play (measured by the DISCO).  Although there was no 
comparison group, the proportion of original responses across the TTCT measures 
ranged from .47 to 1.0, which suggests that some participants were highly original in 
their thinking.  Several participants expressed a difficulty with thinking about the 
future; however, in general participants were able to generate several future events, 
although the specificity of these events was not assessed unlike in previous studies 
(e.g. Lind et al., 2014).  Finally, more than half of the sample reported playing pretend 
as children, although this was always repetitive.  Overall, the idea that autistic adults 
are impaired across all forms of imaginative thinking was not supported, as there was 
great variation in performance on the imagination tasks; all participants showed some 
difficulty with past pretend play, however many performed very well in terms of 
creativity.  On a related note, scores on these imagination tasks were not associated 
with one another, suggesting that the construct of imagination is multi-faceted. 
  In terms of the main aim of Chapter Five and this thesis, Study Five aimed to 
replicate findings from Study Four, in that a lack of pretend play (measured by the 
DISCO) should be associated with increased scores on IS (as measured by the RBQ-2A) 
or a limited pattern of self-chosen activities (as measured by the DISCO).  Study Five 
failed to replicate these findings in terms of significance, although it should be noted 
that all but two participants did show both a difficulty with pretend play and a limited 
pattern of activities according to the DISCO.  The lack of replication may be due to low 
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statistical power as a result of the small sample size, or it may be the fact there was 
not enough variation in the group in terms of pretend play; all participants reported 
some difficulty with pretend play in the past, which may have masked any significant 
group differences.  Considering imagination other than pretend play, Study Five failed 
to find a significant association between scores on the RBQ-2A and a) design fluency, 
b) ideational fluency, or c) thinking about the future, regardless of whether fluency, 
originality or flexibility were being assessed.  It may be that there is a relationship 
between RRBs and imaginative ability but this is a small effect (hence only seen in 
Study Four’s larger sample and not the relatively small sample of Study Five) that is 
limited to pretend play, or childhood imagination in general.  These results may also 
reflect a genuine finding that RRBs in adulthood do not relate to imagination in 
adulthood.  
 In summary, the goals of the thesis were: to develop a self-report measure of 
RRBs and test its reliability and validity; to examine the profile of imaginative ability in 
autistic adults; and finally to assess the nature of the relationship between imagination 
and RRBs in autistic adults, which I hypothesised would be specific to IS.  The empirical 
work presented in this thesis addressed my goals in the following ways.  Firstly, across 
two PCAs of RBQ-2A data and numerous tests of reliability and validity, and over four 
different samples of participants, I have demonstrated that the RBQ-2A is a reliable 
and valid measure of RRBs in both NT and autistic adults, albeit with some caveats in 
terms of unusual factor structure and lack of a correlation with anxiety.  I measured 
several aspects of imagination in autistic adults and assessed the relationships of the 
different tasks with each other.  Imagination in autistic adults varies widely depending 
on the task used; for example, there was a wide variation in the sample in terms of 
creativity, but almost all participants showed some difficulty with childhood pretend 
play.  Different imagination tasks also do not correlate well with each other, 
highlighting the multidimensional nature of this construct.  Finally, across Studies Four 
and Five I found some evidence of a relationship between imagination and RRBs.  
However, this was limited to childhood pretend play and imagination measured by the 
AQ; none of Study Five’s other measures of imagination correlated with RRBs.  
Nevertheless, I have identified evidence of a specific relationship between reports of 
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childhood pretend play and IS, in particular limited patterns of activities, although 
these findings were limited to Study Four.  The following section shall consider the 
implications of these findings. 
6.2 Implications of findings 
 As I have described in the previous section, in terms of the main goal of this 
thesis, I have found evidence for a specific relationship between IS, including limited 
patterns of activities, and past pretend play.  I began this thesis with the premise that 
behavioural inflexibility in ASD is related to inflexible thought, or difficulty with 
imagination.  Following a review of the previous theory and evidence relating to this 
claim, I further narrowed down the relationship as being between imagination and a 
class of RRBs known as IS – comprising, for example, rigidity, rituals and restricted 
interests – rather than between imagination and the other major class of RRBs, RSMBs.  
Yet the evidence for this remained sparse and I did not find such a relationship with 
most of my measures of imagination.  This raises the question of why it is so difficult to 
uncover convincing evidence of this relationship.  It is notable that the only significant 
evidence came from a measure of childhood pretend play; perhaps there is a 
relationship between RRBs and imagination, but this relationship is more robust in 
childhood compared to adulthood.  The simplest answer is that there is no such 
relationship.  However, it seems intuitive that an individual who finds it difficult to 
flexibly consider alternative scenarios, or who is not motivated to do so, may prefer to 
engage in the same activities on a daily basis and dislike change.  Conversely, someone 
who prefers their environment and activities to remain the same may avoid thinking 
about change or alternative scenarios in order to avoid anxiety-provoking thoughts, 
which would then reduce the flexibility of their thinking. 
An answer to this conundrum may lie in our conceptualisation of imagination.  
Imagination has several dictionary definitions, and has been defined in several 
different ways by creativity researchers, developmental psychologists and the authors 
of international diagnostic manuals and diagnostic tools.  In addition to the issue of 
definition, the concepts of imagination and creativity have been measured using 
several different tools across a wide range of contexts, including pretend play, thinking 
about the future and drawing ability.  Therefore, our understanding of imagination in 
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the ASD literature is underdeveloped compared to RRBs.  There are still unanswered 
questions regarding RRBs in ASD, but there is a large body of work specifically 
focussing on the conceptualisation and measurement of RRBs, unlike with imagination.  
Therefore this makes it difficult to explore the specifics of a potential relationship 
between imagination and RRBs.  I concluded in Chapter One that imagination is not 
necessarily a unidimensional construct.  The evidence presented in this thesis supports 
this conclusion given that Study Five showed little correlation between different 
measures of imagination, even when measured using a similar scoring method such as 
fluency, with the exception of the UUCB and the PFT tasks; although this relationship 
became weaker when controlling for verbal fluency, implying that any relationship may 
be more to do with EF rather than a shared construct of imagination.  From these 
findings it is unwise to draw conclusions about one type of imagination on the basis of 
evidence from another type, or indeed to make conclusions about imagination as a 
whole.  Therefore it follows that a relationship would not exist between RRBs and 
imagination as a single construct, and that there may be differential relationships 
between RRBs and different imaginative behaviours (e.g. pretend play, thinking about 
the future) and different components of imagination (e.g. novelty, flexibility). 
 Not only does the type of imagination that is being measured matter, the type 
of RRB measured when exploring this relationship is equally important.  In the larger 
sample of autistic adults in Study Four, I found evidence of a relationship between past 
pretend play and IS measured by the RBQ-2A, as well as with item 20, what sort of 
activity will you choose if you are left to occupy yourself?  The latter is important as this 
item is not included within the overall IS subscale33, and therefore the IS subscale and 
item 20 may be independently related to imagination; however, it should be noted 
that item 20 is conceptually related to IS.  In the Study Five sample, I qualitatively 
demonstrated a similar pattern using analogous DISCO items, although neither this nor 
the relationship with IS were significant.  However, this lack of replication may be due 
to power issues or floor effects in terms of pretend play.  From this evidence, I 
conclude that there is a specific relationship between impoverished past pretend play 
                                                          
33 As explained in Chapter Two, this is due to the fact item 20’s response scale is non-quantitative, unlike 
the other nineteen RBQ-2A items. 
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and IS, including a restricted range of repetitive activities, but that this is a small effect.  
Again, this appears to be an intuitive relationship; if an individual has difficulty in 
enacting complex pretend scenarios which require a degree of novelty and flexibility, 
this may later manifest as a preference for routines, a narrow, unvaried range of 
interests/activities and other behaviours related to IS.  However, the direction of this 
relationship cannot be assessed in this thesis due to the retrospective nature of the 
studies’ design.   
 The specificity of this relationship may suggest why definitive evidence for the 
relationship between imagination and RRBs has been difficult to ascertain.   It may be 
that previous research into this relationship has been too broad, whereas focussing on 
specific aspects of imagination and RRB allows for a clearer understanding of this 
relationship.  From this thesis, the only aspect of imagination that appears to be 
related to RRBs is childhood pretend play, albeit this is a weak relationship.  Previous 
evidence of a relationship between other creativity measures and RRBs (Best et al., 
2015; Turner, 1997) may arise from shared features of different aspects of 
imagination; although my imagination measures were not related to each other, a lack 
of power may have masked some small relationships based on the fact that these 
measures all tap into generativity, novelty and flexibility, the key components of 
imagination.  It is unclear which aspect of childhood pretend play is driving this 
relationship, as pretend play relies on the ability to generate novel events or 
sequences of events in a flexible manner.  In comparison to the various creativity 
measures I employed, I did not assess pretend play in as much detail, due to the fact I 
was interested in autistic adults.  Further exploration of this construct in relationship 
to RRBs may reveal whether one or all of the components of generativity, novelty and 
flexibility relate to RRBs.  Moreover, this relationship was specific to IS including a 
limited pattern of self-chosen activities, rather than overall measures of RRBs.   The 
weakness of a relationship that is specific to pretend play and IS may explain why this 
relationship is not always supported (e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Dichter et al., 2009; 
Lind et al., 2014). 
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6.3 Strengths, contributions and limitations 
6.3.1 Strengths 
The main strength of this body of research has been to analyse a wide range of 
types of imagination for the first time in a single sample of autistic adults, including 
measurements of pretend play, thinking about the future, ideational fluency and 
design fluency, and assessing imagination in terms of fluency, originality and flexibility.  
As such this is the first study to present a detailed picture of imagination in autistic 
adults and to show the variety of performance on both standardised and non-
standardised measurements of imagination and creativity.  I was also able to include a 
wide range of ages and genders in my studies, which is sometimes difficult in ASD 
research.  Unlike most other previous research, originality and flexibility were assessed 
along with fluency, which represents a strength of the research in that a fuller picture 
of imagination was assessed.  
6.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 
6.3.2.1 Contribution to researchers 
In terms of the main question of this thesis - whether or not there exists a 
relationship between imagination and RRBs in ASD - I have provided evidence of a 
small but significant relationship between retrospectively reported pretend play and IS 
in ASD.  This thesis has made a theoretical contribution to researchers working in the 
field of imagination and ASD.  In Chapter One I identified several issues regarding the 
imagination literature in ASD, which need to be addressed by current and future 
researchers.  Firstly, there is no clear, agreed upon definition of imagination and it is 
vital for researchers to consider this carefully before carrying out imagination research.  
In Chapter One I presented a possible candidate: the generation and flexible 
manipulation of existing concepts to form novel ideas, which may be rooted in past 
experience and may result in adaptive outputs (creativity).  The key components 
identified here were: generativity, flexibility and novelty, and related (but not 
necessary) components are the connection with memory and past experience, and the 
production of adaptive outputs.  Although my conceptualisation of imagination is by 
no means definitive, it may provide a clearer starting point for researchers wishing to 
explore this construct.   
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Related to this, I noted that the imagination literature in ASD research is limited 
in terms of scoring imagination, and researchers should take into consideration the 
imagination and creativity literature outside of ASD research, which places more 
emphasis on aspects of imagination such as originality (e.g. Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  
Dimensions of imagination such as originality and flexibility are increasingly the subject 
of research studies (e.g. Best et al., 2015; Pring et al., 2012) and this trend should 
continue.  Similarly, more research is needed regarding the relationships between 
different measures of imagination and creativity, as our lack of knowledge in this area 
limits our ability to draw conclusions across different studies.  I attempted to address 
this in Study Five, however it is unclear whether or not my findings are a result of low 
power.  Finally, I have suggested that it is important to also consider the strengths of 
imagination in ASD as well as difficulties.  The findings from Study Five that autistic 
adults show a varied profile in terms of imagination support this, and researchers 
should also build upon the findings of Liu et al. (2011) and Kasirer and Mashal (2014; 
2016) that autistic individuals show high levels of originality rather than focusing on 
difficulties with imagination. 
The main concrete contribution of the work contained in this thesis is the 
development of a reliable and valid self-report measure of RRBs in autistic adults, the 
RBQ-2A.  This is an important contribution to the field as many measures of RRBs tend 
to be parent-report or rated by a researcher or clinician.  However, these types of 
measures, while advantageous in their own right, are limited in measuring RRBs that 
cannot be easily observed by others, or that are masked by adults who may have been 
encouraged or trained to hide their traits from others.  Therefore, self-report from an 
autistic individual may provide useful information that cannot be accessed through 
other means.  In other cases, parents may be unable or unwilling to take part in 
research on behalf of their child, and therefore it is necessary to have good RRB 
measures that do not rely on parent report.  Although the RBQ-2A is by no means a 
perfect or comprehensive measure of RRBs and further research is needed to assess its 
utility, the findings in this thesis represent a strong starting point for this tool.  The 
RBQ-2A is freely available to download online34 and may be a useful addition to sets of 
                                                          
34 The RBQ-2A can be downloaded here: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/rbq2a/download/  
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questionnaires for research purposes.  Section 6.4 (page 181) suggests some potential 
avenues for future research. 
6.3.2.2 Contribution to clinicians 
The contribution of this thesis to clinicians is limited by the fact that the studies 
presented here are not specifically related to the work of clinicians such as diagnosis or 
intervention. For example, the diagnostic utility of the RBQ-2A has not yet been 
assessed, but given that several of the RBQ-2A’s items have their origin in a diagnostic 
tool (the DISCO) it may prove to be a useful additional measure when diagnosing 
individuals.  The self-report nature of the RBQ-2A allows for individuals to report on 
their own RRBs, which could be important for diagnosis in the case of adults where 
there is no available informant.  However, it is important to note that the RBQ-2A can 
never be a diagnostic tool on its own as it only measures one set of criteria for ASD, 
although it may provide useful supplementary information for tools that might be 
limited in capturing RRBs, such as the ADI-R (Lecavalier et al., 2006).  Moreover, the 
RBQ-2A may be a useful outcome measure when assessing the performance of 
interventions for autistic individuals. 
In terms of imagination and the role it plays in diagnosis, a particular issue with 
diagnostic manuals – especially the DSM-5 – is that the importance of imagination in 
ASD has been relatively downplayed.  Although initially centred as one of the ‘triad of 
impairments’ in ASD (Wing & Gould, 1979), as I described in Chapter One, there is little 
guidance from diagnostic manuals about how to evaluate imagination in autistic 
individuals in relation to a diagnosis (pages 10-11).  Again, this thesis does not present 
any evidence relating to imagination in a clinical context, however findings from Study 
Four demonstrate that a lack of retrospectively reported pretend play is associated 
with increased IS in autistic adults, and Study Five showed that past difficulty with 
pretend play is common in autistic individuals.  These findings highlight the importance 
of considering past pretend play when making a diagnosis of ASD, if possible.  Finally, 
the detailed imagination profiles of a small number of autistic individuals in Study Five 
highlight the variety of imaginative strengths and difficulties in autistic individuals.  
This information may prove useful for clinicians who are considering whether or not to 
use creativity-based therapies and interventions, as well as using interventions to 
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foster creative skills and improve imaginative difficulties such as thinking about the 
future. 
6.3.2.3 Contribution to the autism community 
Given that research into ASD should ultimately benefit the autism community, 
it is important to consider the contribution to the autism community when evaluating 
research.  To my knowledge there is no universal definition of the autism community, 
and there are many individuals who could be captured by this term.  Here I use this 
term to refer to autistic individuals, relatives and friends who offer support, and 
professionals that work with autistic individuals and their families, such as charity 
organisations.   
 Although the development of the RBQ-2A primarily benefits researchers (see 
page 176), this in turn may have indirect benefits for the autism community as the 
RBQ-2A is used for research into RRBs in adulthood, which is often limited to 
retrospective informant report (e.g. Chowdhury et al., 2010; Seltzer et al., 2003).  The 
RBQ-2A also represents an opportunity for autistic individuals to express themselves, 
albeit to a limited extent, in research.   
Regarding the imagination findings, these have a less concrete advantage for 
autistic individuals given the caution necessary when interpreting underpowered 
studies.  The strongest finding related to imagination was that a retrospectively 
reported lack of pretend play is associated with self-reported IS in autistic individuals.  
This finding may be important to families and professionals as it suggests that 
supporting a child with ASD with their pretend play may reduce IS later in life; however 
this particular hypothesis has not been tested and further research is needed before 
this advice can be given to the autism community.  Studies Four and Five supported 
previous research suggesting that many autistic individuals do not engage in 
spontaneous pretend play when young.  Accordingly, the use of interventions and 
therapies to support pretend play in autistic children is already the subject of research 
(e.g. Kasari, Freeman, & Paparella, 2007), but arguably effort should also go toward 
fostering imagination and creativity in autistic children in areas other than pretend 
play. 
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Finally, the inclusion of imaginative strengths – i.e., originality – in research 
represents a more positive view of imagination in ASD.  Although it is important not to 
minimise the difficulties facing autistic individuals, highlighting potential creative 
strengths might have a positive effect on the self-esteem and self-image of autistic 
individuals.  In addition, parents may react negatively to news of their child’s diagnosis 
(e.g. Wachtel & Carter, 2008), and it is possible that some positivity may help alleviate 
these negative feelings.  However, it is imperative to not introduce another myth 
related to autism by claiming that all autistic individuals are inherently creative.  
Rather one should acknowledge that while an ASD diagnosis may be associated with 
some imaginative difficulties – perhaps related to EF difficulties such as generativity, or 
specific to pretend play – this does not mean that there is no room for creativity in the 
life of an autistic adult.  
Future research should continue to focus on positive aspects of imagination, as 
this would support the work some services already engage in by in providing support 
and resources, such as creative writing and art groups for autistic individuals.  A 
stereotypical view that autistic people are not creative or have no interest in creative 
pursuits has emerged from the early work describing a difficulty with imagination.  If 
individuals, parents and organisations subscribe to this view, then the amount of 
creative opportunities open to autistic individuals will be reduced.  The work 
presented in this thesis does not constitute any specific strategies or therapies for 
engaging with autistic individuals, however the demonstration of a varied profile of 
imaginative strengths and weaknesses should encourage future academics and 
practitioners to research and design such programmes. 
6.3.3 Limitations 
 This body of work is limited by several factors that are common to many 
studies in the field of ASD research.  In the case of Study Two and Study Five, the 
research is limited in terms of small sample size, as autistic adults are a relatively 
difficult group of participants to recruit.  This makes it difficult to interpret some 
findings from Study Five; the lack of relationships may simply reflect low power due to 
the small sample size and larger number of variables.  More generally, the studies in 
this thesis are also limited in terms of the characteristics of participants.  Both the 
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Study Four and Study Five samples include a relatively high proportion of women, and 
those who were diagnosed as adults, which is unusual in studies of ASD populations.  
Finally, the sample is also limited by the fact that only cognitively able participants 
were recruited.  This is a common problem in ASD research, as many of the methods 
used to assess psychological constructs rely heavily on cognitive and verbal ability and 
therefore participant samples tend to not reflect a wide range of developmental levels 
or cognitive abilities.  It is not clear how non-speaking or developmentally delayed (DD) 
autistic individuals would perform on these tasks and whether or not this would affect 
the relationship between imagination and RRBs. 
 More specific to the research carried out here is the issue of self-report.  
Although I have tried to address this by assessing the relationship between the RBQ-2A 
and the DISCO, a large amount of the measurements here rely on self-reported 
information.  Aside from specific issues with autistic individuals and self-report as I 
described earlier (Chapter Two, page 73), self-reports are not the most desirable 
measurement of any psychological construct, due to the effect of a person’s own 
interpretation and understanding of their behaviour, and social desirability.  Another 
notable limitation of the present research that could be addressed in the future is the 
fact that most participants were diagnosed as adults and some very recently indeed.  
As such participants may be very aware of their symptoms having recently gone 
through the diagnostic process, or may be accessing material in order to gain 
information.  Therefore they may have set ideas about what their symptoms ‘should’ 
be as an autistic individual, which may further affect their reliability in terms of self-
report. 
6.4 Future research 
6.4.1 Future research with the RBQ-2A 
Assessing a measure’s reliability and validity is an ongoing and iterative process 
and never definitely established (Kline, 2000).  Although the findings presented here 
represent good reliability and validity of the RBQ-2A, future work should continue to 
assess this measure in different samples.  The most useful assessment currently would 
be whether or not scores on the self-reported RBQ-2A were correlated with scores on 
the parent-report RBQ-2 in autistic adults; this would address criticisms related to the 
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use of self-report measures in ASD.  This would, however, require some adaptation of 
the parent version of the RBQ-2, given that it was originally designed for use with 
young children.  Similarly, it would be useful to assess whether the RBQ-2A correlates 
with other measures such as the ADI-R, to build on the strong association with the 
DISCO, which may be partially explained by the fact the RBQ-2A has its origins in this 
measure. 
 Given that the internal consistency and factor structure of the RBQ-2A has not 
been entirely stable over studies35, further investigation of these is also warranted.  In 
particular, internal consistency was poorer for NT individuals compared to individuals 
with ASD.  Where NT and ASD groups are being compared, it is important to ensure 
that the measure works well across both groups.  The unusual factor structure should 
also be investigated further in larger samples; although 275 is fairly good for PCA, 
larger samples are desirable for accurate results.  Another issue is that of construct 
validity, and the fact that the RBQ-2A did not correlate strongly with anxiety as 
measured by the HADS.  This could represent a problem for the validity of the RBQ2-A; 
however, I have already suggested this may be due to the unsuitability of the HADS 
and therefore should be assessed using different measures of anxiety (page 159). 
I have previously mentioned that a large proportion of the autistic participants 
in these studies have been diagnosed as adults (e.g. page 132).  Therefore it would be 
interesting to test whether or not there is an effect of having a diagnosis confirmed or 
ruled out.  Longitudinal assessment of the RBQ-2A could be conducted as adolescents 
become young adults, as younger people may not be aware that they have ASD.  
Alternatively, individuals could be assessed before and after diagnosis, to see whether 
the confirmation or ruling out of an ASD diagnosis affects how participants rate their 
RRBs. 
6.4.2 Future research in terms of imagination and its relationship with RRBs 
The most obvious direction for future research with regards to imagination and 
RRBs is to further assess the relationship between pretend play and IS, on the basis of 
                                                          
35 However, factor structure is certainly not stable across RRB measures (see Chapter One, pages 42-45), 
so this is not a limitation exclusive to the RBQ-2A. 
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the research presented in this thesis and previously (Harrop et al., 2014; Honey et al., 
2007).   Figure 2 below is an updated version of Figure 1 (Chapter One, page 12), a 
visual diagram based on my conceptual analysis of imagination, in order to 
conceptualise how RRBs may be related to imagination via pretend play. 
Figure 6-1 Conceptualisation of imagination edited to incorporate RRBs via insistence on sameness and 
pretend play. 
 
Further research should attempt to replicate Study Four’s findings in larger 
samples of autistic individuals (including children) and using different measures, to rule 
out the effect of this relationship being an artefact of the DISCO, bearing in mind that 
both the RBQ-2A and the pretend play questions from Study Five were based on the 
DISCO.  I noted earlier that it is not possible on the basis of the pretend play measure 
used in this thesis to determine which components of imagination (generativity, 
novelty, and/or flexibility) are responsible for this relationship.  These three separate 
components were assessed in Study Five; however, I was not able to discern any 
significant, specific relationships between RRBs and any of these components.  This 
may be a result of low power, or it may be that measuring these components in the 
context of pretend play would have revealed specific relationships.  As mentioned, I 
did not explore pretend play in great detail in this thesis as I was primarily interested in 
autistic adults.  However, future research could assess these components using 
existing pretend play measures and scales.  The frequency of pretend play acts 
provides a measure of generativity and the ability of a child to substitute one object for 
another could provide a measure of flexibility; for example, a child who is willing to 
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pretend a Lego brick is a car is more flexible than a child who will only pretend a toy 
car is a real car.  Finally, novelty could be assessed in relation to the rest of the sample 
in terms of the type of pretend games the child invents.  In this way, the relationship 
between RRBs and these different dimensions of imagination could be assessed.  
Future research should also consider how age may affect the relationship between the 
two.  I noted previously that there is some evidence of a relationship between pretend 
play and RSMBs in younger children (aged five years and younger; Harrop et al., 2014).  
I suggested that imagination may be associated with RSMBs when younger, and IS 
when older (page 57), and this hypothesis should be tested in future research.  On a 
related note, it would be interesting to examine whether the relationship between 
RRBs and imagination is entirely restricted to childhood imagination, which may be the 
case as the only evidence in this thesis came from a measure of childhood imagination. 
Outside of imagination’s relationship with RRBs, another potential avenue of 
research that arises from this thesis is the consideration of the different types of 
imagination, and what these might be; for example, how different are the cognitive 
skills needed for imagining the future to those needed to create drawings? Further to 
this, each subtype of imagination should also be assessed in detail to ensure that it is a 
reliable and valid method, as assessing such a wide variety of imagination measures is 
inherently problematic given issues of statistical power. 
Another important distinction to make is that between social and non-social 
imagination.  Social imagination refers to the ability to foresee the consequences of 
their own and others’ actions and to act in an appropriate fashion, as well as learning 
from past experience and mistakes (Wing et al., 2011).  Few studies have examined the 
difference between social and non-social imagination in autistic individuals.  There 
have been studies that examine how participants draw people and social scenes (e.g. 
Lewis & Boucher, 1991; Jolley et al., 2013), and one study showed that whereas NT 
adults preferred to read about people rather than objects, autistic adults did not show 
a preference between the two (Barnes, 2012). 
To my knowledge, three studies have specifically examined social and non-
social imagination in ASD.  In their study, Ten Eycke & Müller (2015) administered the 
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adapted form of the impossible person task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990; Low et al., 2009), 
and compared the drawing of a person versus a house.  There was no difference 
between groups in terms of the house, but children with ASD found it significantly 
more difficult to produce imaginative drawings of people.  These results were 
replicated in a later study using the same task (Ten Eycke & Müller, 2016).  Although 
these findings lend some support to the distinction between social and non-social 
imagination, this particular measure is not relevant to the concept of social 
imagination as described above in a practical sense.  A more relevant measure would 
be to assess this distinction in terms of thinking about the future, as this is one of the 
ways that social imagination has been conceptualised (e.g. Wing et al., 2011).  The 
second study (Angus et al., 2015) compared the performance of autistic and TD 
children on formal imagination tasks (ideational fluency and storytelling) and a realistic 
anticipation task, in which a child was told that an interviewer was coming to see 
them, and after an interval were asked some questions about the anticipated 
interaction.  Angus et al. found that whereas the groups did not differ in the formal 
imagination tasks, there was a difference between groups on just one of the four 
questions they asked about the anticipated interview (“Have you thought about what 
you might say?”).  This task represents a more ecologically valid measure of social 
imagination; however, the study is limited in that more than half of all children were 
non-responsive, and that children were not asked whether or not they really believed 
an interviewer was coming to see them.  A more natural measure of social imagination 
could be shared pretend play in children; that is whether or not individuals are willing 
to share their ideas and collaborate with others when carrying out pretend games. 
However, when studying social imagination, care must be taken to distinguish it 
from ToM, which refers to the ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and others 
in order to predict and explain behaviour (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  From this definition it can be seen how closely the two 
constructs are related.  This is particularly pertinent when considering pretend play as 
a measure, given that the two have been theoretically linked (e.g. Leslie, 1987).  
Indeed there is some evidence of the association between imagination and ToM.  For 
example, Hanson and Atance (2013) found that autistic children with low episodic 
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future thinking scores also scored lower on a battery of false belief tasks.  Moreover, 
Angus et al. (2015) found that ToM was correlated with performance on their 
anticipation task but only in TD children.  Similarly, Ten Eycke and Müller (2016) also 
found that social interaction predicted imaginative drawings of people in TD children 
but not children with ASD.   It has also been argued that high levels of originality in 
autistic adults may result from a lack of ToM, as they are less bound by social 
conventions and social desirability (e.g. Kasirer & Mashal, 2014).   
 As mentioned in Chapter One (page 10), the ICD-10 and DSM-5 currently 
categorise imagination in the form of pretend play alongside social interaction and 
communication, and there is some evidence that imagination is associated with 
communication.   Although Honey et al. (2007) identified a relationship between play 
behaviours and RRBs, they also identified a significant association between play and 
communication, the latter measured by an expressive language and a receptive 
language item from the DISCO.  Honey et al. interpreted their results as evidence of a 
three-way relationship between imagination, RRBs and communication; although their 
measurement of communication is particularly limited by the use of just two items 
from the DISCO.  It has also been found that generativity is related to communication 
(Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Dichter et al., 2009), as is playful pretence (Hobson et al., 
2013).  Taking these findings together, the relationship between imagination and 
communication warrants further research, although language level would need to be 
controlled. 
Finally, the role of originality in ASD warrants further exploration, despite the 
lack of a significant relationship with RRBs in Study Five.  As quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter, autistic individuals’ “spontaneous and original mental activity, their 
narrowness and single-mindedness, as manifested in their special interests, can be 
immensely valuable and can lead to outstanding achievements in their chosen areas 
(Asperger, 1944, p. 88)”.  Indeed, Wing (1981) argued that a narrow focus of attention 
and disregard of culture result in unusual thought processes which may lead to novel 
insights.  Previous research has demonstrated that autistic traits may be related to 
originality (e.g. Best et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2011) and some researchers have 
specifically suggested that RRBs (e.g. Lyons & Fitzgerald, 2013) and ToM (Kasirer & 
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Mashal, 2014) are associated with increased originality in ASD.  The difficulty with past 
pretend play and limited patterns of activities seen here contrast with the variety of 
creative performance and the high proportion of original responses to the TTCT seen in 
Chapter Five (see Tables 5.5 and 5.7, for some examples).  However, these findings 
may not be incompatible with each other from a theoretical point of view; Figures 1 
and 2 show the three components of generativity, novelty and flexibility as being 
related to one another and to imagination, but some consider originality to be the 
most important aspect of creativity (Wallach and Kogan, 1965).  I would argue that a 
lack of flexibility and fluency does not mean that one cannot be original (see Liu et al., 
2011).  Indeed, Fung (2009) noted that traditional imagination and creativity tasks 
focus on divergent thinking (represented by fluency tasks) as opposed to convergent 
thinking (Guilford, 1959), which requires a focused cognitive style that is important to 
originality.  As convergent thinking is often associated with originality, and ASD is 
associated with a narrow focus of attention (e.g. Happé & Frith, 2006), this may explain 
why some autistic individuals show high levels of originality.  Therefore, the creative 
strength of originality in ASD by virtue of autistic traits merits further research.  
6.5 Conclusion 
 Throughout this thesis I have considered whether or not imagination and RRBs 
are related to one another in autistic individuals.  They have been theoretically 
connected ever since ASD was originally conceptualised as a ‘triad of impairments’, 
and yet this relationship has received little empirical attention and has been 
overlooked in international diagnostic manuals.  I have demonstrated that autistic 
individuals may have imaginative difficulties in some areas, but can still be highly 
creative in other areas.  The key to the relationship between imagination and RRBs 
may be specific to pretend play, as demonstrated by the fact I found evidence of this 
relationship only when examining past pretend play.  Pretend play was not the focus of 
the work presented here, as I was concerned with measuring imagination in autistic 
adults in as broad and wide-ranging a manner as possible; however, this presents a 
useful starting point for future research that may be considering this relationship.  I 
have outlined several avenues for future research, but the priorities should be to 
examine the different aspects of imagination (generativity, novelty and flexibility) in 
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relation to pretend play and social imagination, and also to further our understanding 
of highly original thinking in ASD.  
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Appendix 1: Table of imagination studies comparing ASD to non-ASD groups 
Table 8-1 Table of studies comparing imaginative abilities in ASD vs. non-ASD groups, organised by type of measure. 
Pretend play and pretence 
Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Baron-Cohen 
(1987) 
10 ASD children 
7 boys 
Age: 4,3-12,4 
M=8,1, SD=2,6 
10 children with Down’s 
Syndrome (DS) 
5 boys 
Age: 2,5-12,2 
M=7,5, SD=2,9 
Matched on mental age 
(MA) 
 
10 TD children 
7 boys 
Age: 3,0-5,1 
M=4,1, SD=0,7 
Matched on age 
Free play (video 
coded) with three 
sets of toys, 
provided one at a 
time 
Yes Children with ASD produced fewer pretend play acts 
compared to TD and DS children, with no differences in 
terms of functional, sensorimotor and ordering 
 
Eight children with ASD produced no pretend play acts 
at all 
Blanc et al. 
(2005) 
 
21 ASD children 
Age: 44-140 months 
M=82, SEM=5.7 
14 children with LD 
(learning disability) 
Age: 40-104 months 
M=70, SEM=5.3 
Matched on age 
developmental age, 
functional 
Free play and semi-
structured play, 
video coded 
Mixed Children with ASD mostly engaged in repetitive, 
streotyped sensori-motor play, were able to initiate 
functional play, and had almost no symbolic play 
compared to TD and developmentally delayed (DD) 
children 
 
Guidance by an adult facilitated symbolic play 
regardless of child’s diagnosis 
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developmental age, and 
developmental IQ 
15 TD children 
Age: 28-62 months 
M=40, SEM=2.6 
Matched on 
developmental age 
 
Correlation between disorders of regulation and 
cognitive impairment, indicating this dysregulation is a 
general disorder of cognitive functioning 
Charman & 
Baron-Cohen 
(1997) 
22 ASD children 
18 male 
Age: 63-216 
M=140.3, SD=48.0 
19 LD children 
7 male 
Age: 90-215 
M=149.0, SD=41.3 
Matched on age and 
verbal mental age 
(VMA) 
2x Functional play 
trials and 2x Object 
substitution trials 
with open prompts, 
specific prompts, 
and modelling 
 
Mixed Majority of both groups produced functional play in 
response to open prompts 
 
Fewer participants produced pretend play acts in 
response to open prompts; children in both groups 
needed more specific prompts or modelling, or 
produced no pretence at all 
 
Significantly fewer children with ASD produced 
examples of novel pretend play compared to control 
participants; when children with ASD played pretend, 
this tended to be situationally appropriate object 
substitution 
Hobson et al. 
(2013) 
27 ASD children 
Age: 3,0-9,0 years 
M=5,10, SD=1,6 
Diagnoses: Autism 
 
14 ASD children 
Age: 2,11-7,11 years 
M=5,4, SD=1,5 
Diagnoses: Atypical 
autism (AA), AS, 
16 DD children 
Age: 3,9-9,8 years 
M=5,11, SD=1,6 
 
Matched on age and 
VMA 
Test of Pretend 
Play, video coded, 
Playfulness 
Yes Children with ASD scored lower on playfulness 
compared to DD children 
 
Degree of communication/social interaction 
impairment on Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS) associated with poorer scores for 
playful pretence; significant only for first ASD group 
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Pervasive 
developmental disorder 
- not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS) 
Honey et al. 
(2007) 
19 young ASD children 
16 males 
Age=35-59m 
M=50.95, SD=7.65 
60 older ASD children 
41 males 
Age=72-106 m 
M=84.65, SD=11.23 
 
61 young TD children 
35 males 
Age=29-58 m 
M=46.36, SD=6.6 
56 older TD children 
26 males 
Age=72-104 m 
M=84.2, SD=7.94 
Activities and Play 
Questionnaire – 
Revised 
 
Yes Children with ASD engaged in play less than TD 
children at all ages 
 
Significant correlation between RRBs and play in 
children with ASD but not TD children 
Jarrold et al. 
(1994) 
24 ASD children 
20 male 
Age: 58-154 months 
M=107.1, SD=28.2 
24 LD children 
Age: 75-149 months 
M=115.0, SD=23.5 
Matched on Expressive 
VMA 
 
24 LD children 
Age: 80-149 months 
M=114.0, SD=23.5 
Matched on Receptive 
VMA 
 
24 TD children 
Age:44-96 months 
M=59.3, SD=13.8 
Matched on Receptive 
VMA 
Play with props 
(Object 
substitution) 
No No significant main effect of group; children with ASD 
equally likely to select counter-functional props as 
substitutes in pretend play 
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Jarrold et al. 
(1996) 
Experiment 1 
14 ASD children 
11 boys 
Age: 73-147 months 
M=100.0, SD=24.18 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Same as above with 
additional pair of 
matched children 
 
Experiment 3 
15 ASD children 
13 boys 
Age: 60-156 months 
M=109.6, SD=29.81 
 
Experiment 1 
14 LD children 
9 boys 
Age: 72-121 months 
M=92.14, SD=12.80 
Matched on age and 
VMA 
Experiment 2 
Same as above with 
additional pair of 
matched children 
 
Experiment 3 
15 LD children 
8 boys 
Age: 82-144 months 
M=116.73, SD=21.61 
Matched on VMA & age 
15 TD children 
8 boys 
Age: 47-99 months 
M=62.53, SD=16.43 
Matched on VMA 
Experiment 1 
Elicited vs 
spontaneous 
pretend play and 
functional play with 
doll and doll-plus 
junk 
Experiment 2 
Instructed play 
 
 
 
Experiment 3 
Free vs cued 
pretend play 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Experiment 1 
Children with ASD spent less time engaging in pretend 
play and produced fewer pretend play acts across both 
spontaneous and elicited conditions; same found for 
functional play 
 
 
Experiment 2 
No group differences in terms of producing play in 
response to instructions 
 
 
Experiment 3 
Children with ASD had difficulty generating pretend 
acts in relation to both groups across both cued and 
free conditions 
Kavanaugh & 
Harris (1994) 
Experiment 3  
12 Children with ASD 
11 boys 
Age: 6;2-13;6 y 
M=9;11 
 
 
12 LD children 
9 boys 
Age: 5;5-13;6 y 
M=9;9 
Matched on MA 
Picture 
transformation task 
No Children with ASD scored better than chance at 
choosing correct outcome of transformation, unlike 
children with LDs 
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Lewis and 
Boucher (1988) 
15 ASD children 
11 male 
Age: 6,6-15,8 
M=11,10 
15 LD children 
11 male 
Age: 5,10-10,8 
M=8,2 
Matched on VMA 
15 TD children 
12 male 
Age: 3,10-5,6 
M=4,7 
Matched on VMA 
Free play with junk 
and conventional 
toys, elicited play 
Mixed Children with ASD spent less time spontaneously 
playing functionally; no group engaged in much 
spontaneous pretend play; play of children with ASD as 
varied and spontaneous as control participants 
 
Children with ASD not impaired in terms of elicited 
pretend play 
Libby et al. 
(1997) 
10 ASD children 
9 male 
Age: 64-200 months 
M=126, SD=44.03 
10 DS children 
4 male 
Age: 39-80 months 
M=55, SD=13.59 
Matched on VMA 
 
10 TD children 
7 male 
Age:26-31 months 
M=28, SD=2.08 
Matched on VMA 
Single- and multi-
scheme pretend 
play acts, modelled 
by experimenter 
Mixed Children with ASD more likely to give correct response 
on single scheme acts 
 
Children with ASD performed less well on multi-
scheme task when presented in correct order, although 
not significant, performed as well as other groups 
when presented in wrong order 
 
Children with ASD less likely to correct the multi-
scheme acts when presented in the wrong order 
Rutherford et 
al. (2007) 
28 ASD Children 
Age (time 1): 26-41m 
M=33.65, SD=3.61 
Age (time 2): 48-65m 
M=57.6, SD=3.89 
Diagnosis: Autistic 
disorder (AD) 
18 DD Children 
Age (time 1): 24-47m 
M=35, SD=7.21 
Age (time 2): 47-71 
M=59.0, SD=7.6 
 
27 TD Children 
Age (time 1): 12-35m 
M=19.67, SD=4.77 
Fewell Play Scale  Yes Time 1 
Children with ASD show less pretend and sensorimotor 
play than TD and DD children in both spontaneous and 
scaffolded conditions; no differences between TD and 
DD groups 
 
Time 2 
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Age (time 2): 25-38m 
M=30.1, SD=4.1 
Children with ASD show less pretend play than TD and 
DD children in both conditions; no group differences in 
terms of sensorimotor play 
Diagnosis and joint attention at Time 1 predict 
development of spontaneous pretend play; Diagnosis 
predicted development of scaffolded pretend play 
 
Overall, children with ASD show less spontaneous 
compared to scaffolded pretend play 
Sigman & 
Ungerer (1984) 
16 children with ASD 
15 male 
Age: 39-74 months 
(M=51.7, SD=10.7) 
16 children with LD 
10 male 
Age: 32-80 months 
(M=50.7, SD=12.6) 
Matched on age, MA 
and intelligence 
quotient (IQ) 
 
16 TD children 
15 male 
Age: 16-25 months 
(M=20.8, SD=3.0) 
Matched on MA 
Unstructured and 
structured play 
Yes Children with ASD showed less pretend play both 
spontaneously and in response to cueing compared to 
both control groups; also performed more poorly in 
terms of imitation 
 
Children with ASD not impaired in terms of 
sensorimotor skills 
 
Functional and pretend play associated with receptive 
language in all three groups; sensorimotor play 
associated with receptive language only in the control 
groups 
Wing et al. 
(1977) 
108 Children with 
DD/LD/ASD 
71 male 
Age: 5-12 years 
Diagnoses: DS (N=42); 
other including ASD 
(N=66) 
- Interview and 
observation 
Yes Children with ASD much more likely than children with 
LD/DS only to show no symbolic play or stereotyped 
play 
 
Only two children who showed symbolic play showed 
any features of ASD 
Generativity and fluency tasks 
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Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Bishop & 
Norbury (2005) 
Aged between 6 and 10 
years 
14 children w/ High 
Functioning Autism 
(HFA): 
14 boys 
Age: 6.23-10.56 y 
M=8.30; SD=.99 
Non-Verbal Ability 
(NVA)=84-130 
M=107.21, SD=15.62 
 
25 children with 
Pragmatic Language 
Impairment 
21 boys 
Age: 7.08-10.9 y 
M=8.93, SD=1.43 
NVA=80-130 
M=105, SD=15.04 
17 children with Specific 
Language Impairment 
15 boys 
Age: 7.96-10.71 y 
M=9.33, SD=.92 
NVA = 84-119 y 
M=98.94, SD=11.56 
18 TD  children 
15 boys 
Age: 6.78-9.91 y 
M=8.56, SD=1 
NVA=88-125 
M=110.83, SD=10.38 
Use of Objects Task 
(UOT) 
Pattern Meanings 
Task (PMT) 
Mixed UOT: No main effect of group or interaction between 
groups and object type 
Both the HFA group and the Pragmatic Language 
Impairment group scored significantly lower on 
percentage of correct responses than the control group 
No group differences in terms of repetitious and 
redundant responses 
 
PMT: No significant group differences in terms of total 
responses; HFA group gave significantly fewer correct 
responses compared to control groups 
  
Craig & Baron-
Cohen (1999) 
15 Children with ASD: 
Age M=12;9, SD=3;1 y 
VMA M=6;9, SD=2;2 y 
15 AS children: 
Age M=12;9, SD=2;6 y 
VMA M=9;10, SD=2;5 y 
15 LD children: 
Age M=12;4, SD=2;4 y 
VMA M=6;9, SD=1;8 y 
TD children (N not 
reported): 
Age M=5;2, SD=2;7 y 
Torrance Tests of 
Creative Thinking 
(TTCT) 
Figure Completion 
(two conditions) 
Toy Improvement 
Yes Children with ASD perform worse on both conditions of 
Figure Completion than control groups and children 
with AS. 
Children with AS perform worse than control groups on 
one condition of Figure Completion. 
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AS matched with ASD on 
age but not VMA 
 
ASD and LD matched on 
VMA 
Other 
Imaginative 
Fluency 
Children with ASD/AS generate fewer imaginative 
responses, and fewer rare, flexible responses on Toy 
Improvement compared to control groups 
 
Children with ASD/AS made fewer animate responses 
in Imaginative Fluency, and fewer responses overall 
Dichter et al. 
(2009) 
39 ASD children: 
38 male 
Age M=9.72y, SD=2.66 
NVI (Non-verbal 
intelligence) M=101.69, 
SD=17.5 
 
29 TD children: 
38 male 
Age M=10.57y, SD=3.35 
NVI M=111.67, 
SD=16.11 
Matched on NVI 
Animal Fluency 
Task 
UOT 
 
Yes Children with ASD produced fewer correct responses 
on both Animal Fluency and UOT tasks 
 
No relationship between fluency scores and Restricted 
and Repetitive Behaviours (RRBs; measured by 
Repetitive Behaviour Scale-Revised [RBS-R]) 
Liu et al. (2011) 16 boys with AS 
Age: 10.5-11.7y 
M=10.6 
NVI M=99.3, SD = 15.4 
Vocabulary M=117.8, 
SD=14.2 
42 TD boys 
Age: 10.2-11.9 y 
M=10.4 
NVI M= 98.7, SD =13.1 
Vocabulary M=118.4, 
SD=11.5 
Divergent thinking 
& divergent feeling 
from the Creativity 
Assessment Packet 
(CAP) 
Mixed Children with AS scored significantly higher than TD 
children on originality and elaboration in divergent 
thinking task; TD children scored significantly higher 
than children with AS on openness and flexibility  
 
On divergent feeling task, TD children scored 
themselves higher on imagination than children with 
ASD 
Pring et al. 
(2012) 
9 savants w/ ASD: 
7 males 
Age: 23-43y 
M=34.55, SD=5.13 
Verbal IQ (VIQ)=56-111 
M=83.66, SD=17.49 
Performance IQ 
(PIQ)=55-114 
M=84, SD=18.5 
9 Non-savants with LD 
7 males 
Age: 22-42 y 
M=33.56, SD=5.49 
VIQ=63-117 
M=95.11, SD=17.86 
PIQ=53-115, 
M=83.55, SD=19.19 
Incomplete and 
repeated figures 
task from TTCT  
 
Figural synthesis 
task 
Mixed Art students performed significantly better on TTCT 
 
No significant difference between other groups in 
terms of fluency, flexibility and originality; Savant 
artists scored higher in terms of elaboration 
 
Art students scored better than savant groups in terms 
of fluency on figural synthesis task; no difference 
between other groups; but both ASD groups scored 
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Diagnoses : Autism 
(N=5), AS (N=3), AA 
(N=1) 
9 non-savants w/ASD 
7 males 
Age: 22-43y 
M=32.22, SD=5.49 
VIQ=53-109 
M=78.78, SD=14.79 
PIQ=54-112 
M=82.33, SD=16.59  
Diagnoses : Autism 
(N=5), AS (N=3), AA 
(N=1) 
9 neurotypical (NT) A-
level art students 
7 males 
Age: 16-18 y 
M=33.56, SD=5.49 
VIQ=95-125 
M=114.67, SD=12.99 
PIQ=94-120 
M=114, SD=9 
lower than other groups in terms of representational 
fluency 
 
Art students produced significantly more original 
responses than ASD groups; no difference between 
other three groups 
 
No evidence of generativity difficulty in savant artists 
 
 
Turner 
(1997/1999b) 
22 ASD 
19 males 
Age - 6-32 years 
(M=12,0 ; SD=5,4) 
MA : M=11,6 (SD=3,8) 
VIQ: M=100 (SD=22.3) 
NVIQ: M=108 (SD=20.0) 
 
22 ASD and LD 
19 males 
Age - 6-32 years 
(M=14,0 ; SD=7,2) 
MA : M=6,6 (SD=2,5) 
VIQ: M=60 (SD=9.6) 
NVIQ: M=88 (SD=22.4) 
 
21 Clinical (non-ASD) 
18 males 
Age - 6-32 years 
(M=11,11 ; SD=4,5) 
MA : M=12,4 (SD=4,7) 
VIQ: M=101 (SD=17.8) 
NVIQ: M=110 (SD=12.1) 
 
22 LD 
16 males 
Age - 6-32 years 
(M=12,0 ; SD=6,5) 
MA : M=7,2 (SD=2,4) 
VIQ: M=59 (SD=5.6) 
NVIQ: M=79 (SD=12.7) 
 
Letter fluency 
Category fluency 
Use of Objects 
Pattern Meanings 
Design fluency 
 
Repetitive 
Behaviour 
Interview (Turner 
[1997] only) 
Mixed Participants with ASD performed significantly worse 
than clinical control participants, regardless of LD 
status, in terms of verbal and ideational fluency 
 
Participants with ASD performed worse on design 
fluency also but only qualitatively rather than in terms 
of quantity 
 
Reported in Turner (1997) only: For autistic 
participants, but not control participants, number of 
novel responses on ideational fluency tasks was 
significantly negatively associated with sameness 
behaviour and circumscribed interests but not 
stereotyped movements or repetitive use of language; 
this finding replicated with design fluency and 
circumscribed interests 
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Drawing 
Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Allen & Craig 
(2016) 
16 ASD 
12.5-15.7 years 
(M=13.6) 
14 males 
16 LD 
11.6-15.7 years 
(M=13.0) 
14 males 
 
Matched on age, MA 
and receptive 
vocabulary 
 
Impossible 
Person/Dog  
drawings 
(spontaneous v. 
cued) 
 
Unreal category 
mixing 
Mixed Fewer children with ASD passed the spontaneous 
condition, and drew fewer impossible features, than 
children with LD 
No significant difference in cued condition in terms of 
pass rate or number of impossible features 
 
Fewer children with ASD passed the unreal category 
mixing tasks 
Craig et al. 
(2001) 
15 Children with ASD: 
Age M=12;9, SD=3;1 
VMA M=6;9, SD=2;2 
15 AS children: 
Age M=12;9, SD=2;6 
VMA M=9;10, SD=2;5 
 
15 children with LD: 
Age M=12;4, SD=2;4 
VMA M=6;9, SD=1;8 
15 TD children: 
Age M=5;2, SD=2;7 
Impossible person 
Real v unreal 
category mixing 
Imagining 
combinations 
Transforming a 
picture 
Mixed Children with ASD worse at drawing an impossible 
person compared to TD but not MLD 
Children with ASD worse at mixing unreal categories 
only 
 
Fewer children with ASD passed unreal and 
spontaneous transformation, and made fewer 
transformations from inanimate to animate; more 
likely to make within-category transformations 
Jolley et al. 
(2013) 
15 ASD children 
13 boys 
Age: 6,10-18,2 
15 LD children 
Matched on age and 
VMA 
 
15 TD children 
Matched on age 
 
15 TD children 
Happy vs sad 
drawing 
Mixed Main effect of group: TD group matched on age scored 
significantly higher than other three groups in terms of 
quality of expression; no differences among the other 
groups 
 
Children with ASD drew significantly more 
disembodied body parts than TD group matched on 
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Matched on VMA VMA; Children with ASD drew significantly fewer 
pictures of people than LD children 
 
Children with ASD drew fewer social scenes than TD 
children matched on age (approached significance for 
children matched on MA) 
Leevers  & 
Harris (1998) 
16 ASD children: 
13 male 
Age: 7;9 – 15;2y 
M=11;2, SD=24.8m 
VMA = 4;0 – 8;0 y 
M=5;0, SD=11.8 m 
 
16 LD children: 
10 male 
Age: 9;11 – 14;4 y 
M=11;7, SD=16.5m 
VMA = 4-6 y 
M=5;2, SD=6.2m 
16 TD children: 
6 male 
Age: 4 – 4;11 y 
M=4;5, SD=4.2 m 
VMA = 4 – 6 y 
M=5;0, SD=7.8m 
All matched on VMA 
and sex; ASD and LD 
matched on age 
Picture Completion 
 
Impossible Person 
and House Task 
No No differences between groups in terms of picture 
completion task 
 
No significant main effects or interactions in terms of 
group on the Impossible Person/House Task 
Lewis & 
Boucher (1991) 
12 ASD children 
8 male 
Age: 10,11-15,0 
M=13,1 
12 LD children 
8 male 
Age: 10,11-15,4 
M=13,3 
 
Matched on age and 
non-verbal IQ (NVIQ) 
Free drawing task Mixed Drawing content: No differences between groups in 
terms of complexity of drawings, number of people 
included in drawings, range of objects 
 
Children with ASD included more symbols (e.g. letters) 
and schematics (e.g. maps) 
 
Generative strategies: No difference between groups in 
terms of copying/tracing or overall range of topics 
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Children with ASD’s drawings were more related to 
each other than control participants’ (indicating 
difficulty with flexibility) 
Low et al 
(2009) 
27 ASD children: 
Age: 5.25-13.08y 
M=8.26, SD=2.17 
VMA=4 – 10.83 y 
M=6.29, SD=2.23 
Diagnoses: Autism 
(N=8), AS (N=9) 
 
27 TD children: 
23 males 
Age: 4.5-10.67y 
M=6.6, SD=1.31 
VMA=1-10.83 y 
M=6.16, SD=2.09 
Matched on VMA and 
gender 
UOT 
PMT 
Impossible Person 
Task 
Yes Children with ASD produced drawings with significantly 
fewer imaginative features and showed lower 
generativity 
 
Generativity unique predictor of imaginative drawing 
content; but when visuospatial planning was entered 
the correlation between generativity and imaginative 
content became non-significant 
Scott & Baron-
Cohen (1996) 
15 ASD children: 
Age: 8;9  –16;2 y 
M=13, SD=2;2 
VMA=4-10 y 
M=4;11, SD= 1;6 
 
14 LD: 
Age: 9;6-16;8 y 
M=12;8, SD= 2;6 
VMA=4-5 y 
M=4;6, SD=0;5 
Clinical groups matched 
on age and VMA 
15 TD children: 
Age: 4;10-5 y 
M=4;10, SD=0;9 
Impossible Person 
task 
 
Spontaneous and 
instructed drawings 
 
Functions of a Brick  
 
Verbal Fluency (F, 
A, S) 
Mixed Significantly fewer children with ASD produced 
drawings of impossible houses or men compared to 
control participants 
 
Children with ASD less likely to spontaneously generate 
imaginary responses and worse than control 
participants when drawing something imaginary under 
instruction 
 
Children with ASD produced fewer responses on 
Functions of a Brick compared to TD but not LD 
children; significantly fewer children with ASD 
produced abstract/pretend responses 
 
TD children performed better on the verbal fluency 
task, but no difference between clinical groups 
Ten Eycke & 
Müller (2016) 
22 children with ASD 29 TD children 
Age 61-167 months 
Impossible person 
task  
Mixed No group differences on control tasks 
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Age 60-176 months 
(M=111.6, SD=31.5) 
 
Diagnoses: AD (N=16); 
PDD-NOS (N=2); AS 
(N=4) 
(M=103.3, SD=28,7) 
 
Matched on NVIQ, VMA, 
MA and age 
 
UOT 
 
Design fluency 
 
Category fluency 
No significant group differences on executive function 
(planning and working memory), generativity (UOT, 
design fluency and category fluency) or local 
processing bias 
 
No difference in terms of drawing houses, but children 
with ASD produced drawings of people with 
significantly fewer imaginative features 
Executive function (EF) was associated with 
imagination in children with ASD and young TD 
children; generativity and social interaction associated 
with imagination in person condition for TD children 
Ten Eycke & 
Müller (2014) 
25 children with ASD 
Age: 60-176 months 
M=115.3 (31.5) 
 
 
29 NT children 
Age: 61-167 months 
M=103.3 (28.7) 
 
Matched on NVIQ, VMA, 
non-verbal mental age, 
MA and age 
Impossible Person 
and House task 
 
Mixed Children with autism finding drawing imaginative 
people more difficult than houses 
 
No difference between groups in terms of houses but 
children with ASD drew fewer imaginative features on 
person than control participants 
Thinking about the future 
Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Angus et al. 
(2015) 
64 children with ASD 
59 boys 
Age: 6.2-12.8 years 
(M=9.3, SD=1.8) 
Full Scale IQ (FSIQ): 75-
145 
(M=103.6, SD=14.9) 
71 TD children 
67 boys 
Age: 6.5-12.2 
(M=9.3, SD=1.7) 
FSIQ: 70-139 
(M=104.0, SD=14.7) 
 
Social anticipation 
task 
 
Ideational fluency 
 
Storytelling 
Mixed No difference between groups in terms of ideational 
fluency or storytelling 
 
Ideational fluency and storytelling significantly 
positively correlated 
Children with ASD just as likely to guess age, gender 
and what the anticipated interviewer might ask them, 
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Matched on age and 
FSIQ 
but less likely to generate their own response; 
however, most children non-responsive in this task 
 
Theory of mind correlated with social anticipation 
performance in TD group only 
Crane et al. 
(2013) 
18  AS adults 
13 males 
Age M=40.12, 
SD=13.94y 
 
18 TD adults 
13 males 
Age M=44.8, SD=11.59 y 
Matched on age, 
gender, VIQ, PIQ and 
FIQ 
Sentence 
completion tasks 
for episodic future 
thinking (EFT) and 
episodic memory 
(EM) 
No No significant main effects on interactions in terms of 
group 
 
No correlation between EFT and EM in either group 
Hanson & 
Atance (2013) 
25 ASD children 
22 male 
Age: 3;2 – 8;3 y 
M=5;10 
Diagnoses: ASD (N=13), 
AS (N=1) PDD-NOS (N=7)  
25 TD children 
22 male 
M=4;10 y 
Matched on sex and MA 
Battery of EFT, EF, 
and theory of mind 
(ToM) tasks 
Mixed Children with ASD perform significantly worse than TD 
children on two EFT tasks, two ToM tasks and one EF 
task; no differences on others 
 
In children with ASD, children with lower EFT scores 
had lower ToM and EF scores 
Jackson & 
Atance (2008) 
12 ASD children: 
1 female 
Age: 4;8 - 13;1 y 
M=7;2, SD=2;4 
VMA=4;1 – 8;4 y 
M=5;11. SD=1;4 
 
12 TD children: 
1 female 
Age: 3;6 – 5;10 y 
M=4;9, SD=0;9  
VMA=4;3 – 8;5 y 
M=5;11, SD=1;4 
Matched on VMA 
Two self-based EFT 
tasks 
Two mechanical-
based EFT tasks 
 
 
Mixed Children with ASD showed worse performance on self-
based compared to mechanical-based EFT tasks 
 
TD children showed no differences 
Lind & Bowler 
(2010) 
14 ASD adults: 
3 female 
Age: 21-57 y 
M=41.38, SD=12.71 
VIQ=86-134 y 
M=107.86, SD=12.37 
14 TD adults: 
3 female 
Age: 23-57 y 
M=43.83, SD=10.39 
VIQ=82=134 y 
M=110.71, SD=15.75 
EM & EFT tasks  
 
Memory 
Characteristics 
Questionnaire 
 
Mixed Adults with ASD performed worse in EFT task than NT 
adults 
 
No group differences in terms of fluency 
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 Matched on gender, 
age, & VIQ 
Letter, category 
and ideational 
fluency 
EFT and EM significantly correlated in TD group but not 
ASD group 
 
EFT significantly correlated with imagination in the 
ADOS 
Lind et al. 
(2014) 
27 ASD adults 
21 male 
Age M=35.46, 
SD=13.23y  
 
29 NT adults 
22 male 
Age M=33.25, 
SD=16.15y 
Matched for age, verbal 
ability and NVA 
Scene construction 
task (including EFT 
and EM) 
 
Yes Adults with ASD performed worse than NT adults 
across all conditions of scene construction 
Lind et al. 
(2014) 
 
20 ASD children 
16 male 
Age: M=8.67 (SD=1.37) 
Diagnoses: AD (N=15); 
AS (N=5) 
20 TD children 
16 male 
Age: M=8.32 (SD=.91) 
Matched on: VIQ, NVIQ, 
Structural language 
ability, sex, age 
Event description 
(three conditions: 
EFT, EM and 
semantic event 
knowledge) 
Mixed No significant difference between groups in terms of 
specificity but children with ASD less accurate in terms 
of EFT, EM and semantic events – but not effect of 
condition or interactions 
 
No significant relationship between total RBS-R score 
and EFT in either group 
Marini et al. 
(2016) 
77 ASD children 
Age: 6-11.09 years 
M=8.11, SD=1.51 
77 TD children 
Age: 6-11.11 years 
M=8.23, SD=1.51 
Matched on age and IQ 
Two self-based EFT 
tasks 
Two mechanical-
based EFT tasks 
Mixed Children with ASD scored lower than participants with 
TD on both self- and mechanical-based tasks 
 
Both groups scored higher on mechanical- rather than 
self-based tasks 
Terrett et al. 
(2013) 
30 ASD children 
77% male 
Age: 8-12 y 
M=9.5, SD=1.31 
Diagnoses: AS (N=22), 
HFA (N=8) 
 
30 TD children 
70% male 
8-12 y 
M=9.73, SD=1.02 
Matched on age, FSIQ 
and VIQ 
Autobiographical 
Interview (EFT and 
EM) 
Mixed Children with ASD produced fewer internal details 
overall compared to the TD group and produced more 
external details than the TD group for past events but 
no difference in terms of the future 
 
In both groups EFT and EM significantly correlated 
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Counterfactual thinking 
Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Begeer et al. 
(2014)  
71 Children with ASD 
64 male 
Age: 6-12 years 
Diagnoses: PDD-NOS 
(N=45), AS (N=26) 
71 TD children 
67 male 
Age: 6-12 years 
Matched on gender, 
FSIQ, and age 
Emotional 
counterfactual 
reasoning tasks 
(upwards and 
downwards) 
Yes Children with ASD performed worse on the 
counterfactual reasoning tasks across all emotion 
conditions 
 
This difference was particularly marked for downwards 
reasoning (e.g. feeling regret, disappointment) 
 
Unlike for TD children, performance on second-order 
false belief tasks was not significantly related to 
counterfactual reasoning in children with ASD 
Begeer et al. 
(2009) 
 
72 HFA children 
65 male 
Age: 6-12 years 
71 TD children 
67 male 
Age: 6-12 years 
 
Matched on VIQ, FSIQ, 
gender and age 
Counterfactual 
antecedent story 
 
RAKIT idea 
production task 
Mixed Counterfactual reasoning: No main effect of groups, 
however, for children with ASD as age increased so did 
subtractive counterfactual reasoning but not additive 
reasoning, which relies more on creativity.  Opposite 
pattern for TD children 
 
Ideational fluency task: children with autism generated 
fewer ideas than TD children 
 
Ideational fluency was correlated with additive but not 
subtractive counterfactual reasoning 
Leevers & 
Harris (2000) 
16 ASD children 
13 male 
Age: 7,9-15,2 years 
M=11,2y SD=25m 
16 TD children 
6 male 
Age: 4,0-4,11 years 
M=4,5y SD=4.2m 
Matched on VMA 
Counterfactual 
reasoning task 
(Counterfactual 
only vs 
Counterfactual & 
Yes Effect of instruction strongest in TD group and weakest 
in ASD group 
 
Children with ASD displayed a yes response bias 
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16 ASD children 
10 male 
Age: 9,11-14,4 years 
M=11,7y SD=16m 
Matched on VMA and 
age 
imagery 
instructions) 
Children with ASD were not systematic in terms of their 
justifications to responses and performed around 
chance levels 
Morsanyi & 
Handley (2012) 
Experiment 1 
26 ASD children 
23 male 
Age: 11-16 years 
M=13y 3m  
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
25 ASD children 
22 male 
Age: 11-16 years 
M=14y 2m 
 
42 TD children 
19 male 
Age: 11-16 years 
M=13y 
 
 
 
 
49 TD children 
26 male 
Age: 11-16 years 
M=13y 10m 
 
Syllogistic 
reasoning tasks 
(both experiments) 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Experiment 1 
Children with ASD performed worse on the 
counterfactual reasoning task compared to TD 
children, not facilitated by use of fantasy context 
 
Not explained by ability to solve analogical reasoning 
problems 
 
Experiment 2 
Again, children with ASD performed worse on 
counterfactual reasoning task; this was not explained 
by inhibition or flexibility 
Peterson & 
Bowler (2000) 
36 ASD children 
Age: 44-216 months 
M=130.3, SD=42.0 
21 LD children 
Age: 125-220 months 
M=152, SD=26.4 
 
54 TD children 
Age: 38-68 months 
M=48.4, SD=6.2 
 
Both groups matched on 
MVA 
Subtractive 
reasoning and false 
belief tasks 
No Children with ASD performed worse on FB task 
compared to TD children, no difference between two 
clinical groups or between TD and LD children 
 
No difference between groups in terms of subtractive 
reasoning task 
 
Children with ASD or LD found subtractive reasoning 
task easier than false belief task   
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Scott et al. 
(1999) 
15 children with ASD 
Age: 7.9-18.0 y 
M=12.11, SD=35.7m 
VMA = 4-6 
M=4.7, SD=7.57m 
 
14 LD children: 
Age: 8.6-18.2y 
M=12.3, SD=36.28m 
VMA = 4-5 y 
M=4.6, SD=5.13m 
15 TD children: 
Age: 4.9-4.11 y 
M=4.10, SD=.743 m 
Counterfactual 
reasoning task 
(Counterfactual 
only vs 
Counterfactual & 
pretence) 
Mixed No main effect but significant interaction between 
group and condition: TD and LD children’s task 
performance was helped by inclusion of pretence, but 
ASD group’s was not 
 
Children with autism better than both control groups in 
terms of counterfactual reasoning only 
 
Children with autism performed poorly on the 
pretence questions 
Writing 
Authors ASD Sample Control Sample Imagination 
Measures 
ASD- specific 
Imagination 
Difficulty 
Key Findings 
Dillon & 
Underwood 
(2012) 
10 Children with ASD: 
9 boys 
Age M=8.96y, SD=1.28 
VMA M=8.4y, SD=3.56 
 
10 TD children 
6 boys 
Age M=8.6y, SD=.9 
VMA M=9.07y, SD=1.86 
Bubble Dialogue 
(Story-telling task) 
No No difference between groups in terms of narrative 
coherence or elaboration 
Dowker, 
Hermelin & 
Pring, 1991 
1 female poet with AS 1 NT female poet Definition of Words 
and UOT 
 
Thematic analysis 
of poems 
 
Structural analysis 
of poetic devices 
Mixed Poet with AS produced same number of responses on 
Definition of Words (fluency task) and UOT but these 
were more likely to be incorrect or idiosyncratic for 
poet with AS 
 
There were few differences between the poets in 
terms of poetic content and use of structural devices 
Kasirer & 
Mashal (2016) 
34 children with ASD 
29 boys, 5 girls 
Age 9-16 years 
39 TD children 
28 boys, 11 girls 
Age 10-15 years 
Metaphor 
comprehension 
 
Mixed TD children performed better than ASD children on 
conventional metaphor comprehension, but no 
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M=12.59, SD=1.92 
NVI 33.35 (SD=6.85) 
Hebrew naming 
M=44.56 (SD=2.57) 
Vocabulary M=45.62 
(SD= 7.05) 
Diagnoses: Autistic 
Disorder (AD; N=5); AS 
(N=7); PDD-NOS (N=22) 
M=12.26, SD=1.58 
NVI 31.85 (SD=6.57) 
Hebrew naming 
M=44.26 (SD=2.66) 
Vocabulary M=47.15 
(SD= 5.84) 
 
Groups matched on sex, 
age, NVI, naming and 
vocabulary 
Metaphor 
generation 
difference found for comprehension of novel 
metaphors 
 
TD children performed better than ASD children on 
conventional metaphor generation, but ASD children 
performed better in terms of generating novel 
metaphors 
Kasirer & 
Mashal 
(2014)
  
34 adults with High 
Functioning Autism 
(HFA) 
14 men; 3 women 
Age 18-27 years 
M=21.06, SD=3.44 
NVI M=38.8 (SD=4.13) 
Hebrew naming 46.47 
(SD=1.73) 
Vocabulary M=48.18 
(SD=6.46) 
 
17 NT adults 
8 men; 9 women 
Age 18-25 years 
M=22.71 (SD=2.02) 
NVI M=40.71 (SD=1.89) 
Hebrew naming 
M=46.71 (SD=1.82) 
Vocabulary M=55.82 
(SD=3.34) 
Matched on age, NVI 
and naming 
Metaphor 
comprehension 
Metaphor 
generation 
 
Creativity (using 
metaphor task) 
 
No Adults with ASD showed no difficulty in understanding 
metaphors  
 
Adults with ASD performed better in terms of 
generating metaphors and originality of metaphors 
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Appendix 2: Table of RRB factor analytic studies 
Table 8-2 Factor analytic studies of RRBs in ASD populations organised by number of factors identified (2[N=13], 3[N=3], 4[N=1] or 5[N=4]), along with studies assessing 
RRBs in TD populations 
Studies identifying two factors/components 
Authors Sample  Measure EFA/CFA/PCA Rotation Factors/components 
Bishop et al. (2006) N=830 
Age=15m-11y 
(M=58m; SD=29m) 
81% male 
Diagnoses=Autism, AS, 
PDD-NOS 
ADI-R PCA Oblique 
(Promax) 
Sensory motor behaviours 
Insistence on sameness and/or sensory aversions) 
Bishop et al. (2013) N=1825 
Age=4-18 years 
(M=8.9; SD=3.5) 
86% male 
Diagnoses=Autism, AS, 
PDD-NOS 
ADI-R PCA Oblique 
(Promax) 
RSM 
IS 
Carcani-Rathwell et al. 
(2006) 
N=621 
Age=1-18 years 
81% male 
Diagnoses=Pervasive 
developmental disorder 
(Childhood Autism, AA, 
AS, PDD-NOS) without LD, 
with LD, and LD only 
Maudsley 
Item Sheet 
CFA - Sensory/Motor Symptoms 
Cognitive Rigidity Symptoms 
Cuccaro et al. (2003) N=207 with autism 
Age= 29-254 months 
(M=108.7; SD=54.8) 
ADI-R PCA 
FA 
Oblique 
(Promax) 
RSM Actions 
Resistance to Change 
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74% Male 
Diagnosis=Autism 
Georgiades et al. (2010) N=205 
Age=2-48 years 
(M=11.5; SD=8) 
84% Males 
Diagnosis=ASD 
RBS-R EFA (principal axis) Orthogonal 
(Quartimax) 
Compulsive Ritualistic Sameness Restricted Behaviours 
Stereotyped Self-Injurious Behaviours 
Hanson et al. (2016) N=704 
Age=2-23 years 
72% Males 
Diagnosis=ASD without 
LD, ASD and LD, LD, TD 
BSIQ CFA - RSM 
IS 
Honey et al. (2012) N=180 
Age=37-192 months 
(M=45.53) 
48% Males 
Diagnoses=ASD 
RBQ EFA - Insistence on sameness/circumscribed interests 
Sensory/motor 
Hundley et al. (2016) N=332 
Age=2-17 years 
(M=6.15, SD=3.28) 
85% Males 
Diagnoses=ASD 
ADI-R CFA - RSM 
IS 
Lidstone, Uljarević et al. 
(2014) 
N=120 
Age=2-17 years 
92% Males 
Diagnosis=Autism, AS 
RBQ-2 PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSMB 
IS 
Mooney et al. (2009) N=137 
Age=20-55 months 
(M=38.59; SD=7.21) 
ADI-R EFA (maximum 
likelihood) 
Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
Lower-level factor 1 
Higher-level factor 2 
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83% males 
Diagnosis=AD, PDD-NOS, 
DD without PDD (N=61) 
Papageorgiou et al. (2008) N=153 
Age=19m-19y 
(M=71.56m; SD=39.65m) 
84% Males 
Diagnosis=Autism, AS, 
PDD-NOS 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSMB 
IS 
Richler et al. (2007) N=192 
Age=2 years 
Diagnosis=ASD (N=165), 
Non-spectrum DD (N=49), 
TD (N=65) 
ADI-R CFA - RSM 
IS 
Richler et al. (2010) N=214 
Age=2-9 years (4 cohorts) 
Diagnosis=ASD (N=165), 
Non-spectrum DD (N=49) 
ADI-R CFA - RSM 
IS 
Shao et al. (2003) N=221 
Age=3-21 years 
Diagnosis=AD 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSMB 
IS 
Smith et al. (2009)* N=245 
Age=5-21 years 
(M=9, SD=3.36) 
79% Male 
Diagnosis=ASD 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSMB 
IS 
Szatmari et al. (2006) N=339 
Age M=110.79m 
(SD=66.13m) 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSMB 
IS 
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80% Male 
Diagnosis=Autism, AS, AA, 
PDD-NOS 
Tao et al. (2016) Discovery dataset: 
N=1335 
Age=1-44 years 
(M=8.0, SD=4.87) 
79% Male 
Diagnosis=Autism, Not 
Quite Autism, Broad 
Spectrum 
Replication dataset: 
N=2588 
Age=1-108 years 
(M=821.46, SD=13.96) 
80% Male 
Diagnosis=Autism, ASD 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
RSM 
IS 
Studies identifying three factors/components 
Authors Sample Measure EFA/CFA/PCA Rotation Factors/components 
Honey et al. (2008) N=104 
Age=24-48months 
(M=37.05; SD=6.08) 
80% Males 
Diagnosis=Autism, ASD, 
Other (N=25) 
ADI-R PCA Oblique 
(Direct 
oblimin) 
Sensory Motor 
Resistance 
Interests 
Lam et al. (2008) N=316 
Age=20m-29y 
(M=9.02y; SD=6.15) 
83% Male 
Diagnosis=AD 
ADI-R PCA 
Comprehensive EFA 
Orthogonal 
(Varimax) and 
Target 
Repetitive Motor Behaviours 
IS 
Circumscribed Interests 
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Mirenda et al. (2010)* N=287 
Age=24-64 months 
(M=40.7; SD=9.3) 
84% Males 
Diagnosis=ASD 
RBS-R CFA - Compulsive Ritualistic Sameness Behaviours 
Self-Injurious Behaviours 
Restricted Stereotyped Behaviours 
Studies identifying four factors/components 
Authors Sample Measure EFA/CFA/PCA Rotation Factors/components 
Anagnostou et al. (2011) N=181 
Age=2-18 years 
(M=8; SD=5) 
83% Male 
Diagnosis= Autism 
Y-BOCS EFA (principal axis) 
CFA 
Orthogonal 
(Varimax) and 
oblique 
(Promax) 
Obsessions 
Higher-Order Repetitive Behaviours 
Lower-Order Repetitive Behaviours 
Hoarding 
Bourreau et al (2009) N=145 
Age=3-33 years 
(M=12.2, SD=7.3) 
74% Males 
Diagnoses=AD, PDD-NOS, 
AS 
RRB Scale PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
Sensorimotor stereotypies 
Reaction to change 
Restricted behaviours 
Modulation insufficiency 
Smith et al. (2009)* N=245 
Age=5-21 years 
(M=9, SD=3.36) 
79% Male 
Diagnosis=ASD 
ADI-R PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
Simple RSMB 
Complex RSMB 
IS 
Intense preoccupations 
Studies identifying five factors/components 
Authors Sample Measure EFA/CFA/PCA Rotation Factors/components 
Bishop et al. (2013) N=1825 
Age=4-18 years 
(M=8.9; SD=3.5) 
RBS-R EFA Oblique 
(Promax) 
Sensory-Motor 
Self-Injury 
Compulsive 
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86% male 
Diagnoses=Autism, AS, 
PDD-NOS 
Ritualistic/Sameness 
Restricted Interests 
Lam & Aman (2007) N=307 
Age=3-48 years 
(M=15.34; SD=9.6) 
Diagnosis=Autistic 
Disorder, AS, PDD-NOS  
RBS-R EFA (ordinary least 
squares) 
Orthogonal 
(Quartimax) 
Rituals/Sameness 
Self-Injurious Behaviour 
Stereotypic Behaviour 
Compulsive Behaviour 
Restricted Interests 
Mirenda et al. (2010)* N=287 
Age=24-64 months 
(M=40.7; SD=9.3) 
84% Males 
Diagnosis=ASD 
RBS-R CFA - Stereotyped Behaviours 
Self-Injurious Behaviours 
Compulsive Behaviours 
Ritualistic Sameness Behaviours 
Restricted Behaviours 
Scahill et al. (2014) N=229 
Age=4-17 years 
(M=7.8; SD=2.6) 
84% Males 
Diagnosis=AD, AS, PDD-
NOS 
CY-BOCS 
adapted for 
ASD 
PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax and 
Equimax) and 
Oblique 
(Promax) 
Hoarding and Ritualistic Behaviour 
Sensory/Motor and Arranging Behaviours 
IS and Self-Injurious Behaviours 
Stereotypy 
Restricted Interests 
Studies assessing TD children 
Authors Sample Measure EFA/CFA/PCA Rotation Factors/components 
Evans et al. (1999) N=1488 
Age=8-72 months 
48% Males 
Diagnosis=None 
CRI PCA 
CFA 
Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
Just Right 
Repetitive Behaviours 
Leekam et al. (2007) N=679 
Age=24-33 months 
(M=29.02; SD=2.09) 
51% Males 
Diagnosis=None 
RBQ-2 PCA Orthogonal 
(Varimax) 
Two factor model: 
Motor/Sensory/Behaviours 
Rigidity/Routines/Preoccupation with Restricted Interests 
Four factor model: 
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Repetitive motor movements 
Rigidity/adherence to routine 
Preoccupation with restricted patterns of interest 
Unusual sensory interest 
Wolff et al. (2016) N=914 
Age=17-27 months 
(M=19.7; SD=2.4) 
52% Males 
Diagnosis=None 
RBS-EC EFA 
CFA 
Oblique 
(Promax) 
Three factor model: 
Repetitive motor 
Ritual and routine 
Restricted behaviour 
Four factor model: 
Repetitive motor 
Ritual and routine 
Restricted behaviour 
Self-directed 
*Mirenda et al. (2010) used CFA to test six possible models, and identified two models as being the best fit depending on for what purpose the measure is to be used; 
Smith et al. (2009) conducted two PCAs, the second of which included the item verbal rituals and resulted in a four-factor solution. 
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Appendix 3: The Adult Repetitive Behaviours Questionnaire-2 
 
Do you like to arrange items in rows or patterns? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
 
Do you repetitively fiddle with items? (e.g. spin, twiddle, bang, tap, twist, or flick 
anything repeatedly? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
 
Do you spin yourself around and around? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
 
Do you rock backwards and forwards, or side to side, either when sitting or when 
standing? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
 
Do you pace or move around repetitively? (e.g. walk to and fro across a room, or 
around the same path in the garden?) 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
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Do you make repetitive hand and/or finger movements? (e.g. flap, wave, or flick 
your hands or fingers repetitively? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ One or more times daily 
☐ 15 or more times daily 
☐ 30 or more times daily 
 
Do you have a fascination with specific objects? (e.g. trains, road signs or other 
things?) 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
 
Do you like to look at objects from particular or unusual angles? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
 
Do you have a special interest in the smell of people or objects? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
 
Do you have a special interest in the feel of different surfaces? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
 
Do you have any special objects you like to carry around? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
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Do you collect or hoard items of any sort? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional 
☐ Marked or notable 
 
Do you insist on things at home remaining the same? (e.g. furniture staying in the 
same place, things being kept in certain places, or arranged in certain ways?) 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (does not affect others) 
☐ Marked or notable (occasionally affects others) 
☐ Serious or severe (affects others on a regular basis) 
 
Do you get upset about minor changes to objects? (e.g. flecks of dirt on your clothes, 
minor scratches on objects?) 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (does not affect others) 
☐ Marked or notable (occasionally affects others) 
☐ Serious or severe (affects others on a regular basis) 
 
Do you insist that aspects of daily routine must remain the same? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (does not affect others) 
☐ Marked or notable (occasionally affects others) 
☐ Serious or severe (affects others on a regular basis) 
 
Do you insist on doing things in a certain way or re-doing things until they are “just 
right”? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (does not affect others) 
☐ Marked or notable (occasionally affects others) 
☐ Serious or severe (affects others on a regular basis) 
 
Do you play the same music, game or video, or read the same book repeatedly? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (not entirely resistant to change or new things) 
☐ Marked or notable (will tolerate changes when necessary) 
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☐ Serious or severe (will not tolerate any changes) 
 
Do you insist on wearing the same clothes or refuse to wear new clothes? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (not entirely resistant to change or new things) 
☐ Marked or notable (will tolerate changes when necessary) 
☐ Serious or severe (will not tolerate any changes) 
 
Do you insist on eating the same foods, or a very small range of foods, at every 
meal? 
☐ Never or rarely 
☐ Mild or occasional (not entirely resistant to change or new things) 
☐ Marked or notable (will tolerate changes when necessary) 
☐ Serious or severe (will not tolerate any changes) 
 
What sort of activity will you choose if you are left to occupy yourself? 
☐ A range of different and flexible self-chosen activities 
☐ Some varied and flexible interests but commonly choose the same activities 
☐ Almost always choose from a restricted range of repetitive activities 
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Appendix 4: Breakdown of full sample from Chapter Three, Study 
Three 
 
 Initially, there were 2685 responses to the online survey as of the 8th October 
2015.  Of these, 92 were excluded for one of the following reasons: exact same 
response submitted twice, the participant was below the age of 18 years, or there was 
evidence of the participant not taking the survey seriously.  Table 8.3 overleaf shows 
the descriptive statistics for the remainder of the sample (N=2593).  For descriptive 
purposes, participants self-diagnosed as ASD are included with ASD.  Undergoing 
diagnosis or suspected ASD includes those who indicated they thought they might have 
ASD or are actively seeking a diagnosis.  Missing/unknown participants included those 
who did not report whether or not they had a diagnosis, as well as those who were not 
clear as to whether or not they had a diagnosis (e.g. some participants responded with 
I don’t know).  Participants had to clearly state they had no diagnosis to be coded 
under No diagnosis. When coding countries as Other, I first determined whether or not 
the national/official language of the country was English.  If it was English, I then coded 
them under Other (English-Speaking), along with participants who indicated they were 
ex-patriates of English-speaking countries.  If the official/national language was 
anything other than English I coded them under Other separated into broad global 
regions.
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Table 8-3 Descriptive statistics for full sample (N=2593) from Study Three, broken down by country/global region. 
Country N Age (years) Gender Diagnosis Ethnicity 
United Kingdom 783 18-69 
M=37.14 (SD=11.95) 
38.7% Male 
60.4% Female 
0.6% Non-Binary 
0.3% Missing 
36.1% No diagnosis 
45.2% ASD 
6.1% Other diagnosis 
3.2% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
9.3% Missing/Unknown 
92.6% White 
2.2% Mixed 
2.9% Asian 
0.8% Black 
1.3% Other 
0.3% Missing 
United States of America 623 18-77 
M=40.44 (SD=13.03) 
40.9% Male 
58.4% Female 
0.5% Non-Binary 
0.2% Missing 
32.6% No diagnosis 
46.5% ASD 
8.8% Other diagnosis 
3.0% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
9.0% Missing/Unknown 
84.3% White 
9.8% Mixed 
1.6% Asian 
2.6% Black 
1.3% Other 
0.5% Missing 
Brazil 722 18-71 
M=25.37 (SD=6.86) 
75.5% Male 
23.3% Female 
0.1% Non-Binary 
1.1% Missing 
37.5% No diagnosis 
26.3% ASD 
9.0% Other diagnosis 
3.2% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
24.0% Missing/Unknown 
50.4% White 
44.9% Mixed 
1.0% Asian 
2.5% Black 
0.4% Other 
0.8% Missing 
Australia 50 19-75 
M=40.30 (SD=13.97) 
34.0% Male 
66.0% Female 
 
30.0% No diagnosis 
56.0% ASD 
4.0% Other diagnosis 
8.0% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
2.0% Missing/Unknown 
78.0% White 
8.0% Mixed 
8.0% Asian 
2.0% Black 
2.0% Other 
2.0% Missing 
Canada 48 19-64 
M=37.67 (SD=11.83) 
37.5% Male 
60.4% Female 
2.1% Missing 
33.3% No diagnosis 
56.3% ASD 
6.3% Other diagnosis  
85.4% White 
4.2% Mixed 
8.3% Asian 
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4.2% Missing/Unknown 2.1% Missing 
New Zealand 19 24-53 
M=36.61 (SD=9.62) 
68.4% Male 
31.6% Female 
 
26.3% No diagnosis 
36.8% ASD 
5.3% Other diagnosis  
31.6% Missing/Unknown 
89.5% White 
10.5% Mixed 
Republic of Ireland 10 19-51 
M=35.70 (SD=10.79) 
30.0% Male 
70.0% Female 
 
30.0% No diagnosis 
50.0% ASD 
10.0% Other diagnosis 
10.0% Missing/Unknown 
80.0% White 
10.0% Mixed 
10.0% Asian 
South Africa 5 28-66 
M=43.20 (SD=14.74) 
20.0% Male 
80.0% Female 
60.0% No diagnosis 
20.0% ASD 
20.0% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
100.0% White 
Other/Ex-patriate (English 
speaking) 
15 19-62 
M=40.93 (SD=12.30) 
53.3% Male 
46.7% Female 
46.7% No diagnosis 
40.0% ASD 
13.3% Missing/Unknown 
66.7% White 
6.7% Mixed 
26.7% Black 
Other (Europe) 98 18-70 
M=36.86 (SD=12.49) 
51.0% Male 
49.0% Female 
33.7% No diagnosis 
42.9% ASD 
10.2% Other diagnosis 
3.1% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
10.2% Missing/Unknown 
89.8% White 
5.1% Mixed 
2.0% Asian 
2.0% Black 
1.0% Missing 
Other (South/East Asia) 22 18-69 
M=33.77 (SD=12.73) 
63.6% Male 
36.4% Female 
22.7% No diagnosis 
36.4% ASD 
13.6% Other diagnosis 
4.5% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
22.7% Missing/Unknown 
27.3% White 
13.6% Mixed 
45.5% Asian 
13.6% Other 
Other (Middle East Asia) 6 21-46 
M=32.17 (SD=9.41) 
66.7% Male 
33.3% Female 
16.7 No diagnosis 
50.0% ASD 
16.7% Other diagnosis 
16.7% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
33.3% White 
16.7% Mixed 
33.3% Asian 
16.7% Black 
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Other (The Americas, The 
Caribbean) 
5 24-29 
M=27.20 (SD=1.92) 
60.0% Male 
40.0% Female 
20.0% No diagnosis 
80.0% ASD 
20.0% White 
80.0% Mixed 
Missing/Unknown 187 18-62 
M=30.46 (SD=9.29) 
54.0% Male 
42.2% Female 
1.6% Non-Binary 
2.1% Missing 
45.5% No diagnosis 
33.2% ASD 
5.3% Other diagnosis 
1.6% Undergoing diagnosis or suspected ASD  
14.4% Missing/Unknown 
51.3% White 
18.7% Mixed 
3.2% Asian 
2.7% Black 
24.1% Missing 
  
 258 
 
Appendix 5: PCA solution for Chapter Three, Study Three 
following Varimax rotation 
Table 8-4 Study Three: The rotated component matrix for the PCA of the ASD sample, after Varimax 
rotation. 
 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Rotated item 
loadings: 
IS RMB RSB 
1. Arrange .303 .282 .394 
2. Fiddle  .121 .665 .117 
3. Spin  -.036 .604 .076 
4. Rock  .031 .683 .247 
5. Pace  .161 .643 -.055 
6. Hand/finger  .081 .574 .289 
7. Fascination .474 .247 .243 
8. Angles .207 .195 .573 
9. Smell .039 -.042 .757 
10. Feel .071 .193 .761 
11. Carry .311 .282 .490 
12. Collect .569 .164 .246 
13. Home  .745 -.084 .103 
14. Change .675 -.103 .270 
15. Routine .666 .124 .015 
16. Redoing .649 -.044 .182 
17. TV/Music .477 .378 .103 
18. Clothes .476 .395 .110 
19. Food .518 .179 -.094 
Percentage of 
variance explained: 
18.07 14.24 12.15 
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Appendix 6: Selecting between the two PCA solutions 
 
 This section describes the differences between Study One and Study Three PCA 
solutions of the RBQ-2A, in order to conclude which solution is more suitable to use for 
the analyses in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  The sample size of the Study Three PCA 
(N=275) gives it a clear methodological advantage over the smaller sample size of 
Study One (N=148).  Furthermore, in this thesis I examine the construct of RRB and its 
relationship to imagination within an autistic population and as such the PCA solution 
arising from ASD data may be more valid; we have seen from the differing solutions 
across Study One and Study Three how diagnosis may influence the structure of RRBs.  
However, if the RBQ-2A is to be used in a research setting it is important to understand 
its reliability and validity in an NT population. 
 A less subjective criterion for deciding on a PCA solution is to examine the 
reliability of each component. Since the first PCA yielded two components, and the 
second PCA yielded three, there are five potential components of the RBQ-2A.  Table 
8.5 below shows the internal consistency (measured by Cronbach’s alpha) and the 
mean inter-item correlation for each of the five possible components in the ASD 
sample (N=275). 
Table 8-5 The reliability (Cronbach’s alpha and mean inter-item correlation) for the Study Three ASD 
sample (N=275) across both factor solutions for the RBQ-2A. 
 IS (Study One) IS (Study 
Three) 
RMB (Study 
One) 
RMB (Study 
Three) 
RSB (Study 
Three) 
Cronbach’s alpha .76 .79 .71 .70 .67 
Mean inter-item 
correlation 
.30 .31 .29 .32 .34 
 
 In terms of internal consistency, there are only very small differences between 
the two IS components and the two RMB components; however, they are all 
acceptable.  Similarly, they all show moderate mean inter-item correlations.  Whereas 
the mean inter-item correlation for RSB is satisfactory, it is somewhat unacceptable in 
terms of internal consistency.  When combining the two components to create an 
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RSMB component, the internal consistency is improved (α=.75) but the mean inter-
item correlation is worsened (.25).  Field (2013) argues that mean inter-item 
correlation is more important when assessing the reliability of components.  On that 
basis, the second PCA shows a clear advantage in terms of component reliability.  
However, this is a somewhat circular examination of the components given that the 
second PCA was performed on these data.  Therefore the five components were also 
examined in the sample of Australian adults from Study Two, and the reliability of 
these are shown in Table 8.6 below. 
Table 8-6 The reliability (Cronbach’s alpha and mean inter-item correlation) for the Study Three ASD 
sample (N=275) across both factor solutions for the RBQ-2A. 
  IS (Study 
One) 
IS (Study 
Three) 
RMB (Study 
One) 
RMB (Study 
Three) 
RSB (Study 
Three) 
ASD Group Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.87 .89 .70 .71 .84 
 Mean 
inter-item 
correlation 
.47 .47 .32 .39 .56 
  IS (Study 
One) 
IS (Study 
Three) 
RMB (Study 
One) 
RMB (Study 
Three) 
RSB (Study 
Three) 
NT Group Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.55 .62 .65 .60 .68 
 Mean 
inter-item 
correlation 
.11 .15 .26 .28 .36 
 
 For the ASD group, the second PCA solution is more reliable (though by a small 
margin).  Notably for the ASD group the RSB component is actually the most reliable 
component in terms of mean inter-item correlation.  Neither solution is ideal in the NT 
group; however, the second IS component is marginally better than the first IS 
component, and the RMB components are roughly equivalent with each having an 
advantage on one of the indicators.  Again it is notable that RSB is the most internally 
consistent component for the NT group.
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Table 8-7 Comparison of PCA solutions for the RBQ-2/RBQ-2A across four studies. 
 Leekam et al. (2007) Lidstone, Uljarević et al. 
(2014) 
Study One (Barrett et al., 
2015) 
Study Three 
 RSMB IS RSMB IS RMB IS RMB RSB IS 
Variance  27.8% 11.2% 11.1% 29.2% 25.67% 10.16% 10.44% 7.32% 26.72% 
Cronbach’s α - - .79 .83 .78 .73 .70 .67 .79 
Mean I-IC - - .63 .67 .37 .25 .32 .34 .31 
Items loading onto equivalent components across studies 
2. Fiddle  .77 - .683 - .611 - .665 - - 
3. Spin  .66 - .639 - .713 - .627 - - 
4. Rock  .61 - .617 - .871 - .683 - - 
5. Pace  .75 - .697 - .718 - .655 - - 
6. Hand/finger .74 - .660 - .686 - .559 - - 
13. Home  - .72 - .777 - .702 - - .782 
14. Change - .65 - .716 - .695 - - .689 
15. Routine - .64 - .741 - .716 - - .687 
16. Redoing - .73 - .829 - .505 - - .666 
17. TV/Music - .56 - .594 - .507 - - .449 
18. Clothes* - .53 - .569 - - - - .445 
Items which do not always load onto a component across studies, but load onto equivalent components 
7. Fascination - - - .390 - - - - .442 
8. Angles** .53 - .571 - - - - .548 - 
10. Feel** .51 - .565 - - - - .764 - 
12. Collect - - - .579 - .503 - - .551 
Items which do not load onto equivalent components across studies 
1. Arrange .55 - - - .447 - - - - 
9. Smell .44 - - .484 - - - .791 - 
11. Carry - .38 - - - .424 - .437 - 
19. Food - .47 .447 - - .438 - - .539 
*This item was not included in Study One due to poor endorsement by the participants (>80% responded Never or rarely). 
**Both items loaded on to two components in Leekam et al.’s four-factor solution: unusual sensory interest and preoccupation with restricted patterns of 
interests. Since the latter falls under IS, these two items have been categorised as not always loading onto a component across studies, but loading onto 
equivalent components. 
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Table 8.7 on the previous page compares the solutions of Study One and Study 
Three with previous research (Leekam et al., 2007; Lidstone, Uljarević et al., 2014).  It 
should be noted that, as discussed in the previous chapters and literature review, 
Leekam et al. (2007) actually found support for both a two-factor solution and a four-
factor solution.  For the ease of reading and comparison, the two-factor solution from 
Leekam et al. has been used in the table, although the following discussion will take 
into account findings from the four-factor solution.  
 There are eleven items that, when entered into a PCA, always load in the same 
way.  Items 2-6 always load onto RSMB or RMB in across these studies; moreover in 
Leekam et al.’s (2007) four-factor solution, they formed their own component, 
repetitive motor movements.  This mirrors the RMB component in Study Three and can 
be considered a part of RSMB.  Items 13-18 always load on to the IS component and 
they loaded on to rigidity/adherence to routine in the four-factor solution, which can 
be considered a part of IS. Therefore we can be confident about the way in which 
these items are loading across different studies.  
 However, four items do not always load onto any component, but when they 
do they load onto equivalent components. For example, item 7 (fascination with 
specific objects) loaded on to IS in Lidstone, Uljarević et al.’s (2014) analysis and in 
Study Three, whereas it did not load at all in Leekam et al.’s (2007) analysis or Study 
One.  In Leekam et al.’s four-factor solution, item 7 loaded on to preoccupation with 
restricted patterns of interests.  There are also four items which do not always load 
onto equivalent components across studies. For example, item 1 (arranging objects) 
did not load in Lidstone, Uljarević et al.’s analysis or in Study Three, but it loaded onto 
RSMB in Leekam et al.’s two-factor solution and RMB in Study One.  However, item 1 
loaded on to preoccupation with restricted patterns of interests, in Leekam et al.’s 
four-factor solution. 
 It is notable that of the items that do not always load, or load in different ways, 
four of them are sensory items (items 7-10).  Moreover, item 11 (carry) loaded on to 
RSB in Study Three.  As discussed, it is not always clear whether a particular RRB is 
driven by insistence on sameness or the need for sensory feedback.  For example, 
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refusal to eat certain foods (item 19) may reflect a desire to maintain routine or it may 
reflect a disliking of certain tastes and textures.  The items which do not consistently 
load across studies may be too complex to definitively categorise as either RSMB or IS.  
Therefore, although most studies find support for a two-factor structure of RRB, a 
more complex structure may be closer to reality. 
 As summarised in Chapter 4 (page 130), the second PCA solution is more 
reliable in an independent sample and contains sensory items.  The second solution is 
also more similar to previous research; in particular compared to Lidstone, Uljarević et 
al. (2014).  Therefore I decided to analyse the sub-scales as identified by the second 
solution (Study Three, Chapter Three) in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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Appendix 7: The effect of age at diagnosis for Chapter Three 
 Two hundred and sixty-three participants in Study Three and Study Four 
reported their age at diagnosis.  Of these 63 (23.6%) were diagnosed as children (>18 
years) and 204 (76.4%) were diagnosed as adults (≥18 years).  There were no 
significant relationships between age at diagnosis and gender (χ2[2]=.33, p=.85) or 
pretend play (χ2[2]=.87, p=.65).  Participants diagnosed as adults were significantly 
older (M=40.01, SD=11.09; Md=41.0, IQR=18) than participants diagnosed as children 
(M=26.44, SD=9.80;Md=22.0, IQR=9;Z=-7.98, p<.001).  In addition, participants 
diagnosed as adults scored significantly higher on the AQ (M=39.65, SD=5.64; 
Md=40.0, IQR=9.0) than participants diagnosed as children (M=34.81, SD=5.14; 
Md=35.0, IQR=8.0; Z=-5.66, p<.001).  Table 8.8 below shows the means, SDs, medians 
and IQRs for the RBQ-2A and its subscales across both groups.  Those diagnosed as 
adults scored higher on the RBQ-2A (Z=-2.91, p=.004), IS (Z=-2.62, p=.009) and RSB (Z=-
2.47, p=.014) but not RMB (Z=-.36, p=.722). There were two outliers across the sample; 
however, removing these did not affect the pattern of analyses. 
Table 8-8 Means, SDs, medians and IQRs for the RBQ-2A total, IS, RMB and RSB scores by age of 
diagnosis 
 RBQ-2A IS RMB RSB 
 M (SD) Md 
(IQR) 
M (SD) Md 
(IQR) 
M (SD) Md 
(IQR) 
M (SD) Md 
(IQR) 
Child 2.10 
(.35) 
2.15 
(.50) 
2.32 
(.47) 
2.33 
(.78) 
1.94 
(.48) 
2.0 (.80) 1.80 
(.52) 
1.75 
(.75) 
Adult 2.25 
(.35) 
2.30 
(.50) 
2.50 
(.40) 
2.56 
(.56) 
1.96 
(.51) 
2.0 (.80) 1.99 
(.56) 
2.0 (1.0) 
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Appendix 8: The Adult Routines Inventory 
Everyone has certain habits, routines or preferences as part of their personality and 
behaviour.  We are interested in learning more about people’s individual habits and 
traits.  
Please read the items below and indicate the degree or frequency to which they 
apply to you or have applied to you in your adult life. 
 
 
 Not at 
all/Never 
A little/ 
Rarely 
Somewhat/ 
Sometimes 
Quite a 
lot/ 
Often 
Very 
much/ 
Always 
1 Do you prefer to do things in a 
particular order? 
     
2 Do you prefer to do things in a 
certain way? 
     
3 Are you attached to certain 
objects? 
     
4 Are you concerned with dirt, 
cleanliness, or neatness? 
     
5 Do you arrange objects or 
perform certain behaviours 
until they are "just right?" 
     
6 Do you like to eat your meals in 
a certain order or certain way? 
     
7 Do you have persistent habits? 
 
     
8 Do you prefer to have the items 
on the top of your desks, 
tables, or counters lined up in 
straight lines, or in patterns? 
     
9 Do you prefer to keep the same 
schedule or routine every day? 
     
10 Do you fiddle with objects (tap 
pens, rip labels on bottles, 
etc.)? 
     
11 Do you prefer to have certain 
belongings "in their place?" 
     
12 Are you a picky eater?      
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13 Do you twirl or play with your 
hair? 
     
14 Do you enjoy collecting things?      
15 Do you focus on details when 
doing a task? 
     
16 Do you clench/grind your teeth 
during the day or when 
sleeping? 
     
17 Do you notice imperfections in 
objects, like scratches on 
furniture, spots/stains, or frays 
on clothing, etc.? 
     
18 Do you prefer to finish one task 
before moving on to the next? 
     
 
 
Not at 
all/Never 
A little/ 
Rarely 
Somewhat/ 
Sometimes 
Quite a 
lot/ 
Often 
Very 
much/ 
Always 
19 Do you prepare for bedtime by 
engaging in a routine? 
     
20 Do you avoid eating certain 
foods because of their "feel" or 
texture? 
     
21 Do you lick your lips until they 
are chapped? 
     
22 Do things have to be "in their 
place" before you can get 
anything else done? 
     
23 Do you chew non-edible objects 
(like pens or any other 
objects)? 
     
24 Are you sensitive to loud 
noises? 
 
     
25 Do you fidget or bounce your 
legs when you are bored or 
anxious? 
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26 Are you sensitive to the ways 
that certain clothes feel? 
     
27 Do you notice when pictures on 
walls are not lined up, or are 
crooked? 
     
28 Do you feel you have to 
complete a task once you have 
started it? 
     
29 Does the sound of people 
eating bother you? 
     
30 Do you seem more aware of 
high-pitched noises than other 
people? 
     
31 Do you pick your skin? 
 
     
32 Are you aware of buzzing or 
other sounds that come from 
lights or electronics? 
     
33 Do you crack your joints 
(knuckles, neck, back, jaw, 
etc.)? 
     
34 Do you feel the urge to clear 
your throat even when you 
don't have a cold or allergies? 
     
35 Do you make odd sounds or 
noises? 
     
36 Are you bothered when objects 
seem not to be lined up evenly? 
     
37 Do you feel bothered if 
something disrupts your daily 
schedule or routine? 
     
38 Do you tend to tap your fingers 
when you feel stressed or 
bored or are trying to 
concentrate? 
     
 
 
Not at 
all/Never 
A little/ 
Rarely 
Somewhat/ 
Sometimes 
Quite a 
lot/ 
Often 
Very 
much/ 
Always 
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39 Do you like to have a sense of 
evenness or balance, so if 
something touches one side of 
your body you have the urge to 
have it touch the other side of 
your body? 
     
40 Do you bite your nails or skin 
on the fingers (cuticle)? 
     
41 Do you rock your body when 
you feel stressed, bored, or ill? 
     
42 Do you order the same meals 
when you go to a particular 
restaurant? 
     
43 Do you bite your lips/cheeks? 
 
     
44 Do you tug on your hair, 
eyelashes, or eyebrows? 
     
45 Do you like to go to new 
places? 
 
     
46 Do you feel the urge to do or 
say things a certain number of 
times? 
     
47 Are you fascinated with one 
subject or activity? 
     
48 Do you recite lines from 
movies, videos, TV shows, or 
commercials that you have 
heard before? 
     
49 Are you good at imitating 
sounds or others' voices? 
     
50 Do you need to know when 
future events are happening so 
that you can plan for them? 
     
51 Once something is done a 
certain way do you feel like it 
has to be done that way every 
time? 
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52 Do you insist that certain 
activities need to take place at 
a certain time? 
     
53 Do you like to try new things? 
 
     
54 Do you clean or straighten up 
your home or office even when 
there may be more important 
things to do at that time? 
     
55 Are there certain topics that, 
once you get started talking on 
them, it's difficult to stop? 
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Appendix 9: Instructions for the Personal Future Task 
"Now I'd like to ask you to think about things that might happen to you in the future.  I will give you 
different time periods in the future, one at a time, and I'd like you to try to think of things that might 
happen to you in those time periods.  This time, I will give you two minutes to try to think of as many 
things as you can.  It doesn't matter whether the things are trivial or important, just say what comes to 
mind.  But, they should be things that you think will definitely happen or are at least quite likely to 
happen.  If you can't think of anything or if you can't think of many things, that's fine, but just keep trying 
until the time limit is up. 
First I'm going to ask you to think of positive things in the future.  So, I'd like you to try to think of things 
that you are looking forward to, in other words, things that you will enjoy.  So, I want you to give me as 
many things as you can that you're looking forward to over the next week including today". 
(R gives one minute and writes down as close to verbatim as time allows what subject says) 
Now, I'd like you to do the same but this time I want you to give me things that you're looking forward to 
over the next week. 
(R does same as for one week) 
Now, I'd like you to do the same but this time I want you to give me things that you're looking forward to 
over the next five to ten years. 
(R does same as for previous) 
"Now, I'd like you to think of things that you're worried about or not looking forward to, in other words, 
things that you would rather not be the case or rather not happen.  So, I want you to give me as many 
things as you can that you're worried about or not looking forward to over the next week including 
today". 
(R does same as for previous ) 
"Now I want you to give me as many things as you can that you're worried about or not looking forward 
to over the next year" 
(R does same as for previous) 
Finally, I want you to give me as many things as you can that you're worried about or not looking 
forward to over the next five to ten years" 
(R does same as for previous) 
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Appendix 10: RRB items from the DISCO 
 
Table 8-9 DISCO items contributing to the DSM-5’s RRB algorithm, listed according to DISCO section. 
DISCO section Item DSM-5 algorithm 
Stereotyped Activities Unusual movements of hands or 
arms 
Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
 Complex movements Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
Responses to sensory 
stimuli 
Smelling objects or people Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Touching objects Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Repetitive, aimless manipulation of 
objects (not near eyes) 
Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Indifference to pain, heat, cold Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Distress caused by sounds Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Twisting hands or objects near eyes Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
 Interest in studying objects from 
different angles 
Hypo or hyper reactivity to 
sensory input 
Routines, resistance to 
change 
Collecting objects Highly restricted, fixated interests 
 Fascination with specific objects Highly restricted, fixated interests 
 Arranging objects Obsessive adherence to routines 
 Abstract property of objects Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
 Maintenance of sameness of 
environment 
Obsessive adherence to routines 
 Eats only a small range of foods Obsessive adherence to routines 
 Maintenance of sameness in routines Obsessive adherence to routines 
 Repetitive themes Obsessive adherence to routines 
 Activities related to special skills Highly restricted, fixated interests 
 Fascination with TV/DVDs Highly restricted, fixated interests 
Summary items Limited pattern of self-chosen 
activities 
Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
Methods used to 
communicate 
Delayed echolalia or repetitive use of 
words or phrases 
Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
 Tone of voice when using words, not 
babbling 
Stereotyped and repetitive 
speech, motor movements or use 
of objects 
Imaginative activities Repetitive acting out roles Obsessive adherence to routines 
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Appendix 11: Correlation analyses for Study Five 
 
Table 8-10 Study Five: Correlation coefficients, significance values and power for the association between 
anxiety and RRBs. 
 RBQ-2A Total RMB RSB IS 
HADS Anxiety 
(N=26) 
r=.31, p=.123 
Power=.36 
rs=.242, p=.233 
Power=.23 
r=.288, p=.154 
Power=.31 
rs=.286, p=.156 
Power=.31 
 
Table 8-11 Study Five: Correlation coefficients, significance values and power for the association between 
verbal fluency and RRBs. 
 IS RMB RSB 
FAS 
(N=26) 
rs=.377, p=.057 
Power=.26 
rs=.324, p=.106 
Power=.17 
r=.257, p=.205 
Power=.09 
CAT 
(N=26) 
rs=.137, p=.504 
Power=.03 
rs=.139, p=.497 
Power=.03 
r=.226, p=.267 
Power=.07 
 
Table 8-12 Study Five: Correlation coefficients, significance values and power for the association between 
the TTCT measures and RRBs. 
 IS RMB RSB 
IFT Fluency 
(N=23) 
rs=.34, p=.112 
Power=.14 
rs=-.099, p=.653 
Power=.02 
rs=.206, p=.346 
Power=.05 
IFT Originality 
(N=23) 
rs=-.101, p=.645 
Power=.02 
rs=.219, p=.315 
Power=.06 
r=.102, p=.642 
Power=.02 
RFT Fluency 
(N=23) 
rs=.158, p=.471 
Power=.03 
rs=.007, p=.974 
Power=.01 
r=-.25, p=.25 
Power=.08 
RFT Originality 
(N=22) 
rs=.112, p=.62 
Power=.02 
rs=.267, p=.229 
Power=.08 
r=-.034, p=.881 
Power=.01 
UUT Fluency 
(N=26) 
rs=.016, p=.937 
Power=.01 
rs=.126, p=.538 
Power=.03 
r=-.096, p=.642 
Power=.02 
UUT Originality 
(N=26) 
rs=-.171, p=.405 
Power=.04 
rs=.007, p=.972 
Power=.01 
r=-.429, p=.029 
Power=.37 
UUT Flexibility 
(N=26) 
rs=.014, p=.944 
Power=.01 
rs=.028, p=.891 
Power=.01 
r=.159, p=.438 
Power=.04 
 RFT Fluency UUT Fluency  
IFT Fluency rs=.275, p=.205 
Power=0.1 
(N=23) 
rs=-.086, p=.690 
Power=.02 
(N=24) 
 
RFT Fluency - r=.186, p=.384 
Power=.04 
(N=24) 
 
 RFT Originality UUT Originality  
IFT Originality r=.094, p=.669 
Power=.02 
(N=23) 
r=.372, p=.073 
Power=.22 
(N=24) 
 
UUT Originality r=.188, p=.391 
Power=.04 
(N=23) 
- 
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Table 8-13 Study Five: Correlation coefficients, significance values and power for the association between 
the PFT, RRBs, Anxiety and TTCT. 
 IS RMB RSB 
PFT Total 
(N=26) 
rs=.284, p=.160 
Power=.12 
rs=.093, p=.650 
Power=.02 
rs=.065, p=.753 
Power=.01 
PFT Positive 
(N=26) 
rs=.203, p=.321 
Power=.06 
rs=.019, p=.926 
Power=.01 
rs=.063, p=.760 
Power=.01 
PFT Negative 
(N=26) 
rs=.339, p=.09 
Power=.19 
rs=.198, p=.333 
Power=.05 
rs=.046, p=.825 
Power=.01 
 Anxiety (HADS)   
PFT Total 
(N=26) 
rs=.332, p=.097 
Power=.26 
  
PFT Positive 
(N=26) 
rs=.256, p=.206 
Power=.15 
  
PFT Negative 
(N=26) 
rs=.363, p=.068 
Power=.33 
  
 IFT Fluency RFT Fluency UUT Fluency 
PFT Total rs=-.045, p=.836 
Power=.01 
(N=24) 
rs=.262, p=.216 
Power=.09 
(N=24) 
rs=641, p<.001 
Power=.93 
(N=27) 
PFT Positive rs=-.078, p=.717 
Power=.01 
(N=24) 
rs=.17, p=.426 
Power=.04 
(N=24) 
rs=.497, p=.008 
Power=.58 
(N=27) 
PFT Negative rs=.034, p=.873 
Power=.01 
(N=24) 
rs=.348, p=.096 
Power=.19 
(N=24) 
rs=.675, p=<.001 
Power=.97 
(N=27) 
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Appendix 12: Imagination tasks and DISCO items for Study Five 
 
Table 8-14 Study Five: Correlations between DISCO imagination and other imagination tasks, and mean 
scores on imagination fluency measures in terms of scores on past pretend play measures 
 IFT Fluency RFT Fluency UUT Valid PFT Total  PFT Positive PFT 
Negative 
Imaginative 
activities 
rs= -.074, 
p=.715 
Power=.02 
rs= .235, 
p=.239 
Power=.11 
rs= .189, 
p=.345 
Power=.08 
rs=.098, 
p=.627 
Power=.03 
rs=-.027, 
p=.893 
Power=.014 
rs=.218, 
p=.274 
Power=.11 
Pretend play 
No (N=11) 6.64 (3.8) 9.09 (7.48) 15.18 (10.22) 36.27 (25.68) 21.36 (16.13) 14.91 
(13.04) 
Yes (N=16) 6.94 (2.91) 11.88 (7.42) 17.0 (7.62) 37.88 (20.4) 18.56 (9.67) 19.31 
(12.44) 
Shared pretend play 
Marked problem 
(N=6) 
6.83 (1.72) 10.33 (5.42) 18.5 (8.53) 49.83 (27.55) 24.0 (10.39) 25.83 
(18.42) 
Minor problem 
(N=7) 
6.14 (3.84) 11.86 (8.99) 16.57 (7.81) 33.57 (9.81) 17.71 (7.85) 15.86 (4.53) 
No problem 
(N=2) 
10.0 (.00) 17.0 (11.31) 15.5 (10.61) 26.5 (16.26) 10.0 (8.49) 16.5 (7.78) 
Repetitive pretend play 
Marked problem 
(N=9) 
7.11 (3.59) 11.89 (8.68) 13.89 (4.83) 31.67 (11.2) 16.78 (8.9) 14.89 (4.2) 
Minor problem 
(N=6) 
6.67 (2.16) 12.0 (6.69) 22.17 (9.24) 50.33 (26.83) 22.83 (10.38) 27.5 (17.41) 
 
 
 
